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Abstract 
This is an orthodox thesis in that it is a “book”. However, it is also the practice 
element of the PhD by part-practice; i.e. it is presented as the practice and the 
theoretical aspects of the PhD submission. In a sense, it stands for a thesis, in 
which instance it has become a “stereotypical” thesis, a “straw man” at which the 
theoretical arguments are launched. The written text describes itself as a self-
reflexive paradox, using the well known illusion of the duck-rabbit as an example 
of its undecidable nature. As a “test” for the representatives of the awarding 
institution the problem set is whether to regard the thesis as art-work or as 
theoretical exposition. In order to drive the point home a “version” of the thesis is 
presented with a spine binding on both ends thus making it impossible to open – 
literally, a “double-bind”. Much of the discussion is centred on current debates 
over whether “knowledge” can be extracted from art works — that is to say, 
knowledge that can be communicated and that could be called “reliable” as a 
pre-requisite for a PhD. The thesis argues that the available literature on the 
subject seems to be continually “in pursuit” of a satisfactory answer — a pursuit 
much like that in Lewis Carroll’s nonsense poem, The Hunting of the Snark. 
Interpretation of art works is the mainstay of this literature and it is the 
hermeneutical approach that is given most critical attention from a deconstructive 
angle. The ontological status of “art” is examined as a consequence of the 
Duchampian readymade, which is often overlooked as the transparency of art 
works is often assumed in order to “contain” subject-matter that “embodies” 
knowledge. This, the thesis argues is a non sequitur and only leads to a 
dissemination of possible, equally valid knowledge claims and is thus a specious 
epistemological enterprise. By enunciating the thesis as a work of art, there 
forms a duality of text and object/image where each reinforces the other at the 
same time as each cancels the other out. The text fictionalizes the art aspect and 
the art aspect objectifies the text into a kind of calligram. It is anticipated that 
claims for the irresolvable nature of the “pursuit” lead to a sense of the uncanny 
which is characterized by repetition (of themes that result in circular arguments) 
and disembodiment — separating knowledge from aesthetic judgement and 
separating textual theory from the readymade that calls itself a Thesis. 
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How to begin <?> 
Before the “introduction” to a work such as this, “it is 
customary” as Hegel says, “to preface a work with an 
explanation of the author’s aim, why he wrote the 
book, and the relationship in which he believes it to 
stand to other earlier or contemporary treatises on the 
same subject”. He then goes on to add that, “In the 
case of a philosophical work, however, such an 
explanation seems not only superfluous but, in view of 
the subject-matter, even inappropriate and 
misleading.”1 In Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s 
“Translator’s Preface” to Derrida’s Of Grammatology 
she echoes Hegel’s misgivings and the consequential 
response from Jean Hyppolite which goes as follows: 
 
When Hegel had finished the Phenomenology 
…he reflected retrospectively on his 
philosophic enterprise and wrote the “Preface”. 
… It is a strange demonstration, for he says 
above all, “Don’t take me seriously in a 
preface. The real philosophical work is what I 
have just written, The Philosophy of the Mind 
(sic). And if I speak to you outside of what I 
have written, these marginal comments cannot 
have the value of the work itself. … Don’t take 
a preface seriously. The preface announces a 
project and a project is nothing until it is 
realized.”2
An assumption is 
made when dealing 
with art works that 
allows so many 
things to be brought 
to light.- some 
attuned, pre-
established approach 
that hinges on 
“clues” to the 
“entry” of them, 
contextualizing 
them in order to 
speculate about 
them: to “feel” a 
way in.  
It “begins” with 
a statement 
about itself – a 
preface about 
“prefaces” and 
“introductions. 
Drawing 
attention to 
itself as a self-
referential 
artifice. 
Ultimately – this 
would require a 
“pre-preface” a 
spiral of infinite 
regression of 
prefaces. 
 
footer 
                                            
1 Georg F.W Hegel, “Preface: On Scientific Cognition”. Phenomenology of Spirit (Trans. Miller. A.V.) 
Oxford. Oxford University Press.1977 p.1 
2 Jean Hippolyte, “Structure du langage philosophique d’après la ‘Préface’ de la ‘Phénoménoligie de 
l’esprit’ de Hegel,” The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man: The Structuralist 
Controversy. R. Macksey and E. Donato (Eds.), Baltimore 1970. Translated in the same volume as 
“The Structure of Philosophic Language According to the ‘Preface’ to Hegel’s Phenomenology of the 
Mind” p. 159. Found in the preface p. x of Spivak’s translation of Derrida’s. Of Grammatology. 
Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press 1974. 
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As Spivak rightly points out, Hegel’s “Preface” was 
retrospectively written so that when we read what 
appears to come before there is a “tacit acceptance of 
a fiction” and that “We think of the Preface, however, 
not as a literary, but as an expository exercise. It 
‘involves a norm of truth,’ although it might well be the 
insertion of an obvious fiction into an ostensibly ‘true’ 
discourse.”3
Spivak adds to the point of her preface when she says 
that, 
  
Derrida suggests that a very significant part of 
Hegel’s work was but a play of prefaces. 
Whereas Hegel’s impatience with prefaces is 
based on philosophical grounds, his excuse for 
continuing to write them seems 
commonsensical: ‘Having in mind that the 
general idea of what is to be done, if it 
precedes the attempt to carry it out, facilitates 
the comprehension of this process, it is worth 
while to indicate here some rough idea of it, 
with the intention of eliminating at the same 
time certain forms whose habitual presence is 
a hindrance to philosophical knowledge. 4
 
She goes on to illustrate Hegel’s objection to prefaces 
as “preface/text = abstract generality/self-moving 
activity” and his acceptance of prefaces as 
“preface/text = signifier/signified” claiming the “=” as 
the Hegelian Aufhebung a word that signifies both 
“raising” and “lifting” as well as “suppression” and 
“abolition”. As she explains, “Aufhebung is a 
relationship between two terms where the second at 
Hegel’s 
dialectics 
is 
“restricted 
economy — 
what does 
Derrida do 
with the 
Aufhebung? 
                                            
3 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology. (G.C. Spivak. Translator’s Preface ) op. cit. p.x 
4 Ibid., p.xi 
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once annuls the first and lifts it up to a higher sphere 
of existence;…”5
 
In this preface, then, lies the nub of the enterprise 
which is to demonstrate that which explains the 
demonstration, or, conversely, to explain that which 
demonstrates the explanation — depending on 
whether the work is looked upon as art practice or a 
thesis. It unveils a practice that is simultaneously 
“research” and the annulment of itself as such. Its 
“contribution” to the enterprise of “practice-as-
research” in general seems to be ambiguous, that is 
to say it confirms the hiatus of the visual and the 
verbal, the creative and the critical. What is more 
significant and could be regarded as “new” (as a 
prerequisite for the PhD) are the possibilities inherent 
in the necessary fictions derived from such a denial of 
closure.  
In effect, this preface is one of many “frames” that 
enfold around the “work”. Derrida uses such terms as 
parergon and exergue to denote an “outside” of the 
work that is supplementary to it. He demonstrates how 
the “outside” becomes the “inside” and that there is 
never a definitive “norm” or resting place where ergon 
and parergon situate themselves. Such a dizzying 
enfolding is in danger of plummeting into the abyss. 
Derrida writes6: 
                                                                        
economise on the abyss: not only save oneself 
from falling into the bottomless depths by 
weaving and folding back the cloth to infinity, 
textual art of the reprise, multiplication of 
patches within patches, but also establish the 
                                            
5 Ibid., p.xi 
6 Derrida is here using the word “economy” in its original meaning of the “law of the home”. It is a way 
of staving off the “unhomely” (Ger. unheimlich — trans. as uncanny). The abyss is chaos; the home 
is where there is a sense of belonging/meaning. The domestic metaphors of cloth/textile/text, 
patching and weaving work towards repairing the gulfs and tears, But, as they mend, these patches 
or shards proliferate equally to an infinite degree — a chaos of their own making.  
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laws of reappropriation, formalize the rules 
which constrain the logic of the abyss and 
which shuttle between the economic and the 
aneconomic, the raising [la relève]* and the 
fall, the abyssal operation which can only work 
toward the relève and that in it which regularly 
produces collapse7
 
Stephen Barker comments on the above passage. 
 
The fall and the relève are both consummate 
transgressions, by which the law of genre, and 
thus of acculturation, is formed. In Derrida’s 
elliptical shard8, as he economises on the 
abyss, the fragment behaves as such: no 
grammatical sign to open, no period to close 
the period of its semantic passage: an imitative 
strategy of abyssal subversion. Thus is the 
shard, like fragmentarity itself, revealed as 
oxymoronic: as a parergon in the imperative 
voice; a parodic work outside the work 
operating, it seems, sui generis, within earshot 
of Blanchot’s noli me legere but reading 
nonetheless.9
 
Here, then is the preface that is both a question and 
an imperative, introducing a work that is not to be read 
but demands reading. 
 
 
 
                                            
7 Jacques Derrida (Trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod), The Truth in Painting. Chicago and 
London. The University of Chicago Press. 1987. p.37. 
* relève is Derrida’s translation of Hegel’s Aufhebung. 
8 The references are to the particular page layout of Derrida’s chapter on the Parergon  which 
demonstrates its meaning through fragmentary passages within/outside of special printer’s marks 
that act as “frames”. 
9 Stephen Barker, “Nietzsche/Derrida, Blanchot/Beckett: Fragmentary Progressions of the 
Unnamable.” Postmodern Culture vol.6 no.1 (September 1995). http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-
only/issue.995/barker.995 (accessed September 2009) 
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Introduction 
 
In the late 1960s when it became conventional 
to argue ad nauseam that anything at all could 
be called art, an obvious conclusion drawn in 
five minutes or so by some of us was “OK, let’s 
nominate-cum-appropriate-cum-declare the 
whole world as art and get on with something 
else”. That something else was going to have 
to be, among other things, finding conditions of 
exclusion. We could reflect upon art’s own 
surpassing.10
 
When Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, as Thierry de Duve 
puts it, “passed the test” of becoming an art object, it 
problematized the ontological condition of Art. It meant 
that anything could be art if called such, and this had 
severe repercussions for the meaning of art. It called 
into question “who” could make such declarations, and 
more importantly, make them stick! That is to say, 
which part of society would allow someone to do this 
kind of thing and acknowledge it as such for the rest of 
that particular culture? The question of what art “was”, 
problematical though it appeared, made way for a 
whole new cluster of approaches that overran the purist 
concerns for medium specificity crucial to Greenbergian 
modernist ideology. History has shown that the 
hybridization of forms since the 50s and 60s has 
become the “norm” and it is as though Duchamp’s test-
case was merely an early stylistic example that could 
be pluralistically subsumed under a genre. This idea of 
course serves the continuation of “art” for all who have 
vested interest in it and includes, besides artists 
themselves, all the organizations that disseminate art 
                                            
10 “Attributed” to Michael Baldwin in the quasi-Interview: Victorine Meurend with Art & Language, 
Installed in the Style of The Jackson Pollock Bar. 
http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&q=jackson+pollock+bar+interview+with+Victorine&btnG=Sear
ch&meta  (accessed July 2008) 
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including institutions of education and academia. In 
such a world, painting, sculpture and printmaking sit 
comfortably beside performance art, conceptual art and 
derivatives of the readymade. Art can now be thought 
of in terms of academic research and the PhD by part 
practice is, however uneasily, testament to its 
burgeoning status.  
Practice as research 
e.g. LUSAD models:  
 
Practice Based 
Key Points 
 
A balanced critical 
interrogation / historical 
contextualisation of a 
developing artwork-in-
progress 
60% Text based (50,000 
words) / 40% Artefact based 
Testing against known 
models / assumptions 
A mode of Pure Research 
A new theoretical / critical 
paradigm 
Practice Led 
Key Points 
 
A practically driven project 
involving a developing 
artwork-in-progress 
underpinned by a critically 
proven hypothesis by which 
the outcome might be 
evaluated 
60% Artefact based / 40% 
Text based (40,000 words) 
Testing the formation of 
meaning / creation of new 
meaning 
A Model of Applied Research 
A realisation of a creative 
‘solution’ 
Practice Integrated 
Key Points 
 
A cross-disciplinary 
interrogation of methodology / 
intention / materials in the 
service of artwork-in-progress 
30% Text based (20,000 
words) / 30% Report based 
(20,000 words) / 40% Artefact 
based 
Exploration / integration of 
critical / process based 
interfaces 
A Model of Developmental 
Research 
Insight into creative process / 
practice 
Practice Aligned 
Key Points 
 
An engagement with the 
infrastructural tenets which 
facilitate a methodology / 
hypothesis in creating an 
artwork-in-progress 
40% Report based (25,000 
words) / 30% Methodology 
based (15,000 words) / 30% 
Artefact based 
Material Investigation / 
Contextual production 
Investigative / Infrastructural 
New methods / models / 
techniques in practice 
 
What the above situation throws up is a double duality 
— the readymade that is both an object in the world 
and an object for contemplation as art; and practice-as-
research that relies on an “artefact” and a textual 
positioning of that practice. What this thesis-cum-
artwork proposes is a reinstatement of Duchamp’s test 
but situated within the confines of the PhD itself. 
Without overstating the obvious it might be useful to 
inquire what the conditions were that obtained during 
the famous debacle at the Society of Independent 
Artists Inc. exhibition of 1917: 
 
(I)f the hanging committee of the show at 
the Grand Central Palace consented to 
exhibit the gleaming object poking fun at 
them, they would have to call it art. If they 
were to pass the test, so would it. They 
didn't, as we shall see. But it did, and that's 
the irony of the joke. Who would dare deny, 
today, that Duchamp's urinal is art?11
 
It is a contention central to this thesis that to be able 
to accomplish the test, Duchamp had to act outside of 
the realm of art and in so doing relinquished the role 
of artist. His was best described as a second order 
position where “art” was something to be manipulated 
from outside and hence the nom de guerre, “R Mutt”. 
The initial problem, and indeed the real problem that 
What is the 
outside of art 
when Duchamp 
is already 
claiming the 
“outside” as art? 
— the origin of 
the double-bind. 
                                            
11 Thierry de Duve. Kant After Duchamp Ch.2 “Given the Richard Mutt Case”  Cambridge Mass. and 
London 1996 October Books The MIT Press pp. 91-92 
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still holds true is that it formed a double-bind for the 
institution that agreed to include any “artistic” 
contribution for the six dollar entry fee. The question 
simply put was, “Should it be exhibited?” — If yes, the 
institution would have been made to look foolish for 
displaying the urinal; if no, the institution would have 
been made to look foolish, reneging on its own 
asserted bylaws. By engaging in a practice that is 
chosen to be a meta-practice rather than an art 
practice the thesis is able to manipulate through 
(textual) reading. By asserting its prerogative as art 
work, it relinquishes the necessity to become anything 
other than fictional representation of an idea. It forms 
a double-bind with the institution on whose terms it 
has parasitically entered. 
Same 
question 
as “is it 
art? Or, 
a 
different 
question? 
The pre-condition 
is that it is art. A 
strange pre-
condition – as a 
pre-condition – a 
result of years of 
blague  and 
réclame.  For a 
fuller account see 
Jeffrey Weiss The 
Popular Culture of 
Modern Art: 
Picasso, Duchamp 
and Avant-
gardism, 1909-17, 
Yale University 
Press, 1994.
One major condition of the PhD is that it contributes to 
“new knowledge” of the specialist subject. New 
knowledge may not always be synonymous with 
encouragement; it may also be salutary by virtue of a 
sceptical assertion that a venture may be 
fundamentally flawed. New knowledge may be a new 
awareness of its absurdity, demonstrable and 
explicable through its own terms — reiterating its 
point. New knowledge like Occam’s razor may 
betoken the end of self-serving over sophistication.  It 
may well be that its contribution to new knowledge is 
to assert art practice to be redundant as a subject for 
the PhD, not as might be thought because of a lack of 
academic rigour, but because art itself has diversified 
into self-perpetuating tautology, driven more by 
economic than philosophical or aesthetic goals. Whilst 
the project has emerged from the disturbance caused 
by shifting the ontological nature of art, it has 
acknowledged that all questions concerning the 
potential of art practice lie within the culture of art, that 
is to say, within its social nexus. 
If a work of art can
contain knowledge 
how can it 
communicate that 
knowledge? 
Can a work 
of art 
“contain” 
knowledge? 
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When Charles Harrison writes about Modernism in 
two voices12 he separates one “voice” that valorizes 
creativity and intuition against the “critical”, with the 
other “voice” that: “perceives these distinctions and 
priorities not as true reflections of the nature of art but 
as forms of organization of the culture of art.” He 
further adds, “It takes the prising apart of the ‘creative’ 
and the ‘critical’ as a move to defeat the critical 
purport of art, and the privileging of practice over 
theory as a mystification of both.”13  
 The aim then, of this research-cum-art practice is to 
demonstrate and explain the unreliability of “art as 
such” within the realm of research: in effect removing 
the foundations of its initial enterprise. As a PhD 
submission its contribution to “new knowledge” will be 
to show that under certain conditions that are in 
themselves valid, art practice as research can 
become unstable and delocalized. It will argue against 
the description of “art” as necessarily hermeneutical, 
having a “subject” as a basis for research that is a 
posteriori declared to embed theory, and set in its 
place a practice that is concerned with its ontological 
basis and literally take on the form as research by 
virtue of a self-reflexive strategy that combines the 
two aspects to create a complexity that is both 
plausible and absurd. Like Duchamp’s “test” of 
whether an “art condition” can be proclaimed upon an 
object in the world, the intention is not only to declare 
the thesis a work of art, but to make a sound case to 
test the limits of the “art condition” as a thesis. 
“art as such” will be 
an assumed 
condition. What this 
eventually will mean 
for this thesis will be 
discussed in the 
following chapters. 
You will 
need a 
more 
complex 
definition 
of art 
than … 
Plausible, in that it 
fulfils the requirements 
for the PhD: absurd, in 
that it undermines its 
own integrity as a thesis 
“art condition” — 
a term used by 
Joseph Kosuth in 
order to extract a 
quintessence  that 
might be 
preserved  
The supporting arguments presented in this “art-work 
that explains itself” will draw on writers and thinkers 
who have influenced my position and generally reflect 
a dissensus, firstly with the language that is often 
                                            
12 Charles Harrison. Essays on Art & Language  Cambridge, Mass. and London. The MIT Press. 
2001 p.2 ff.   
13 Ibid., p.6 
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presumed to offer straightforward meaning, as 
criticized by Nietzsche as a “mobile army of 
metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms” and 
Derrida’s deconstructive approach of “dissemination” 
and the wordplay associated with its promiscuous 
etymologies; and secondly, with the institution(s) that 
confirm art status on the candidate — whether that be 
within education or the art world at large. The thesis 
will attempt to expose the antinomies within the 
language of research and the relationship with post-
Duchampian art strategies.  Wittgenstein, although 
coming from a different philosophical tradition, in later 
work such as Philosophical Investigations, was 
equally concerned with the way that the contextual 
use of language gives meaning: both he and the 
deconstructionists emphasise the uncertainty of “truth” 
as something signified by linguistic means alone. It is 
Niklas Luhmann who takes up ideas about the 
“institution” already begun by Wittgenstein adding the 
idea of autopoiesis — the sustainability of a self-
contained system that is to be found within the range 
of social systems including that of art and education. 
Luhmann’s description of institutions as social 
systems includes all the forms we use to declare 
something to be the case and are thus self-defined 
and self referenced. Such institutions as marriage, 
money, the law, etc. depend on social agreement and 
consensus but remain independent of each other’s 
terms of reference. In this way they allude to the 
original meaning of theoria, which, in the ancient 
Greek world referred to the public pronouncement of 
what we would now call “fact”. Wlad Godzich, in his 
“Foreword” to Paul de Man’s Resistance to Theory 
explains that deixis is the rhetorical equivalent of 
“pointing to” and declaring something to be the case. 
But language is 
self-defining. 
“Truth”, in this 
instance is self-
defined evidence — 
see below. 
But if language cannot 
exhibit truth — how 
can the statement 
that “language cannot 
exhibit truth” be 
true? 
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Deixis is the linguistic mechanism that permits 
the articulation … between the here and the 
there, the now and the then, the we and the 
you. It establishes the existence of an “out 
there” that is not an “over there” and thus it is 
fundamental to the theoretical enterprise.14
 
 Institutions act in a way that is self-replicating and self-
referencing and use language to define boundaries 
dividing what is “in” from what is “outside”. Concerns for 
the way that institutions use language to ascribe 
meaning are relevant to the way that the thesis is 
presented against the regulations of the PhD. 
Institutional rules are themselves subject to an 
ambivalency that is highlighted in David Bloor’s 
Wittgenstein: Rules and Institutions. On one hand, they 
define fairness in that all candidates will be treated 
equally, on the other; they are bound to restrict 
“practice” if it is their intention to uphold academic 
quality. The academicization of art that came about in 
the USA in the 50s has reached its apogee world-wide 
in the doctorate awarded for practice as research, and 
it is the hegemony of the academy that the thesis as 
artwork seeks to intervene in order to deconstruct it by 
turning its own terms back upon themselves to expose 
the conventions that their meanings rely upon. As the 
theory and practice can be thought of as equivalents to 
text and image, these seemingly opposing forces can 
be used in counterchange so that as Foucault would 
imagine there would be a “viewed” text and a “read” 
image. For such mental gymnastics to occur, the thesis 
will lay out possible scenarios such as those that 
scientists make when describing thought experiments. 
One such example which also comes through Foucault 
is the idea of the calligram. Typically, the calligram is a 
— In this sense it has 
to hide under the 
cloak of acceptability. 
It has to take on the 
guise of a 
stereotypical written 
thesis 
Art practice is surely 
open to many 
strategies for dealing 
with academic content. 
The term “Thesis” is a 
challenge to turn the 
whole idea on its head.  
                                            
14 Wlad Godzich, Foreword in Paul de Man. The Resistance to Theory, Minneapolis and London, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. xv  
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harmless game of making words form a picture, but 
what Foucault conjures up in his exposition of 
Magritte’s This is Not a Pipe is a monster with 
intricately tentacular signifiers. Now, one condition of 
the thesis is that it could be thought of as such a 
calligram whose shape is that of a thesis. Congruence 
of thesis as thesis and thesis as work of art practice is 
crucial to the ambiguity that disturbs the domesticity of 
institutional language. The thesis then should be seen 
as a critique of theoretical art practice — but critiqued 
as practice, and as such has to admit to being blind to 
itself. There is no escape from such an auto double-
bind as it is congruent with written description, whether 
this be autobiography, where the writer never achieves 
a “catching-up” of his/her actual existence (c.f. 
Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo — “becoming what one is”) or 
any “definitive” account — fictional or factional — 
rhetoric takes charge and language speaks itself 
beyond the rhetor. Fictionalization was the preserve of 
Marcel Broodthaers whose Musée d’Art Moderne, 
Département d’Aigles intervened on the institution that 
was the site of display. It was Broodthaers’ example in 
the use of strategies of inclusion and negation of an art 
condition (Fig.1) that initiated the form of this thesis.  
Domestic = canny = logic 
Uncanny = paradoxical = 
eternally unresolved 
The Institution — 
“home” of order 
When it is arguing a point it loses 
sight of its own whimsicality — it 
takes itself seriously. 
Where does the 
impulse to speak 
arise? Is it 
already written? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 This is not a work of art 
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By combining the Duchampian “this is a work of art” 
with the Magrittean “this is not a pipe” — where “pipe” 
may signify “art” just as easily — Broodthaers created 
an unresolvable condition when inserted into an 
institution that thrived on classification, and incidentally 
was brought to a form of conclusion in which the artist 
took part in an interview with a cat which went: 
 
 «(…)  —  Alors fermez les musées! Is this the reference 
to: “If a lion could 
talk, we could not 
understand him”? 
My edition is the 
50th Anniversary 
Commemorative 
Edition p. 190e
 
See 
Wittgen-
stein — 
Philosoph
ical 
Investiga
tions. 
P.223 
—   Miauw 
 — Ceci est une pipe. 
 — Miaouw 
 — Ceci n’est pas une pipe. 
 —   Miaouw (…)»15
 
It may be inferred by the lack of punctuation in the 
cat’s response that this could never be regarded as a 
language able to affirm or deny, and that the question 
of “pipeness” will forever remain open.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2 This is not a pipe 
 
 
 
Fig.3 This is a Pipe 
                                            
15 Marcel Broodthaers. Section Littéraire du Musée d’Art Moderne Département des Aigles —Ceci 
est une Pipe  Leuven, Belgium. Publication Merz. Luc Derycke & Co.Marot et Tijdsbeeld 2001 
(uncompleted project) 
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Broodthaers’ work in the 60s and early 70s was the 
starting point for this approach to the PhD. Practice 
initially consisted of conventional forms such as 
painting, drawing and three-dimensional pieces that 
would have another “layer” attached to them — 
whether by way of added information that deflected 
what seemed to be straightforward, or by selecting 
materials and subject matter that seemed incongruous 
(Figs. 4 and 5).  
 
Tak
por
Go
dea
Dr.
und
nom
gue
Rys
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
Fig. 4               Fig 5Embarking on the PhD provoked a reconsideration of 
these kinds of strategies within a more theoretical 
framework and the idea of making pieces as fictional 
projects within a totalizing meta-project were the 
outcome. However, it also became apparent that the 
problem arises with the “meta” status that it too is 
potentially subject to an infinitely regressive “meta-
meta …” status. There was something intriguing in 
this kind of situation that leant itself to such plays of 
deconstruction to be found in Derrida’s The Truth in 
Painting — particularly the idea of the “frame” and the 
inside/outside relationship and interchangeableness of 
the two. The culmination of the book of projects in 
2005 was an installation at LUSAD of the piecemeal 
fabrication of an “artist’s studio” that played on an idea 
that Daniel Buren had expounded in his 1979 essay 
en from a 
trait of van 
gh on his 
th bed by 
 Gachet 
er the 
 de 
rre: van 
sell 
Dürer’s 
Melecolia I 
hidden under 
gold metal foil 
with stencil of 
a fish sprayed 
in red 
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The Function of the Studio. The installation entitled, 
Exhibition, Artist’s Studio, No Entry, was a part-
performed demonstration of parallel worlds of the 
private space of the authentic artist and the public 
space of exhibition in which an “artist” was seen to be 
working as an actor playing a role. This idea could be 
further convoluted by considering the “acting” also as 
authentic. In order to keep the paradox at a distance, 
doors were barred to any audience who had to 
witness the progress via CCTV on a small monitor 
(Fig.6). 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 
 
 
 
Is the image a private 
space or, a public space?  
 Illustration to show 
that the event has 
“taken place”. What 
does “taken place” 
mean? Is this the 
place taken? 
 
 
 
 
 
 As a starting point for what was to develop as a 
distinct theme dealing with the creative paradox, 
chapter one of the thesis deals with the way such 
ideas have led to more complex manoeuvrings. The 
installation as video, and transferred to DVD recording 
is not only described in the chapter, but is itself part of 
the thesis via a spin-off quasi-theoretical exposition 
entitled Hapax consisting of a fictional interview in 
which the interviewer and interviewee reverse roles. 
Chapter one thus lays out the ground and main 
themes of duality, duplicity, parallelism, and paradox 
that will have further repercussions in later chapters 
and the practice-as-thesis as a whole. It might be 
argued that none of the “art works” actually 
materialized but were truly “fictionalized” and as such 
became art works by virtue of being included in this 
Thesis as a 
“stereotypical thesis” 
i.e. institutionally 
palatable. 
Terms that signify 
the uncanny 
It might be a well-
founded accusation 
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study of them as art works thus autopoietically 
manifesting themselves as autofiction.16
pter two surveys the ground for practice as research 
in academic papers, articles and books in their 
attempt to assert how art practice can be given 
“equivalence” to academic enquiry. The main criticism 
levelled at most of these is that they accept that art 
itself is an unproblematical means to a set of 
problems. It is the transparency of “art” in these 
descriptions that makes it seem banal such that there 
is an ironic distortion of Kantian sensus communis into 
“common sense”. Regarded as such “art” merely 
becomes a vehicle to illustrate ideas. The alternative 
view is laid out in chapter three whereby art itself is 
discussed as a post-Duchampian phenomenon that 
vied with modernism and affected resurgence in the 
1960s. A strong case is made for a robust 
appreciation of the conditions that attended this 
transformation that any application of the term “art 
practice” should acknowledge. Critical theory and 
deconstruction were contemporaneously part of that 
resurgence and affected a self-awareness of the 
practice itself, where “authorship” could be called into 
question, and the “location” of art might be immaterial 
or even fictional. Chapter three consolidates ideas 
from the previous chapter to espouse practice that is 
self-referential and interventional. Here the precedent 
of Broodthaers is highlighted together with other 
practitioners who have challenged the modes of 
representation and meaning within an institutional 
setting. In the final chapter the thesis describes itself 
as a work of art as well as being an academic study 
But the “canny” in 
extremis becomes 
uncanny. 
 
 
 
 
An attempt is made 
to show that art is a 
well-behaved 
model that exposes 
itself to scrutiny 
Academic papers that argue 
the case for art practice as 
legitimately valid for a PhD. 
How this is logically 
consequential and therefore 
“canny” 
…and it is no simple 
etymological 
coincidence that 
“authority” is gendered 
male, and westernized 
concepts as such could 
also be called into 
question 
                                            
16 Autofiction: a term coined by Serge Doubrovsky in literary criticism to describe “fictional 
autobiography” thus two conflicting genres. See also Joost de Bloois: “Introduction. The artist 
formerly known as … or, the loose end of conceptual art and the ‘possibilities of visual autofiction’ in 
Image [&] Narrative. [e-journal], 19  (2007) http://www.imageandnarrative.be/autofiction/debloois.htm 
(accessed May 2008) 
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and poses the ambiguity of reception similar to the 
bistable figure known as the duck-rabbit (Fig. 7).  
 
 
 
 
Fig.7 
 
 
 
 
 
The problem that has become a double-bind for the 
project itself is the one facing the conclusion. For if the 
project is to succeed, the outcome must be the 
attainment of a PhD, but if the criteria for academic 
success mean that there has to be closure, then the 
project could be seen to have failed. The demand for 
failure is therefore a prerequisite for the success as 
academic achievement. As such, “art practice” is a 
coerced collaboration (as distinct from co-option) 
between the candidate and the institution in the 
“making” of the work. 
A conceit – for 
otherwise, why 
would you have 
taken the trouble 
to write it? 
  ? 
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Chapter One: Studio 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Rob Ward, Studio as installation, LUSAD, 2005 
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Studio  
I have chosen the word “studio” (as a homophone of 
studeo)17 in the title of this chapter to reflect two senses 
of, “I study”, and the place where artists are supposed 
to initiate their ideas into visible form. It is the move 
from “workshop” to “studio” that placed the higher 
status of post Renaissance artists over the “artisan”. 
Albrecht Dürer’s allegory Melencolia I (1514) (Fig.9)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
typifies this shift and as the title suggests, it is not 
without certain misgivings. The artist has become a 
scholar and this attribute brings with it other demands 
and concerns that are beyond mere hand-work. Later, 
in Kant’s description of “art” versus “craft” in The 
Critique of Judgement18 he refers to the former as free 
art and the latter as mercenary art and finds the 
distinction being between pleasure for its own sake and 
labour for financial reward. Ultimately, what seems to 
make art Art, comes down to “spirit”, a transcendental 
ingredient invoking genius, a special quality that the 
best artists possess requiring that those who 
experience this quality should be able to recognize it. 
From this description and probable over-simplification 
there arise two features. The first is that art practice 
 
Fig. 9 
Melencolia is a 
life-size plaster 
mould taken from 
a sculpted clay 
figure of the 
character in the 
Dürer engraving. 
The mould is not 
intended for re-
casting as it is 
used to give the 
illusion of being 
convex rather 
than concave 
when raking light 
is shone across 
it. Thus 
Melencolia 
becomes an 
apparition – a 
void. 
 
Fig. 10  
Inspired by my first 
encounter with 
Dürer’s engraving I 
wanted to develop 
and extend work 
that pulls in two 
directions at once: 
creativity/sterility; 
light/dark; 
material/ephemeral; 
phenomenal/noume
nal; 
manual/conceptual;  
image/text; 
practice/research 
About Melancholia –
Panofsky says: 
In the miniatures and 
woodcuts of the 
fifteenth century the 
secondary figure is as 
sleepy and as slothful 
as the principal one, 
while Dürer’s 
engraving shows a 
deliberate contrast 
between the inaction 
of the Melancholia 
(sic), and the 
strenuous efforts of 
the scribbling putto.  
And, more important, 
the Melancholia is idle 
and the women in the 
earlier illustrations 
have abandoned their 
distaffs for entirely 
opposite reasons.  
These lowly creatures 
have gone to sleep out 
of sheer laziness.  The 
Melancholia, on the 
contrary, is what may 
be called super-
awake; her fixed stare 
is one of intent though 
fruitless searching.  
She is inactive not 
because she is too 
lazy to work but 
because work has 
become meaningless 
to her; her energy is 
paralysed not by sleep 
but by thought.  E. 
Panofsky— The Life 
and Art of Albrecht 
Dürer. Princeton 
University Press 1955. 
p.160 
 
Fig 10 
My Installation based 
on Melencolia at 
Longsides, Bretton 
Hall  has equivalence to knowledge, but that this 
                                            
17 Latin. Studium = Enthusiasm, zeal; studeo 1st. person singular = I study 
18 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement 1790 Trans. Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis / Cambridge, 
Hacket Publishing Company, 1987 “On Art in General” p.171 
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equivalence is un-knowable in the strict sense of the 
word. The second is the fact that art continues to exist 
and is appreciated shows that something passes 
between the creator and one who experiences the 
work. In times when art had boundaries defining its 
forms (say until the 1960s), restricting them to 
morphologies such as painting and sculpture, rules 
could be devised with general consensus that allowed 
for dialogue, including disagreement, and yet preserved 
the Kantian imperative for a sensus communis whilst 
acknowledging that there is no accounting for taste.  
This is undisputed. 
However, how is riding a 
bicycle to be 
communicated? We can 
show that it can be done. 
We can give instructions 
based on how our own 
experience has told us how 
we did it. We can write 
these down — but— the 
manipulation, the 
coordination of steering 
and balance etc. does not 
come about through that 
communication of 
knowledge but through 
sensations felt by the doer 
The cognitive dimension 
applies to many 
manipulative actions and 
activities. Take riding a 
bicycle — whilst not 
written knowledge, 
nevertheless, contains 
multiple aspects of “know-
how”!   
This coincides with the account of art as aesthetic as 
first expounded by Baumgarten19 and elaborated by 
Kant. That there could be an art without the aesthetic 
was tested by Duchamp, initiated as a “test” of the very 
conditions of art itself. The conditions that allow for the 
test to be passed should not go unnoticed because 
they affect the conditions for all subsequent art. To 
ignore this fact is to fall back into wishful thinking, as 
though a rearguard act could re-establish past historical 
circumstances. The readymade became art through the 
baptism of the institution of art. The recoil on the 
institution is that it is thrown into relief and has become 
self-conscious to the extent that it has often been seen 
to become the artefact rather than some kind of neutral 
ground effecting display. When this happens, the works 
of art displayed take on a “meta” significance. Daniel 
Buren wrote about the identicalness of all works of art 
under certain conditions in his 1979 essay The 
Function of the Studio. 
We can not ignore those 
things that have, as 
discoveries or inventions, 
impinged on our lives. 
Radioactivity and the 
atomic bomb can not be 
un-discovered or un-
invented. Likewise, the 
readymade has made 
such an impact on all of 
art in the Western 
tradition. 
 
The work that ends in the museum is forever 
both in its “place” and at the same time in a 
place” which is never its own. In “its place” as 
this was the aspiration when it was made, yet 
                                            
19 A.G. Baumgarten, Aesthetica 1750 
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it is never “its own” as the place has not been 
defined by the work that is situated there, nor 
has the work been made exactly as a function 
of a place that is necessarily, a priori 
concretely and practically unknown to it. For 
the work to be in place without being specially 
placed, it needs to be identical to all other 
existing works, which are identical among 
themselves, in which case it passes (and 
places itself) everywhere and anywhere (as do 
all the other identical works). 20
 
 
Fig 11 CCTV view 
 
The implication of the baptismal moment is one of 
creation at the very instant of display. Thus, an 
installation that is also called a “studio” (Fig. 11) may be 
seen as the enactment of that baptism. Should the 
studio, which by tradition has been a private space, 
distinct and introspective, be presented as an 
installation, it would become indistinguishable from the 
site of display. The problem, and indeed the resonance 
of such ambiguity are to be found in the oscillation of 
encounter.  
Firstly, there has to be an “adequately sensitive, 
adequately informed, spectator”, a term coined by 
                                            
20 Daniel Buren, “The Function of the Studio” originally published in French in Ragile, Paris vol. III 
September 1979 and in English in October 10, Autumn 1979 and republished in Claire Doherty. (Ed.) 
Contemporary Art From Studio to Situation, London, Black Dog Publishing, 2004. 
 22
Rob Ward: The Hunting of the Duckrabbit: In Pursuit of an Aesthetics of Knowledge. 
  
Richard Wollheim and taken up by Charles Harrison in 
his Essays on Art & Language21. This spectator, then, 
has to be aware, not only of what the art is about, but 
what the art is; that is to say, the conditions that make it 
so ontologically. Under conditions in which the studio 
becomes an installation, that is to say it is making itself 
— (paraphrasing Nietzsche) becoming what it is, certain 
speculations may reflect upon the nature of 
spectatorship and the mutable meanings of artwork and 
spectator. 
Ecce Homo (1888) 
In the studio-as-installation the artist is both “real” and 
acting the part of an artist. He is authentically creating 
and dissembling; acting out his act. Thus, everything in 
the studio is an empty sign as the nested space empties 
out its meaning. The artist is a ghost artist having neither 
actual body nor virtual body at any one moment. His 
actions are like the “asides” of the eiron — the ironic 
actor who “knows” more of what is “going on” on stage 
than his fellow actors — but of course this is equally an 
act to the audience. The artist is “present” twice at the 
same time — or nearly the same time. In another sense, 
he is absent twice! The work is uncanny — a curated 
studio consisting of a meta-collection of remnants and 
remains that the artist embodies. What then, is the 
spectator? As “observer” of either/or; either the art-work 
called Studio or a studio that happens to be presented 
as an art-work. The choice resembles that of seeing a 
duck or a rabbit in the well known optical illusion 
hybridized as the duckrabbit (Fig. 12). When one 
recognizes the “duck”, the “rabbit” disappears. When the 
Studio is a studio, it is private space and action within it 
is “authentic” and non-ironic; when it is perceived as an 
installation called Studio, irony intervenes as 
performance. The spectator who perceives him or 
Is this 
merely a 
conceit … 
persuasive 
rhetoric only 
in the 
reiteration? 
When the “division” 
is made - actor as 
actor / as character 
…doubly divided in 
the sense of the 
“theatre” – as ergon 
and parergon there 
is felt to be an 
instability. 
Ontologically, one 
catches out the 
other – returns it 
only to find that the 
“returning” 
expounds on the 
“other” 
                                            
21 Charles Harrison,  Essays on Art & Language, Cambridge Mass and London. The MIT Press 2001. 
The reference is to Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art. London, Thames and Hudson 1987 p.22  
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herself “entering into” the work will supplement the artist. 
If however, the mode is one of observation or critique, 
“regarding” will reflect an externalized “body”. If it is 
supplement it will disembody: if regarding it will embody 
conditions for the paradox to be re-stated. Both 
conditions are unstable and irreducible. The second 
condition may be thought of as the one taken up by the 
“Institution” whose representative may incorporate 
hermeneutical description. For Gadamer aesthetic 
hermeneutics relies on a subject. However, in this 
instance, such an approach is fraught with the perils of 
infinite regression and should be considered 
- the duckrabbit 
status of? 
a simple (psychological) ambiguity - it looks like this/means this/now it looks 
like this/means that - is not Barthes’ polysemy or Gadamer’s (fusion of) 
horizons, let alone Derrida’s differance  …  
the duckrabbit works in terms of resemblance…ideas/arguments do not…so the 
stuff on visual representation/verbal representation needs re-working - you 
can’t just transfer stuff over (as though it were a metaphor, of a metaphor)…  
Surely there’s more to the difference or relation between thesis and art 
practice than a simple ambiguity? 
If 
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Fig. 12 
ontologically as testing the limitations of a non-
hermeneutical approach, as there is in no real sense a 
subject to interpret, unless it is the subject of a subject: 
subjective-ness without subjectivity. It operates like a 
duckrabbit. 
The duckrabbit that began as a minor amusement in a 
popular German magazine22 was given serious 
consideration by the American psychologist Joseph 
Jastrow23 from whom Wittgenstein produced a more 
schematic form in his Philosophical Investigations24. 
The psychologist John F. Kihlstrom in an unpublished 
letter to Trends in the Cognitive Sciences states that 
the duckrabbit is not strictly speaking an illusion but 
rather “an ambiguous (or reversible, or bistable) 
                                            
22 Fliegende Blätter Munich, October 23 1892. p.147 
23 Joseph Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology, Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1900 
24 Ludwig Wittgenstein, (G.E.M.Anscombe Trans. 3rd Edition) Philosophical Investigations Oxford. 
Blackwell Publishing, 1953/2003. p.166. 
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figure”25, and goes on to explain the difference between 
the two. 
 
From a constructivist point of view, many 
illusions illustrate the role of unconscious 
inferences in perception, while the ambiguous 
figures illustrate the role of expectations, 
world-knowledge, and the direction of 
attention26. (My emphasis) 
 
Expectations, world-knowledge and direction of 
attention seem to be the very elements of Gadamer’s 
subject fields and historical horizons and it is these 
conditions that are thrown out of kilter. Wittgenstein 
writes in Philosophical Investigations emphasizing the 
temporality of perception: 
  
I am shewn a picture-rabbit and asked what it 
is; I say “It’s a rabbit”. Not “Now it’s a rabbit”. I 
am reporting my perception. — I am shewn the 
duck-rabbit and asked what it is; I may say “It’s 
a duck-rabbit”. But I may also react to the 
question quite differently. — The answer that it 
is a duck-rabbit is again the report of a 
perception; The answer “Now it’s a rabbit” is 
not. Had I replied “it’s a rabbit”, the ambiguity 
would have escaped me, and I should have 
been reporting my perception. … 
… “Now I am seeing this”. I might say (pointing 
to another picture, for example). This has the 
form of a report of a new perception. 
The expression of a change of aspect is the 
expression of a new perception and at the 
                                            
25 J.F.Kihlstrom, Joseph Jastrow and His Duck — Or Is It a Rabbit? 
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~kihlstrm/JastrowDuck.htm  p.1 (accessed November 2007) The 
quotation is acknowledged from Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose, & Gilsky 1992 Mental images can be 
ambiguous: Reconstruals and reference-frame reversals. Memory & Cognition, 20(2), pp.107-123 
26 Ibid.,, but with quotation from Long & Toppino. 2004 Enduring interest in perceptual ambiguity: 
lternating views of reversible figures. Psychological Bulletin  130, pp.748-768 A 
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same time of the perception’s being 
unchanged.27
 
When Arthur Danto describes works of art that display 
similar traits of ambiguity in The Body/Body 
Problem28, he cites examples such as Warhol’s Brillo 
Boxes (Fig.13) that are exact opposites to the 
readymade, having been fabricated to look like found 
objects.  
 
 
 
 
 
        
Fig. 13      Fig. 14         Fig.15 
What is more interesting to me is his description of 
visual congruence found in Johns’s Targets and Flags 
(Figs. 14 and 15) where the edges of the images are 
not depicted within an illusory pictorial boundary but 
reach an actual boundary of the edge of the picture. 
They become what they represent. He gives this a 
further twist by describing two hypothetical canvases: 
one in which, upon a white canvas, is painted the 
illusion of a white canvas (as if resting obliquely 
against a wall). On the second canvas, the painting is 
skewed round towards the observer so that the 
illusory canvas fits exactly onto the dimensions of 
actual physical canvas. Under the latter condition, he 
maintains that this is still a painting of and not identical 
to the unpainted primed canvas (Fig 16). 
The idea that a flag is a 
flag – not a picture of a 
flag: a target is a target 
— not an image of a 
target  
 
… but this is also true … 
  
 
                                            
27 Wittgenstein, op. cit. p.167 
28 Arthur C. Danto, The Body / Body Problem – Selected Essays Representational Properties and 
Mind / Body Identity. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press 1999, p.26 
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The absurdity of 
painting a white 
canvas as a 
“painting of” a 
painting may as 
well rest on the 
“empirical” 
painting: en 
plein air, of an 
Ideal image. 
(The white coat 
connotes a 
scientific 
approach as well 
as the “white 
robed” 
candidate.) 
 
Fig. 16 
Yes, as I said earlier, there 
were actual moments when I 
felt the divide: being the maker, 
becoming the spectator!  The 
first encounter was an 
aesthetic one.  That whiteness 
was seductive.  Those objects 
lying on the floor could for the 
best part only be guessed at as 
to their potential.  The folded 
easel may have been a 
giveaway to those familiar with 
painting. 
 
And you yourself, you were 
playing a part.  The white 
laboratory coat:  I suspect it 
wasn’t only intended to give 
visual consistency — rather to 
imply something like “an 
experiment”.  
 
Yes, provisionally, the lab coat 
distracts from the idea of 
“artist”.  Also there is the idea 
of the work waiting to be 
“signed” in order to come into 
being.  This is the hapax — the 
instance.  Now it awaits the 
institutional countersignature in 
order to be vouchsafed as art.  
It is as a candidate that I draw 
upon the etymology which 
means “white robed”. 
(Happax) 
 
 
“Out” of the studio 
There is an interesting question of what should come 
“out” of a “studio” that is itself a fictional entity. The 
answer must be that what is produced is necessarily 
metafictitious, that it continues a narrative that 
reasserts the origin of the disseminating studio. The 
artworks’ description thus testifies to their becoming 
art as in the follow-up to the Studio entitled Hapax a 
word taken from hapax legomenon meaning a word of 
which only one instance of use is recorded. This was 
to emphasize the restricted appearance as a quasi 
report and interview on the subject of the “studio”. 
Hapax begins with an “interview”, which is, in effect a 
re-establishing of the studio as description (ekphrasis) 
with equally ambiguous tones in that neither of the 
“characters” in the interview is identified and in fact 
the interrogator and interrogatee swap places part 
way through. Below is a section of the first part. 
Ironically enough, the 
“once happened” 
is now recorded, 
discussed, reviewed, 
published etc. so that 
it is in one sense to 
“happen” over and 
over again. 
 
Let’s get this straight before we begin: this is not a film, nor is it a structured video with a 
beginning, middle, end.  It’s surveillance — right? 
 
What happened happened, and that’s all there is to it. 
 
But there is a record of what happened? 
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All surveillance pre‐supposes recording.  Surveillance requires reconstructing events that 
led up to a certain point. 
 
But the recording is not the work of art? 
 
Nor is it the point.  Something happened once.  Recording is not anything except a record. 
 
Therefore it isn’t a medium? 
 
I believe it occupies a very odd place in that it educes mediation without rewarding 
expectation.  It requires attention without offering the lure of intentionality. 
 
Except that there is the lure of curiosity — and the frisson of voyeurism. 
 
Moment by moment — and boredom!  Most of the time the view is one of a static 
environment, both the “studio” and the model.  Even my actions are repetitious and 
forced. 
 
Your movements around the work — they were superfluous weren’t they?  After all, you 
could have made the piece and dismantled it in about half an hour.  Why spin it out for 
eight hours? 
 
That’s right, but it wouldn’t be surveillance!  Here, I think you have prised apart a little 
ambiguity; that in order to become surveillance, the subject must begin to look like he is 
unaware of the camera — even though he is the perpetrator of the surveillance.  The 
actions and movements are thus equally perplexing in that they are authentic when 
constructing or dismantling, but are ironic when such acts are posed for the consuming 
eye.  These modes work simultaneously, synchronically, not in series. 
 
A strange transformation, not altogether obvious, but when it becomes clearer it is as if 
you have become two personae — maker and spectator!  Maker and the maker of the 
maker! 
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What you describe is de facto the condition of the artist, isn’t it?  All I am doing is laying 
bare that by a kind of demonstration.   
 
Coming back to the use of the medium of CCTV; isn’t this a simple example of a formalist 
approach using the medium‐specificity of television? 
 
Kraus describes television and video as “Hydra‐headed” , and let me quote from her book 
A Voyage on the North Sea, “[it exists]in endlessly diverse forms, spaces and temporalities 
for which no single instance seems to provide a formal unity for the whole.  This is what 
Sam Weber has called television’s ‘constitutive heterogeneity,’ adding that ‘what is 
perhaps most difficult to keep in mind are the ways in which what we call television also 
and above all differs from itself.’”  She continues, “If modernist theory found itself 
defeated by such heterogeneity — which prevented it from conceptualizing video as 
medium — modernist, structuralist film was routed by video’s instant success as a practice.  
For, even if video had a distinct technical support — its own apparatus, so to speak — it 
occupied a kind of discursive chaos, a heterogeneity of activities that could not be 
theorized as coherent or conceived of as having something like an essence or unifying 
core.”i
 
You reiterate that you are dealing with something that is not a medium, and because of 
this, there is no structure, in a formalist, medium‐specific sense.  However, are you not 
exhibiting a modicum of bad faith?  For instance, The structuring of the event over two 
days of equal duration; the deliberate use of white on the first day, black on the second; 
construction with its counterpart of dismantling — all these suggest not only formalist 
intentions but a seduction by structuralist oppositions!29
 
(1 Rosalind Krauss. A Voyage on the North Sea.  Art in the Age of the Post‐Medium 
Condition.  London, Thames and Hudson 1999. p.31) 
 
Here, then is a staged interview with the supposed 
creator of Studio. The interview (subsequently a 
written report of an interview) genre can be seen to 
cross over into a “medium” for the purposes of 
fictionalization. The “nesting” of works within fictional 
                                            
29 See supplemental appendix on electronic copy for full version of Hapax 
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spaces creates a set of meta-subjects that emerge 
from Studio (as indeed such a nesting that is taking 
place within this chapter). A similar set of strategies is 
employed by the German conceptual art group known 
as “The Jackson Pollock Bar” (Fig 17), whose 
Interview: Victorine Meurend (sic) with Art & 
Language, Installed in the Style of The Jackson 
Pollock Bar30 consists not only of a quasi-interview, 
but can also be performed as “mimed” to “real” 
recorded voices of members of the symbiotically 
attached Art & Language conceptual art group.  
Victorine Meurent (1844 – 
1927) appears as the naked 
model in Manet’s Déjeuer sur 
l’herbe  and Olympia. She was a 
respected painter in her own 
right exhibiting a number of 
times at the Salon and on one 
occasion when Manet’s own 
submission was rejected. 
 
 
 
Fig 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The strange destabilizing effect is one that draws 
attention to itself and the link with the receiving 
audience that adds a challenging dynamic to the 
anticipated conventional interview. 
 
Book of projects 
Books can take on, in a retrospective way, similar 
roles to the studio and the sites of display. Exhibition 
catalogues, reviews and monographs containing 
illustrations of artists’ works sit alongside 
commentaries ranging from critical appraisal to 
autobiographical minutiae. As an analogy with the 
studio, the contents are captive and distant, merely 
                                            
30 The Jackson Pollock Bar: Theory installation at the Lisson Gallery December 13th 2002 
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potentially graspable. As sites of display, they narrate 
a purpose and supplement the main idea and subject. 
This dilemma is noticeable in Marcel Broodthaers’ 
assembled archive which he called Ma Collection, 
which hovered between reporting about and becoming 
an art work. As a precursor to Exhibition, Artist’s 
Studio, No Entry, my own Book of Projects contained 
some elements used for the installation (a miniature 
scale model of a (specifically) painter’s studio was one 
example that included a scale model of the Rietveld 
Blue and Red Chair (Fig 18); another such “studio” 
had a similarly scaled down model of the Breuer 
Wassily Club Chair No. B3 [Fig 19]).  
…the artwork becoming 
reports/journals about the 
artwork which itself 
becomes one of the 
artworks to be subsumed 
under… 
 
 
Two stereotypes of studios – one stereotype of a Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Book of Projects represented a fictional approach 
to the reporting of artworks, that was itself a liminal 
work of art. The “content” of the Book ranged from 
descriptions (with illustrations) of individual pieces 
such as paintings, and their situation within a context 
to more complex sub-projects such as Mumbo and 
Jumbo — a fictionalized interview with two portfolios, 
                 
 
Fig.18                                                                     Fig.19  And so you “constructed” a 
studio; a painter’s studio; a 
cliché of a painter’s studio with 
obligatory easel, table, palette 
and canvas — and a chair!  But 
not any old chair! 
 
No indeed, as old as the second 
decade of the twentieth century!   
 
The Rietveld “Red and Blue 
Chair” — in white of course!  
What was the purpose of this art 
historical reference? 
 
It set up another line of enquiry 
— references are good at doing 
that!   
 
What did it signify? 
 
It signified that signifiers only 
refer to other signifiers! (Happax) 
What was the 
purpose of 
this 
art/design 
historical 
reference? 
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and the Malevich Archive (Fig.20), a vitrine containing 
“artefacts” associated with the Suprematist painter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
Fig. 20 
These examples of reporting works were accompanied 
with “illustrations”. Other projects were ostensibly textual, 
though they strove to be autonomous rather than belong 
to any genre, for example, the short story. The work 
entitled Project IX TALKING ABOUT ART The Aporia of 
Emperors (Fig 21) 
Strategies 
of evasion. 
 
The text to be 
read or, the 
instance of the 
text to be 
viewed as an 
example of 
“text” – such as 
that to be read 
here 
This text as 
a work of art 
  
 
Fig. 21 32
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is such a “formless” form starting as a short story with 
added marginal commentary, it adds a further 
development of the commentary becoming an essay on 
the theme of deception (the Emperor’s New Clothes) 
and Platonic invisibility in the references to “Black 
Geometry (Malevich once again) White Writing”, 
“Ekphrastic Notice” and “Closed Book.” Textual works 
are at pains to explain themselves, but at some point 
they recognize their own susceptibility to paradoxical 
outcomes, a susceptibility that is associated with writing 
about writing, or writing per se. Papers given at 
conferences were admitted to the Projects as works of 
art as with the one given at Tate Liverpool 31 which 
bore the title “Evasive Display (it’s a fair co-opt!)” and 
began with: “If, with Duchampian aplomb, I were to 
declare the delivery of this paper as a work of art, 
would I be the one co-opting the institution?” Along 
similar lines was the paper “Studio as installation” given 
at Staffordshire University in February 2008 which has 
been incorporated into this chapter to be read and 
recognized as praxis that incorporates theory. 
White writing in 
this margin, for 
instance 
The proposed article 
(May 2010)   
“Master” (Stimmulus- 
Respond 
http://www.stimulusr
espond.com/) 
Becomes a quasi-
project that merely 
outlines what it 
would cover were it 
fully fleshed out. 
Even so, the “hints 
and clues” 
themselves point to 
tantalizing possible 
outcomes and 
directions that would 
come to fruition if 
there were a 
“mastery” of the 
means to bring them 
together…. 
Of course all that has been described relies on the 
agreement that such practice is what it says it is. 
Furthermore, it is important by whom this agreement 
is brokered. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, 
this approach could only have been considered with 
the precedent of Duchamp’s readymades. Their 
resonance only occurs within an institutional theory of 
art; that is to say, within a system that has had to tell 
its participants what art is before it can begin to 
develop what it encompasses. Arthur Danto’s artworld 
is one such attempt at a definition: “the artworld 
provides the theories of art which all members of the 
artworld tacitly assume in order for there to be objects 
…or, an admission of 
failure; or, a confidence 
trick; or, a ruse to alert 
the reader to the 
possibilities of either – a 
“mastery” of  légère de 
main. 
                                            
31 Rob Ward, Co-option, Co-operation, or Collaboration?  Art & institutions in Focus. Tate Liverpool 
2nd March 2006. (unpublished) 
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considered as art.”32 George Dickie’s 1974 attempt at 
constructing a social, contextual and relational 
definition of art could briefly be summed up as: a work 
of art is: 
  Such a theory or 
theories of art make art 
an activity like car-
maintenance, topiary, 
kite-flying, dog 
breeding … etc, etc. — 
which some would 
argue it now has 
become. 
 
 
As such, it is 
indistinguishable from 
“activity” — neither 
good nor bad – having 
no resonance 
 
 an (original) artefact; a set of the aspects of 
which has had conferred upon it the status of 
candidate for appreciation by some person or 
persons acting on behalf of a certain social 
institution (the artworld).33
 
The issue of “conferral” and “candidature” would seem 
problematic when one considers works of art such as 
those already within an art system where definitions of 
this kind do not arise, for example, the work of past 
“masters”. However, Dickie has to encompass the 
readymade in his all inclusive theory, and it is perhaps 
the idea of “conferral” that comes closest to how 
something becomes art. He makes another attempt at 
a broader definition in Art Circle: A Theory of Art,34 
which Danto criticises as weakening the original 
robustness of the definition. In one later version Dickie 
considers the artworld as “the totality of all artworld 
systems” which reminds one of the Russell paradox in 
which the set of all sets has to be and yet cannot be in 
a set of itself. In fact it is agued by De Duve that 
institutional theory pursues a circular argument when 
he writes: 
 
If you say that something has become art 
because it was placed in the art context of a 
                                            
32 Institutional Theory and the Artworld. 
http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/irvinem/visualarts/Institutional-theory-artworld.ht...  (accessed 
September 2008). See also Arthur Danto “The Artworld” Journal of Philosophy 1964. Compare for 
contrast of specifically “social” and “class” definitions. Howard Becker: Art Worlds Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1982 and Pierre Bourdieu: The Production of Belief  in The Field of 
Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature. Polity Press 1993 first published by Sage 
Publishing 1986.  
33 George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An institutional Analysis, New York Cornell UP 1974 p.464 
34 George Dickie, Art Circle: A Theory of Art Chicago, Spectrum Press 1997 
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museum or a gallery, you must admit that the 
context is artistic because it contains art. Or 
else it was instituted as art museum or art 
gallery on the basis of some other conception 
of what art is, and then it is not true that 
anything it contains and exhibits out of “habit” 
is art. In both cases, if your theory is true it is 
circular and if it isn’t circular it is false.35
 
 
 
The whole is needed 
to understand the 
parts 
  
You bring your 
preconceptions with you 
when you read this text 
This text 
You 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The parts are needed to 
understand the whole 
Whole 
Parts 
This text appears to you in a 
way that is modulated by 
your preconceptions 
 
 
 
Hermeneutic circles adapted from David Gamez, What We Can Never Know – Blind Spots in Philosophy and Science. 
London and New York, Contiuum, 2007  pp. 12 ‐ 13
 
 
The Studio as installation and the Book of Projects 
highlight a form of site specificity grounded on the 
institution in which they have been invited. They 
respond to Buren’s call for works to form a critique of 
the institution, which in my own instance, is the 
university rather than the museum. 
 
Whether the place in which the work is shown 
imprints and marks this work, whatever it may 
be, or whether the work itself is directly — 
consciously or not — produced for the 
Museum, any work presented in that 
                                            
35 Thierry de Duve, Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge Mass., and London, MIT Press 1996, p.93 
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framework, if it does not explicitly examine the 
influence of the framework upon itself, falls into 
the illusion of self-sufficiency — or idealism.36
 
 
 
Fig.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Buren’s work (Fig.22) is predicated on the compromise 
of art’s authenticity to the site where the famous “stripe” 
marks the artwork/institution dialectic. What Buren 
assumes in this practice is that critique can be levelled  
There can be no “neutral 
ground” from which a 
statement can distinguish 
clearly divided 
uncontaminated positions 
Buren is quite 
clear about this 
division 
from a position that distinguishes between artworks’ 
autonomy and institution, whereas the position itself is 
already marked such that the critique must also critique 
itself. Miwon Kwon states that site specific works that 
critique the institution:  
 
decode and/or recode the institutional 
conventions so as to expose their hidden 
operations — to reveal the ways in which 
institutions mold art’s meaning to modulate its 
cultural and economic value; to undercut the 
fallacy of art’s and institutions’ autonomy by 
making apparent their relationship to the 
broader socioeconomic and political 
processes of the day.37
 
                                            
36 Daniel Buren, “Functions of the Museum” Artforum, September, 1973, quoted in Miwon Kwon, One 
Place After Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity, Cambridge Mass., and London, MIT 
Press, 2002, pp.13-14 
37Miwon Kwon, One Place After Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity Cambridge Mass., 
and London, MIT Press, 2002. p.14 
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The emphasis here is on the mutual dependence of the 
two that effectively neutralizes the critique: 
The artist is now 
defined both in his 
place and in a place 
In this instance, the 
artist is no longer 
exiled in a place  
 
Typically, an artist (no longer a studio bound 
object maker: primarily working now on call) is 
invited by an art institution to produce a work 
specifically configured for the framework 
provided by the institution (in some cases the 
artist may solicit the institution with a 
proposal). Subsequently the artist enters into a 
contractual agreement with the host institution 
for the commission.38
 
In the case of Exhibition, Artist’s Studio, No Entry, 
there is complicity and duplicity working 
simultaneously that stands for the project “PhD by part 
practice” as a whole. Complicity binds the project to 
the institution where its success should be marked by 
the attainment of a PhD. Duplicity, as a form of 
deferred engagement should, on its own terms fail if 
institutionally endorsed. In this way, institutional 
critique is doubly bound to, and not merely insulated 
It has taken itself 
seriously and has 
“resolved the ambiguity 
— it would appear! The nature of the 
double-bind:  
Institution co-opts, 
Thesis fails 
Thesis succeeds, 
Institution fails to 
resolve from the work itself.  
The artist who extended Buren’s dichotomy of 
“authentic” studio space versus “inauthentic” 
exhibition space was Marcel Broodthaers in his 
Museé d’Art Moderne Département des Aigles, a 
fictional “museum-cum-gallery” that existed in various 
forms, inaugurated in 1968 (Section XIXe Siècle Rue 
de la Pépinière, Brussels — Broodthaers own abode) 
and disbanded after being installed as Section 
Publicité; Section d’Art Moderne and Musée d’Art 
Ancien, Galerie du XXe Siècle at Dokumenta V, at 
Kassel in 1972. This installation as museum of 
modern art demonstrated that the exposition would 
                                            
38Ibid., p.46  
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become the artwork, which begged the question of 
whether the exposition was, in this guise, “authentic”; 
or, was the authenticity (of the work as art) and the 
inauthenticity of the work (as the context as exhibition) 
fictional? 
 
Autofiction as a strategy of evasion 
THE TEXT 
WRITTEN BY 
ONE OF THOSE 
AVATARS 
It is at this point that it would appear relevant to 
introduce the idea of “visual autofiction” as a way of 
contextualizing this approach, lending it support as 
both a contemporary and significant way forward. 
“Autofiction” was a term coined by Serge Doubrovsky 
in the 1970s as a form of literary genre. It 
encompassed literary forms, ostensibly 
autobiographical, that place the “author” in a fictional 
“space”. Such “spaces” can become vertiginous 
through the proliferation of avatars that may transcend 
particular locations and occur in fictional timeframes 
such as flashbacks or imaginary scenarios described 
as if they were concurrent with the ongoing narrative. 
Joost de Bloois finds that the usage of the term and 
the situations it describes are not purely coincidental 
with what was happening in the art of the1970s and 
agues a case for its transference into art practice as 
“visual autofiction”: 
The text may be 
seen as a self-
effacing text  i.e, 
one that  
de-scribes itself 
 
Far from being the mere transposition of a 
literary genre to currents in visual art, “visual 
autofiction” forms a contemporary aesthetic 
stratagem that creatively appropriates 
conceptual art’s aporias.39
“visual”  - denotes that “art” 
is always in some way 
retinal. Whilst it serves de 
Bloois’ purpose to 
differentiate, it need not be 
re-attuned to a radically 
different set of practices 
 
Autofiction may be seen as a response to Buren’s 
dilemma, in that it can accommodate its own critical 
                                            
39 Joost de Bloois: The artist formerly known as … or, the loose end of conceptual art and the 
‘possibilities of visual autofiction’ in Image [&] Narrative. [e-journal], 19  (2007) Abstract p.1 
http://www.imageandnarrative.be/autofiction/debloois.htm  (accessed October 2008) 
 38
Rob Ward: The Hunting of the Duckrabbit: In Pursuit of an Aesthetics of Knowledge. 
  
moment as it critiques the “other”, as de Bloois 
continues: 
 
“Autofiction” coins no less than the artistic 
self as an instrument of critique: “autofiction” 
makes “critique” (be it historical or 
institutional) run parallel to investigations into 
imaginaries of the self.40
De-centring the voice of the 
author suggests another author 
who de-centres – regress – ad inf. 
 
When considered alongside the Book of Projects, 
visual autofiction is the mechanism that sets in motion 
a strategic plan: 
 
As Vincent Colonna, one of its specialists in 
the field of literary studies writes à propos 
“autofiction”: it has to be looked at as an 
agencement, as an assemblage of strategies 
that serve as so many answers to questions 
that are not confined to one particular 
medium or genre.41
 
Whilst the proliferation of fictionalized projects may 
appear disconnected in the Book, it is the very 
disjunction that throws into relief the act of discernment. 
This applies particularly to the “indexical trace” where 
something is metonymically, rather than metaphorically, 
transformed. Documentary “evidence” of a work’s 
existence is one such instance and de Bloois gives a 
reminder of this type of strategy in the work of Marcel 
Broodthaers (Fig.23),  
Only if one wishes to 
advance along a set of 
rules do we get “infinite 
regression”. What we are 
discussing here is the 
tacit acceptance of a 
fiction as a starting point 
to enable events to 
unfold. 
 
that, already within conceptualism, indicate(s) 
certain lines of flight, which will prove crucial 
for the very possibility of “visual autofiction”. In 
addition we will highlight the extent to which 
                                            
40 Ibid., p.2 
41 Ibid., p.3 
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conceptual art’s use of documentary 
photography, in relation to performance, 
announces autofictional strategies, as well as 
the importance of the notion of the “indexical 
trace” (already present in conceptual art) for 
the dominant stratagems in “visual 
autofiction”.42
Marcel Broodthaers, Ma 
Collection 
… Where a contract is at 
issue. 
 
Since I appear in this 
collection, which is also a 
selection from among the 
art catalogues of the past 
several years, it does not 
constitute a traditional 
readymade. 
 
But, if one accepts that the 
representation of my art 
carries with it a change of 
sense/non-sense, it would 
then be a new form of 
readymade, a baroque 
readymade. 
 
This dubious readymade 
would therefore be 
equivalent to a dubious 
work of art. How to market 
doubt if it does not have a 
clear artistic quality? 
Moreover, I do not have the 
nerve to speculate on Ma 
Collection, although with 
the money received I could 
relieve the misery that 
ravages the Indies, or even 
finance an avant-garde 
revolution. A contract, a 
good contract would get me 
out of trouble by aligning 
my interests with 
established customs. For 
further information, please 
contact … 
 
Personally, I would like to 
receive a tax (a royalty?) on 
the publications, if there are 
any, that reproduced my 
declaration and the images 
from this page of the 
catalogue of the Cologne 
71 fair 
 
However, should anyone 
still wish to own the 
physical object of Ma 
Collection, then the price 
would be up to my 
conscience (Price 
negotiable. 
© M. Broodthaers? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.23 
 
 
 
 
 
It is the limit of the indexical trace that marks out the 
route taken (and taken knowingly within a fictionalized 
space) and transforms it into theory. In this way de 
Bloois contends that such work opens up possibilities 
for further exploration.  
 
It is precisely the fact that artistic practice and 
theory keep crossing one another that 
provides “visual autofiction” as a concept with 
its heuristic potential.43
 
The point that I am attempting to establish is that only 
through a strategy of fictionalization or “visual 
                                            
42 Ibid., p.4 
? Broodthaers is here parodying the capitalist approach to fine art dealing in the form of readymade 
records of his art works as “a work of art” — a source of ever-increasing generation of wealth. 
43 Ibid., p.4 
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autofiction” can practice and theory really become 
congruent and that theory is practiced. Seen in this 
way the practicing of theory obviates the necessity for 
a “subject”.  
 
Authority, Authenticity and Authorship Etymologically already 
gendered masculine and 
authoritarian in its control of 
the text. 
The following section will look at how traditional 
concepts such as authorship and originality can be 
unravelled when the consequences of fictionalizing the 
“site” of display are extrapolated. Much of the following 
is well established in post-structuralist epistemology as You speak of the 
gendered title of “the 
Author”.  The concept 
can be interrogated as 
can “authority” — as that 
which authorizes — that 
which de-scribes the 
“Other”. a consequence of the way language is used, or, as a 
consequence of the way language uses us. Concepts 
like the author, and the individual creative artist can be 
manipulated to become “players”, who nevertheless 
play the roles of “author” and “creative artist”. In her 
book, One Place After Another: Site-Specific Art and 
Locational Identity, Miwon Kwon states: 
 
… (W)hat is the status of traditional aesthetic 
values such as originality, authenticity, and 
uniqueness in site-specific art, which always 
begins with the particular, local, unrepeatable 
preconditions of a site, however it is defined? 
Is the prevailing relegation of authorship to 
the conditions of the site, including 
collaborators and/or reader/viewers, a 
continuing Barthesian performance of the 
“death of the author” or a recasting of the 
centrality of the artist as a “silent” 
manager/director?44  
 
As a set of statements about a project, the thesis 
authorizes its legitimacy. The “author” of the thesis 
makes statements about a project to which the thesis 
                                            
44 Kwon, op. cit. p.31 
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itself is subjected.  The “author” is in this way a meta-
character described from “outside” — the outside in this 
instance being its reception within the institution. The 
“artist” as author is a fictional character, but there is a 
sense in which the “author” is present in the way he 
has negotiated entry into the candidature for a PhD at 
Loughborough University. Kwon’s generalized 
statement here highlights the particularities of how this 
“work” can be authenticated through the management 
of a role: 
All terms, “outside” / 
“inside” are ironical and 
are themselves subject 
to oscillation – as in 
Studio. 
 
Perhaps because of the absence of the artist 
from the physical manifestation of the work, 
the presence of the artist has become an 
absolute prerequisite for the 
execution/presentation of site-oriented 
projects. It is now the performative (original 
emphasis) aspect of an artist’s characteristic 
mode of operation (even when working in 
collaboration) that is repeated and circulated 
as a new art commodity, with the artist 
him/herself functioning as the primary vehicle 
for its verification, repetition, and circulation.45  
Here the artist 
relinquishes his traditional 
role. 
 
Kwon’s emphasis on the difference between non-
locational site specificity and traditional models of art’s 
reception is particularly relevant to this enterprise. Here 
the artist becomes the administrator of the totality of the 
work’s dimensions through social interaction rather 
than manipulation of media. 
 
Thus if Richard Serra could once distil the 
nature of artistic activities down to their 
elemental physical actions (to drop, to split, to 
roll to fold, to cut etc.), the situation now 
                                            
45 Ibid., p. 47 
 42
Rob Ward: The Hunting of the Duckrabbit: In Pursuit of an Aesthetics of Knowledge. 
  
demands a different set of verbs: to 
negotiate, to coordinate, to compromise, to 
research, to promote, to organize, to 
interview. This shift was forecast in 
conceptual art’s adoption of what Benjamin 
Buchloh has described as the “aesthetics of 
administration”.46  
 
This particular “site” that is being situated as it is being 
seen/read began as an application to do research and 
co-opt an institution into the project. Whilst the 
administration of the initial move was by the author, the 
terms on which a successful outcome would be 
achieved had to be devolved to the institution. Seen in 
this way there is a close tie of partnership that still 
retains a modicum of coercion on either side that has 
its equivalence in the dialectical exchanges within 
education. Kwon sees this kind of discursiveness as 
one such role for site specificity: 
 
… (T)he distinguishing characteristic of 
today’s site-orientated art is the way in which 
the art work’s relationship to the actuality of a 
location (as site) and the social conditions of 
the institutional frame (as site) are both 
subordinate to a discursively (original 
emphasis) determined site that is delineated 
as a field of knowledge, intellectual 
exchange, or cultural debate. Furthermore, 
unlike in previous models, this site is not 
defined as a precondition. Rather, it is 
generated by the work (often as “content”), 
and then verified by its convergence with an 
existing discursive formation.47  
In this instance, the “content” of 
the thesis of which this is part 
 
                                            
46 Ibid., p.51 
47 Ibid., p.26 
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The “work” that is presented as the practice is 
embedded in the text of this thesis and the 
supplementary exchanges that have taken place 
whilst the author has been engaged in the PhD. Self-
referentiality leads to a duality wherein the “authentic 
voice” merges into the “ironic voice”. Thus, an 
oscillation takes place depending on whether this, the 
text which is being read, is read as narration or as 
“artefacticity”. Such oscillation is symptomatic of the 
undecidable condition at any one moment. The 
narration itself, whilst describing the strategies 
adopted in the thesis, falls into the inevitable trap of 
failing to grasp an original intention. According to 
Roland Barthes, this is the inevitability of writing. 
The argument is 
attempting to establish 
“grounds” for a lack of 
any traditional 
foundation, be it 
“authenticity”, 
“originality” or 
logocentric 
“meaningfulness”. Of 
course, such a 
“grounding” is itself 
subject to the 
“logocentricity” of its own 
use of language. Any 
further attempt to refine 
it is equally doomed for 
the same reason. What 
prevents all from 
spiralling into the abyss 
are the parameters of 
the institution that the 
work of the “candidate” 
must test and abide by. 
That is, a rule of 
economy. 
What if none of the 
thesis made any 
sense; would it still be 
a work of art? We 
have said as much. Its 
content would be a 
parody of a thesis. 
Now consider if it did 
make sense…. Is there 
a remainder of the 
parodic in the text that 
pertains to the rule of 
economy? 
 
As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a 
view to acting directly on reality but 
intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of 
any function other than that of the very 
practice of the symbol itself, this 
disconnection occurs, the voice loses its 
origin, the author enters his own death, 
writing begins.48  
 
The limitless dissolution of the Author 
Paternity – seed –
dissemination – 
seme – semen 
An Author — etymologically derived from autor or 
auctor (a father) meant “to cause to grow”, or 
“increase” as in “augment” and implies “one who sets 
forth written statements” (1380).49 This is obviously 
the case for examination purposes of the 
philosophical content that is argued; as Barthes goes 
on to say: 
 
                                            
48 Roland Barthes (trans. Stephen Heath). The Death of the Author, Image Music Text, London, 
Fontana Press. 1977. p. 142 
49 From the Online Etymological Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?1=a  (accessed 
October 2008) 
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The Author, when believed in, is always 
conceived of as the past of his own book: 
book and author stand automatically on a 
single line divided into a before and an after. 
The Author is thought to nourish the book, 
which is to say that he exists before it, thinks, 
suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of 
antecedence to his work as a father to his 
child.50  
 
You speak of the Author 
dissolving entirely. How 
does this aspect of the 
voices of the Other fill the 
vacuum left by the 
dissolved Authorial 
presence? What fills this 
space is the voice that is 
feminine, the voice that 
is what has been 
referred to as the 
subaltern now speak on 
their own terms — no 
longer authorized to do 
so.  
His meaning behind such a “death” is twofold, in that 
not only are words themselves capable of creating as 
many signifieds as there are readers, but that texts 
are themselves always some form of plagiarism: 
 
We know now that a text is not a line of words 
releasing a single “theological” meaning (the 
“message” of Author-God) but a multi-
dimensional space in which a variety of 
writings, none of them original, blend and 
clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn 
from innumerable centres of culture.51
 
So that when the necessity arises for the text to be 
“given” an Author as when the thesis is a Thesis, a 
limit must be drawn that forecloses the enterprise as 
Barthes goes on to write (and here, perhaps “critic” 
may be substituted with “institution”): 
The dissolution of the 
Author thus unfetters 
those repressed voices 
now demanding to be 
heard. 
When authority is no longer, the 
body of the work de-genders 
 
Once the Author is removed, the claim to 
decipher a text becomes quite futile. To give 
a text an Author is to impose a limit on that 
text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close 
the writing. Such a conception suits criticism 
very well, the latter then allotting itself the 
                                            
50 Barthes  op. cit p.145 
51 Ibid., p.146 
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important task of discovering the Author … 
beneath the work: when the Author has been 
found, the text is “explained” — victory to the 
critic.52
 
Barthes’ does claim at the end of his essay that it is the 
“reader” who is able to continue the text by deferral and 
by allowing those signifieds to proliferate rather than 
atrophy. The supreme form of irony is “acting” where 
the understanding lies between author, actor, and 
audience: 
 
Recent research … has demonstrated the 
constitutively ambiguous nature of Greek 
tragedy, its texts being woven from words 
with double meanings that each character 
understands unilaterally; …there is, however, 
someone who understands each word in its 
duplicity and who, in addition, hears the very 
deafness of the characters speaking in front 
of him — this someone being precisely the 
reader …53  
 
In his essay “What is an Author?” Michel Foucault 
writes about the “author-function” as a process rather 
than an “identity” that valorises authenticity. His 
description of writing in this vein has close affinities 
with the fictional “maker” of the Studio. Such writing is: 
Or … yet another 
regimen? With its 
own tropes that 
allude/illude! 
So, has authenticity been re-
habilitated? 
 
… an interplay of signs regulated less by the 
content it signifies than by the very nature of 
the signifier. Moreover, it implies an action 
that is always testing the limits of its 
                                            
52 Ibid., p.147 
53 Ibid., p.148 
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regularity, transgressing and reversing an 
order that it accepts and manipulates.54  
 
Here are echoes of modernism in the testing of limits. 
The “modernist” connection is deliberate in that the 
enterprise of The Hunting of the Duckrabbit is 
basically transgressive. It evinces similar concerns 
about the precedence of the process over “subject” 
and would claim that the project (“writing” in 
Foucault’s case; “writing” and “making” in my own): 
So, that which transgresses the 
Author Function gives credibility 
and value to those who have 
hitherto been denied a voice that 
distinguishes itself, speaks its 
love, its dissent, its needs its 
desires These voices of the 
material world are voices that 
make things happen in ways that 
are ultra-aesthetic.  
 
 
 
This is a radical re-think of the 
role of narrative. 
 
 
 
 
Who has the “right “ to speak? 
 
 
“Does philosophy constitute itself 
in thinking of the poor? If so, can 
it ever refrain from thinking for 
them?” 
 
Editor’s Introduction p. ix in: 
 
Jacques Rancière, The 
Philosopher and His Poor. 
Raleigh-Durham, Duke University 
Press 2004 
 
… unfolds like a game that inevitably moves 
beyond its own rules and finally leaves them 
behind. Thus, the essential basis of this 
writing is not the exalted emotions related to 
the act of composition or the insertion of a 
subject (artefact) into language (world). 
Rather, it is primarily concerned with creating 
an opening where the writing (making) 
subject endlessly disappears.55 (My own 
substitutions in parentheses) 
 
“Endless” disappearance presupposes, at least, a 
momentary “reappearance” that fleetingly registers 
itself only to be transformed. The duckrabbit of the 
Studio and the thesis operate such worlds of 
fictionalized subjects — a self-imposed difficulty when 
submitting practice for academic assessment (it would 
probably be a unique event if the doctorate were 
awarded to a fictional character!) But, as Foucault 
continues: 
 
 
 
                                            
54 Michel Foucault, (Ed Donald F. Bouchard and Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon) 
“What is an Author?” from Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. 
Ithaca New York, Cornell University Press 1977. p.116 
55 Ibid., p.116 
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It is well known that in a novel narrated in the 
first person, neither the first person pronoun, 
the present indicative tense, nor for that 
matter, its signs of localization refer directly to 
the writer, either to the time when he wrote, 
or to the specific act of writing; rather, they 
stand for a “second self” whose similarity to 
the author is never fixed and undergoes 
considerable alteration within the course of a 
single book. It would be as false to seek the 
author in relation to the actual writer as to the 
fictional narrator; the “author-function” arises 
out of their scission — in the division and 
distance of the two. 
Here is a ghost thesis 
whose author and location 
are “elsewhere”: a void, 
an apparition where the 
white page is hollowed out 
by the black graphemes. 
In this instance, 
the author chooses  to 
disappear – thereby he is still 
an author. 
 
Such a description seemingly applies solely to 
“fictional” works so that in the case of the “thesis as 
Thesis” there is the opportunity to resolve the problem 
by differentiation. However, Foucault thinks such an 
application, however plausible, is misleading: 
 
 One might object that this phenomenon only 
applies to novels or poetry, to a context of 
“quasi-discourse”, but, in fact, all discourse 
that supports this “author-function” is 
characterized by this plurality of egos.56
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
56 Ibid., pp. 129-130 
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Aporias of practice by research 
 
 
Fig.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The poster in a limited edition 
consists of a blind embossed text on 
white hand‐made paper. Other text is 
hand written lightly in pencil 
 
 
 
 
This chapter began with the notion of a studio as a 
place of study. My installation Exhibition, Artist’s Studio, 
No Entry, (Fig.24) was an example of dislocating that 
“placeness” into a fictionalized “space” that could be 
said to take place as a thought experiment on the 
duality of maker/spectator, or maker/actor (eiron). The 
location of what should be called “practice” rather than 
“the work” shifted firstly, into text and thence into a 
performative aspect of negotiating strategies. What is 
being described here is in fact the making of the thesis 
as the practice, which may seem, on the face of it, fairly 
straightforward. But, as with all self-reflexive, self-
referential forms there are always problems with 
openings and closure. This locus is indeed a “place” 
where the verb “I study” happens. It happens 
simultaneously as research and autofiction in which 
either course is unsustainable in the other’s terms. 
What the studio has produced is a microcosm of what 
all practice as research stumbles over: namely, the 
incompatibility of fictional extension of factual 
Is the practice, 
then, the work that 
“goes into” the 
thesis, or, the 
Thesis itself? 
What is “contained in” is 
merely an aspect — say, duck.
Thesis as the work — rabbit 
 
— the work — ergon 
— Thesis — parergon 
— Or, a reversal of the two 
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discourse. One attempts to represent the other, and as 
Socrates tells Glaucon, “(W)e seem to be pretty well 
agreed that the artist knows little or nothing about the 
subjects he represents and that the art of 
representation is something that has no serious value 
…” 57
Whilst one can be certain that Plato and indeed 
Socrates did not have in mind the PhD by part practice, 
there are nevertheless, aporias that obtain through the 
incompatibility of certain definitions of “knowledge” and 
“creativity”. Much of the discussion on the subject to be 
found in academic papers and other literature is due to 
association and confusion of such terms with “science” 
and “expression”. Many of these will be examined and 
critiqued in the next chapter.  
It is the imperative of 
knowledge that IT IS 
UNDERSTOOD 
It is the nature of art to be 
misunderstood 
Returning to the duckrabbit and its pursuit: is there not 
something in common here with one of the Reverend 
Dodgson’s (or is it Lewis Carroll’s) elusive beasts — 
the Snark?58 The voyage towards its whereabouts is 
charted with a map that is “A perfect and absolute 
blank!” and its hybrid form, the Boojum causes its 
discoverer to disappear (Fig. 25). The “duck” (in 
Jastrow’s diagram) “looks” to the left, the “rabbit” to the 
right; it is a matter of a sense of direction that orientates 
the spectator as Deleuze comments in The Logic of 
Sense, 
 
For personal uncertainty is not a doubt 
foreign to what is happening, but rather an 
objective structure of the event itself, insofar 
as it moves in two directions at once, and 
insofar as it fragments the subject following 
this double direction. Paradox is initially that 
                                            
57 Plato, The Republic Part X [Book 10] Theory of Art (Trans. Desmond Lee) London, Penguin 
Classics 2007, p.344 
58 Lewis Carroll (with an introduction and notes by Martin Gardner), The Annotated Snark: The Full 
Text of Lewis Carroll’s Great Nonsense Epic The Hunting of the Snark. Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books 1973. 
 50
Rob Ward: The Hunting of the Duckrabbit: In Pursuit of an Aesthetics of Knowledge. 
  
which destroys good sense as the only 
direction, but it is also that which destroys 
common sense as the assignation of fixed 
identities. 59
Fit the Eighth 
The Vanishing 
They sought it with thimbles, they sought it 
with care; 
They pursued it with forks and hope;  
They threatened its life with a railway-share; 
They charmed it with smiles and soap.  
They shuddered to think that the chase might 
fail, 
And the Beaver, excited at last,  
Went bounding along on the tip of its tail, 
For the daylight was nearly past.  
“There is Thingumbob shouting!” the Bellman
said, 
“He is shouting like mad, only hark!  
He is waving his hands, he is wagging his 
head, 
He has certainly found a Snark!”  
They gazed in delight, while the Butcher 
exclaimed 
“He was always a desperate wag!”  
They beheld him — their Baker — their hero 
unnamed — 
On the top of a neighbouring crag.  
Erect and sublime, for one moment of time. 
In the next, that wild figure they saw  
(As if stung by a spasm) plunge into a chasm, 
While they waited and listened in awe.  
“It’s a Snark!” was the sound that first came to
their ears, 
And seemed almost too good to be true.  
Then followed a torrent of laughter and 
cheers: 
Then the ominous words “It’s a Boo-”  
Then, silence. Some fancied they heard in the 
air 
A weary and wandering sigh  
That sounded like “-jum!” but the others 
declare 
It was only a breeze that went by.  
They hunted till darkness came on, but they 
found 
Not a button, or feather, or mark,  
By which they could tell that they stood on the
ground 
Where the Baker had met with the Snark.  
In the midst of the word he was trying to say, 
In the midst of his laughter and glee,  
He had softly and suddenly vanished away — 
For the Snark  was a Boojum, you see. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In practice as research, the “scientific” and the 
“expressive” appear to point in different directions. 
However, it would be well to consider scientific 
research as having its own methodological 
assumptions revised. This is relevant to critics of the 
practice-based PhD who wish to retain “hard” research 
of the scientific kind. Thomas S. Kuhn60 describes 
scientific revolutions in terms of changes of paradigms 
such as the big shifts from Aristotelian to Newtonian to 
Einsteinian physics. Paradigms are something like 
“world views” that bring with them their own “rules”. 
However, such rules need not have consistency or 
even relevance across the fields within such a 
paradigm, as Kuhn remarks: 
                                            
59 Gilles Deleuze, (Trans Mark Lester with Charles Stivale) The Logic of Sense, London, New York, 
Continuum, 2004. p. 5. The “Sense” here is manifold and is used deliberately in the original French 
“sens” to mean “direction” as well as “common sense”, or “sensibility”. 
60 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd Edition, Chicago and London, The 
University of Chicago Press.  
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Scientists can agree that a Newton, 
Lavoisier, Maxwell, or Einstein has produced 
an apparently permanent solution to a group 
of outstanding problems and still disagree, 
sometimes without being aware of it, about 
the particular abstract characteristics that 
make those solutions permanent. They can, 
that is, agree in their identification of a 
paradigm without agreeing on, or even 
attempting to produce, a full interpretation or 
rationalization of it (all italics in the original).61
 
However, such disagreement does not necessitate the 
imposition of a “standard” set of rules as Kuhn goes 
on to claim: “Lack of a standard interpretation or of an 
agreed reduction to rules will not prevent a paradigm 
from guiding research.” and even: “Indeed, the 
existence of a paradigm need not even imply that any 
full set of rules exists.” 62 The move from the purely 
academic doctorate to one that introduced “soft” forms 
of “apprehension” could mark such a paradigm shift in 
attitudes to research with all its concomitant anxieties 
about rules and standards that Kuhn recognises as 
symptomatic. 
Is the doctorate 
being eroded 
academically by 
the introduction of 
the artefact? 
Is there a “proper 
anxiety”? — see F. 
Candlin in Ch. 4 
“Thesis” p.141 
 
Normal science can proceed without rules 
only so long as the relevant scientific 
community accepts without question the 
particular problem-solutions already 
achieved. Rules should therefore become 
important and the characteristic unconcern 
about them should vanish whenever 
paradigms or models are felt to be insecure. 
That is, moreover, exactly what does occur. 
See also p.89 on “stable 
communities within the 
artworld 
                                            
61 Ibid., p.44 
62 Ibid., p.44 
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The paradigm period, in particular, is 
regularly marked by frequent and deep 
debates over legitimate methods, problems, 
and standards of solution, though these serve 
rather to define schools than to produce 
agreement.63
 
The paradigm shifts to be found both in the earliest 
manifestation of the readymade and in the tentative 
acceptance of the PhD as (at least in part) a practical 
doctorate have subsequently established themselves in 
the sense that there can be “no going back”. The 
conditions that necessitated their arrival may be 
isolated and apparently unrelated much like the 
indiscriminate smudge in a gestalt test, awaiting 
recognition as it becomes recognizable: but as Kuhn 
points out: 
Is this art? 
 
 
 
Unorthodox thesis 
Is this good art? 
 
 
Conventional thesis 
 
The subject of a gestalt demonstration knows 
that his perception has shifted because he 
can make it shift back and forth repeatedly 
while he holds the same book or piece of 
paper in his hands. Aware that nothing in his 
environment has changed, he directs his 
attention increasingly not to the figure (duck 
or rabbit) but to the lines of the paper he is 
looking at. Ultimately he may even learn to 
see those lines without seeing either of the 
figures, and he may then say (what he could 
not legitimately have said earlier) that it is 
these lines that he really sees but that he 
sees them alternately as a duck and as a 
rabbit. ...As in all similar psychological 
experiments, the effectiveness of the 
demonstration depends upon its being 
Here is an interesting 
speculation: that, as the PhD 
becomes less of a purely 
academic exercise of “writing”, 
fabrication will become the 
normative version. 
Equivalence is to be found in 
how modernist art has become 
pluralistic, partly through its 
own emphasis on individuality 
and idiosyncracy. In other 
words, the paradigm already 
contains the seeds of its 
unmaking.  
See Gamez in left-hand side gloss p.25 
                                            
63 Ibid., p.47 
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analyzable in this way. Unless there were an 
external standard with respect to which a 
switch of vision could be demonstrated, no 
conclusion about alternate perceptual 
possibilities could be drawn.64
Thus, no external 
standard 
 
In order to capture the duckrabbit “alive” it is necessary 
to see the “lines” that make both appearances possible. 
Though it may not be possible to see the hybrid figure 
in its totality (always some duck, always some rabbit) 
there comes a closeness that may be described as 
asymptotic, that is, infinitesimally contingent. The 
recourse to an external “standard” that would settle the 
account could only be an arbitrary one devised by the 
institution, though this could be deliberately planted in 
order to reveal momentary glimpses and thus fulfill its 
own role as a sine qua non of the assessment process. 
This would highlight the performative as opposed to the 
constative aspect of the language domain of the 
university.65  
 
For the purposes of a PhD submission one could 
imagine there would have to be something that to all 
intents and purposes resembled a PhD thesis and was 
a PhD thesis, congruently so. What is implied here is 
that when a thesis is a work of art it is not research but 
when it is research it is not a work of art and yet 
ostensibly they appear one and the same. One could 
speak of a meta-thesis (which in grammar concerns the 
transposition of letters or sounds in a word), or anti-
thesis, which the Concise Oxford Dictionary’s third 
definition is most apposite and states: “a contrast of 
ideas expressed by parallelism of strongly contrasted 
words”. The term implies a purely philosophical stance 
You can’t 
have an 
argument and 
resembles an 
argument — 
category 
mistake 
here. 
Can one imagine a play in 
which the actors have an 
argument? Or, if not sufficient 
an analogy, what if the 
protagonist in the play were 
someone writing a thesis with 
all its arguments? Are these 
examples of arguments 
proper, or, do they resemble 
“real” arguments in the 
world? Isn’t this a similar 
problem to the one Austin 
encountered in “parasitic 
speech acts”? However, 
Derrida argues against this 
distinction. see Jacques 
Derrida, Limited Inc,  
Signature Event 
Context.(1988; Evanston: 
Northwestern University 
Press, 2000) 
Fur or 
feather 
What, then, is a PhD? 
In current understanding 
as a practice based 
form, the resemblance 
would have to be of a 
stereotypical PhD as 
understood to be a 
written thesis.  
This has implications for the 
description of marks that do 
the describing. Here the 
marks that could be “fur” are 
syntactically in error when 
they describe “feather”. 
… 
 
Unless …”decided” 
upon by … ? 
 
The account to be settled! 
 
 
The Institution qua institution
i.e. The 
                                            
64 Ibid., p114  
65 This refers to speech-act theory found in J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words (second 
edition) Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1975. But as Derrida would point out, such a 
structuralist opposition is itself subject to the aporia of identification. 
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that I suspect that Gadamer would decry as lacking the 
sensibility of encounter. Indeed, the self-reflexive 
artwork is more of a demonstration of art’s sublimation 
into philosophy. Yet in a post-ironic, ironic sense it is 
grounded exactly in the right place when it intervenes in 
the institution of education. Whilst it still retains the 
name of art, the thesis as antithesis, and the studio as 
installation remain in a dialogical relationship between 
the maker and representatives of the institution. It is by 
concentrating on the conditions that make it so that 
places the studio-as-installation between the realms of 
structure and event.  
It is both a stereotypical and an 
unconventional type as duck 
and rabbit 
The nexus of rules 
and differends. — see 
J.F. Lyotard and Ch. 4 
“Thesis” 
 
 
 
Thesis as theory     ⌦ ? = 
 
    structure Ontology/meaning Studio as real/fiction 
Thesis as artwork  ⌦  ? = 
 
    event Presentation/spectacle Presentation of studio as 
real/fiction 
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Illustrations 
 
Fig.8 Rob Ward, Studio as installation. Assembled pieces for performance, 2005 
dimensions variable 
 
Fig.9 Albrecht Dürer, Melencolia I, 1514, engraving. 31 × 26 cm, British Museum 
 
Fig.10 Rob Ward, “Ghost Melencolia” concave plaster mould in raking light to give 
convex (solid) appearance 150 x 110 x 40 cm. (part of MA installation, Longsides, 
Bretton Hall 2002) 
 
Fig.11 Rob Ward, CCTV view of Exhibition, Artist’s Studio, No 
Entry. 2005. Performance piece, Light and sound room LUSAD  
 
Fig.12 The Duck-rabbit from Fliegende Blätter 1892 
 
Fig.13 Andy Warhol, Brillo Box 1968, Silkscreen ink on painted wood 43.5 x 43.5 x 
35.5cm. Private collection . New York 
 
Fig.14 Jasper Johns, Flag, Encaustic, oil and collage on fabric mounted on 
plywood,1954-55, 106.7 x 155cm., Museum of Modern Art, New York
 
Fig.15 Jasper Johns, Target 1958 oil and collage on canvas 91.44 x 91.44 cm  
Collection of the Artist. 
 
Fig.16 Rob Ward, Painting en plein air  2009. Photograph, 
dimensions variable. 
 
Fig.17 The Jackson Pollock Bar theory installation. 
 
Fig.18 Rob Ward, Studio with Rietveld Blue and Red Chair 2005. 
Card model 45 x 40 x 30cm 
 
Fig. 19 Rob Ward, Studio with Breuer Wassily Club Chair 2005. 
Card model 45 x 40 x 30cm 
 
Fig.21 Rob Ward, Project IX  TALKING ABOUT ART The Aporia of  
Emperors 2005-6. essay/short story, A4. 
 
Fig.22 Daniel Buren, Peinture-Sculpture (Painting-Sculpture), work in 
situ, 
Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York, 1971
 
Fig. 23 Marcel Broodthaers, Ma Collection 1971, Photographs and 
documents. Front view and back view. Photo, © Maria Gilissen 
 
Fig. 24 Rob Ward, Exhibition, Artist’s Studio, No Entry. Hand made 
paper poster, blind embossing and pencil. 2005, 55 x 80cm. 
 
Fig. 25 Henry Holiday (illustrator) From Fit the Eighth: The 
Vanishing The Hunting of the Snark: An Agony in Eight Fits by 
Lewis Carroll 1876 
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Art as Common Sense (Canny Ideologies) 
 
If art practice is to “contain” knowledge (as some would 
argue as the prerequisite for a PhD by practice), and be 
able to communicate that knowledge it would have to 
assume a common understanding. It would have to be 
“common sense” in the broadest connotation of the 
term. This chapter will highlight attempts, both historical 
and contemporary, to bridge the gap between 
sensation, reason and meaning within an art context. 
I have chosen to refer to this and the following chapter 
in terms of what Jonathan Culler describes as “canny” 
and “uncanny” oppositions of structuralist and post-
structuralist thinking66.  The “canny” is characterized by 
a faith in the ability to probe and revise notions of truth 
through what Nietzsche called, “the thread of logic”. 
The uncanny, Culler insists, is not simply the opposite 
of the canny, “for the uncanny is neither a refutation of 
nor a replacement for the canny.”67 The uncanny work 
is that which takes the canny to the point where it 
recognizes itself as unhinged, that is to say, it is 
inherent in the logic of the canny to deconstruct itself — 
which is the uncanny.  
For this thesis, a 
stereotypical thesis, 
argument will 
demonstrate such a 
sublimation into … 
In some ways it is unfortunate that the literal English 
translation of the German unheimlich (un-homely) 
misses the sense that Freud intends of the strange-in-
the-familiar. “Uncanny” and “canny”, in English, are 
related to being aware or knowing. However, the 
misnomer of un-canny (literally, un-knowing) can be 
useful for the purposes of this and the next chapter. To 
“know” is not neutral but, I would maintain, ideological 
and therefore bound to the nexus of power structures 
and dominance. In this instance, knowledge becomes 
interpretation, and it is the hermeneutical project 
                                            
66 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, Theory and Criticism after Structuralism. London, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul Ltd. 1983. 
67 Ibid., p.24 
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applied to art and meaning that lies at the heart of 
regarding art practice as a form of research. In the 
chapter following this one, “un-knowing” will be offered 
as the most appropriate approach to a methodology. 
The aim of this chapter is to show ways that art practice 
can be argued as having equivalence to knowledge. 
Also, it will be shown that the arguments that try to 
prise that knowledge out of practice rely on what I have 
chosen to call “common sense”, a deliberate conflation 
of the demotic usage with sensus communis, the basis 
of common understanding, or, of “good sense”. That 
there is something in the academic community called 
“research” is self-evident but in this instance needs to 
be clarified, and that there is something within the 
culture of the twenty-first century called art practice will, 
for the time being, be assumed to be merely self-
evident. “Art as such”, in relation to research, will come 
under scrutiny in the following chapter.  
Research may be divided into two kinds, for the sake of 
highlighting what, in the literature appears to be a 
stumbling block. Firstly, with its rigorous methodologies 
quantitative research has gained reputation as a result 
of adhering to the mathematical and scientific principles 
of testing hypotheses and secondly, qualitative 
research has strong links to theoretical and 
philosophical systems that underpin ideas. Both are 
considered as research because both are creating new 
insights and knowledge. Since the inclusion of art 
practice into higher university degrees the problem has 
arisen of how something practical can, of itself, contain 
knowledge. Practice which is not written practice is 
mute68, and even written practice itself does not 
necessarily convey knowledge, especially when 
regarded as an aesthetic act. Also, it would appear that 
(T)he examination 
of models for art 
practice is not 
exhaustive – 
models which give 
prominence to 
socio-political 
engagement/interv
ention activist 
strategies are 
not considered.; 
notions of art 
practice as 
indisciplinarity/
disturbing the 
sensible and on 
the notion of 
“dissensus”, e.g. 
Rancière’s The 
Politics of 
Aesthetics  
(trans. Steven 
Corcoran) London 
and New York, 
Continuum 2010, 
and Rancière and 
indisciplinarity:
Interview with 
Marie-Aude 
Baronian and 
Mireille Rosello, 
“Art & Research, 
A Journal Of 
Ideas, Contexts 
and Methods. 
Vol.2, No. 1, 
Summer 2008; also 
Gramscian (and 
other) models of 
the insurgent 
/activist 
intellectual 
(e.g. Diana 
Sorensen and 
Latin 
America/Antonio 
Negri et al in 
Italian context -
1970s operating 
inside the 
“academy” 
This artwork called 
Thesis is one such 
interventionist piece. 
See Chapter , “Thesis” 
for fuller discussion 
                                            
68 This is used in the defined sense of “refusing to plead” its case. This, of course does not apply to 
art practice that is overtly didactic by means of the spoken/written word. However, even in this 
instance it could be regarded as such from the understanding of practice as being strictly aesthetic, 
as opposed to the political etc. 
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any product that has a subjective basis falls into such a 
trap of untrustworthy communication in that it is 
impossible to verify. Subjectivity, it would appear 
debars practice from communal research because it is 
singular and not universal.   Enlightenment thinking 
assumes universal paradigms.  
Examples include, Newtonian 
physics, Leibnizian  philosophy 
and more recently Einstein’s 
belief that, “God does not play 
dice with the universe”. 
Before a discussion of the problem can be extended, it 
will be necessary to make reference to Immanuel 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement69 whose central thesis 
concerns the antinomy of “taste” as something 
subjective and at the same time, necessarily objective. 
The Critique of Judgement is the third in line to the 
Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical 
Reason both of which are concerned to make a rational 
case for knowledge and ethics respectively. The third 
critique is seen as a bridge between the two in that it 
offers a rational account of sensation and in this 
respect it has implications towards “art” as it attempts 
to objectify “taste” and universalize judgment. 
“Universality” as a 
paradigm — also as an 
“act of faith” that such 
a rule of universality 
exists 
 
Whenever we make a judgment declaring 
something to be beautiful, we permit no one 
to hold a different opinion, even though we 
base our judgment only on our feeling 
rather than on concepts; hence we regard 
this underlying feeling as a common rather 
than as a private feeling. But if we are to 
use this common sense in such a way, we 
cannot base it on experience; for it seeks 
to justify us in making judgments that 
contain an ought: it does not say that 
everyone will agree with my judgment, but 
that he ought to (emphasis added).70
 
Whilst what is under discussion is the possibility of a shared 
                                            
69 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement (1790) Trans. Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis / Cambridge, 
Hacket Publishing Company, 1987   
70 Ibid., pp. 91- 92 
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judgement about the condition of “beauty”, it is interesting to 
set Kant’s problem in the context of its time in order to see 
the analogy with the problem offered in this chapter.  
The term aesthetics given in its modern usage as a system 
of conditions was first coined by A.G Baumgarten (1714 – 
1762) meaning the ability to judge via the senses rather 
than the intellect. The hope was to create a systematic 
approach to judgment that would have a universal appeal 
and so satisfy the need brought about by the appearance of 
contemporaneous art to a wider connoisseurship. The 
senses, properly attuned, it was hoped, would find a 
commonality, a “common sense” of agreement in other 
words. It is this sensus communis71 that Kant 
acknowledges as a necessity and yet can only be a priori 
true as obligation — it ought to be so given that humans are 
rational beings.  
Italic? 
 
(W)e must [here] take sensus communis to 
mean the idea of a sense shared [by all of 
us], i.e., a power to judge that in reflecting 
takes account (a priori), in our thought, of 
everyone else's way of presenting 
[something], in order as it were to compare 
our own judgment with human reason in 
general... Now we do this as follows: we 
compare our judgment not so much with the 
actual as rather with the merely possible 
judgments of others, and [thus] put ourselves 
in the position of everyone else...72
 
The concept of the supersensible is Kant’s attempt to 
justify an origin of the claim to universality, and he goes 
on to invoke a transcendental supersensible substrate 
                                            
71 Aristotle’s sensus communis was a physical entity situated near the heart and was responsible for 
gathering sense data from the sense receptors. As such it was responsible for the discernment and 
discrimination of qualities and was concerned with judgement: cf. Kant’s usage. 
72 Kant, Op. cit. p160 
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of humanity — a condition common to all human beings 
that causes the compulsion to expect a consensus of 
the judgment of taste — a “common sense” in its 
restricted meaning. 
Kant’s three Critiques, and particularly the third, served 
the purpose of showing the limits of what can be 
claimed for knowledge, and contributed to the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment programme of 
achieving a rational basis for all human dealings, be 
they scientific, political, judicial, ethical or aesthetic. By 
claiming a rational universality of humanity, Kant’s 
system echoed the French republican ideals of Liberty, 
Equality and Brotherhood. What he achieved was a 
system that legitimated judgments of quality based on 
human reason rather than dogma.  
In the mid twentieth century Clement Greenberg, in 
attempting to legitimate judgments of taste in modern 
art cites Kant as his antecedent. 
 
I identify Modernism with the intensification, 
almost the exacerbation, of this self-critical 
tendency that began with the philosopher 
Kant. Because he was the first to criticize the 
means itself of criticism, I conceive of Kant 
as the first real Modernist.  
Once we are on the track of 
self-reflexivity, there is no 
stopping us from critiquing 
the criticism that criticises 
itself — not to subvert it 
completely but nevertheless 
to undermine the confidence 
of its originary foundation. 
The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, 
in the use of the characteristic methods of 
a discipline to criticize the discipline itself not 
in order to subvert it, but to entrench it 
more firmly in its area of competence. Kant 
used logic to establish the limits of logic, 
and while he withdrew much from its old 
jurisdiction, logic was left in all the more 
secure possession of what remained to it.73
But see also the development of 
German Idealism through Hegel, 
Fichte, Schelling and 
Schleiermacher — continuations 
of and deviations from Kant. 
                                            
73 Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Painting" in The Collected Essays – Modernism with a Vengeance 
1957 - 1969 Ed. John O’Brian. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press. 1993. p.85 
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It is the notion of self-critique that forms the basis of a 
methodology common to disciplines that aspire to 
qualities such as integrity and the adjudication of 
“quality” itself. The kind of self-critique offered by Kant 
is based upon reason and as such becomes an 
adjudication of the limits of reason. Thus, the tendency 
to self-critique is claimed for scientific enquiry in Karl 
Popper‘s falsifiability principle where true scientific 
theory has to be capable of risk of being proven untrue, 
and marginalizes areas of “science” such as 
psychoanalysis and sociology for their lack of ability to 
have their findings proven “wrong”. Given all of this, 
Kant’s rationalist account takes very seriously aesthetic 
judgment and struggles to find the operational 
mechanism that connects sensation (of the beautiful) 
with a rational cause. In his paper Art and Knowledge 
in Kant’s Aesthetics Clive Cazeaux writes:   
So, as practice, is one 
step down from so many 
sciences in that until it 
became a subject for 
academic enquiry — art 
had nothing to prove.  
 
The fact that reflective judgement does not 
assign a determinate property to its object is 
initially a major problem for Kant, since his 
entire theory of judgement is based on the 
premise that each and every judgement 
requires the subsumption of an intuition under 
a concept. If this is the foundation of Kant’s 
theory, yet he entertains a (reflective) form of 
judgement which does not determinatively 
exercise a concept, how can his theory of 
judgement be accepted as complete and 
coherent? It would seem that his own 
definition of judgement precludes reflective 
judgement from taking place. Kant’s solution 
is to argue that since judgement always 
requires a concept, what reflective judgement 
does in these circumstances is not categorize 
its objects but produce a concept which 
reflects the mind’s capacity to form a 
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judgement, (original emphasis) that is to say, 
the mind’s capacity to get a purchase on the 
phenomenon before it that is posing a 
challenge to categorization. The concept that 
is produced is “nature’s subjective 
purposiveness”, the concept that nature 
appears as if it were designed for our form of 
perception74 (my emphasis).  
 
Cazeaux is making a case through Kant that there is a 
direct link between subjectivity and the “real” world that 
would lay the foundations for the transmission of 
knowledge via subjective means such as is found in art 
works. Kant’s “purposiveness” is, it would seem, 
circular, in that the presupposition of a “Natural Law” 
which is “out there” — a thing-in-itself, and therefore 
unknowable, can only be conceivable through a human 
concept: the Natural Law that regulates human law that 
defines the Natural Law. This is not the only flaw in 
Cazeaux argument as is shown by the insecurity of 
language when trying to extend his thesis. 
There is no foundational 
starting point. Natural 
Law depends on human 
“law” (concept) that 
depends on Natural 
Law that depends on … 
 
However, what is innovative about Kant’s 
theory of judgement is that this apparent lack 
of determination or objectivity — for example, 
the fact that concepts or metaphors are used 
which can’t be evidenced or empirically 
supported by the object in question — is 
claimed to be part of the purposiveness 
whereby we reflect on our own capacity to 
find or produce concepts which organize the 
world and generate knowledge.75
So tropes are regarded as 
essential to understanding? 
—  
 
see Paul de Man  footnote on following 
page 
 
Such terms as “reflection”, “capacity to”, “organize the 
                                            
74 Clive Cazeaux, Art and knowledge in Kant’s aesthetics. Working Papers in Art and Design  volume 
2 (2002) http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol2/caxeauxfull.html ISSN 1466-
4917 p.4 (accessed July 2007)  
75 Ibid., p.5 
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world” and “generate thinking” do little to substantiate his 
claim that this gets us any closer to establishing that 
“knowledge” can be extracted from the sensation of an 
artefact. His admission of metaphor as a legitimate trope 
that is “vital to the construction of knowledge” should be 
received with caution. He states that, “(F)ar from being 
merely a source of decoration or peripheral imagery, 
metaphor is theorized as the generation of conceptual 
relationship and cross-referral which allows knowledge 
to be constructed and coordinated.”76 I would argue that 
with metaphor, as with allegory, what is interesting and 
significant is not so much the “primary meaning” aided 
by some other image, but more the choice of secondary 
image itself that gives it force. This secondary image is, 
in fact, the subject-as-frame, that says that the primary 
image is encapsulated. In a sense, metaphors are, of 
themselves, reducing the primary images to mere 
examples of possible figurations and images that 
proliferate ad infinitum.77 Cazeaux’s paper is one of 
many attempts at a squaring of the hermeneutic circle 
that attempts to invoke sense out of sensation by 
appealing to a transcendent quality assumed to be 
already present. Here, the invocation of “purposiveness” 
is used to overcome the aporia of reflective judgement in 
the service of “sensory cognition”.  
The secondary image 
conjured up to throw 
light on the first implies 
a tertiary, quaternary 
etc. image as when 
looking up a definition 
in a dictionary. Each 
term demands yet 
another definition. 
Signifiers signify other 
signifiers. 
 
Purposiveness — the appearance of the 
world as if it had been designed for our 
awareness — is the concept which allows 
                                            
76 Ibid., p.7 
77 Paul de Man in his essay “The Epistemology of Metaphor” examines how a number of 
philosophers have attempted to derive a language free from the excesses of connotation caused by 
tropes such as metaphor, catachresis, prosopopeia etc. He writes, Contrary to common belief, 
literature is not the place where the unstable epistemology of metaphor is suspended by aesthetic 
pleasure, … It is rather the place where the possible convergence of rigor and pleasure is shown to 
be a delusion. The consequences of this lead to the difficult question whether the entire semantic, 
semiological, and performative field of language can be said to be covered by tropological models, a 
question which can only be raised after the proliferating and disruptive power of figural language has 
been fully recognized. 
In Critical Inquiry, vol. 5, No. 1, Special Issue on Metaphor (Autumn, 1978) quotation is from JSTOR  
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0093-1896%28197823%295%3A1%3C13%3ATEOM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4  
(accessed September 2009) 
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Kant to claim that … this process does not 
involve the imposition of order but rather 
occurs as the emergence of order and 
graspability necessary for our faculties to 
obtain a unified, coherent purchase on the 
world. 
Ex nihilo, nihil fit 
…it is precisely because reflective judgement 
is positioned at the centre of Kant’s thought 
that his philosophy can be used to give 
aesthetics a cognitive dimension.78 (my 
emphasis) 
 
It is the cognitive dimension that appears to legitimate 
art practice as a form of knowledge, but it is not clear 
how this knowledge is articulated for the practitioner and 
particularly for the “other” who experiences the result of 
that practice. It is with this consideration that various 
attempts have been forwarded that “interpret” the 
cognitive dimension such as the phenomenological 
approach of Graham Sullivan: 
 
The artwork carries its own status as a form of 
knowledge. Research of art subsequently 
communicates new insights into how objects 
carry meaning about ideas themes and issues. 
As an object of study an artwork is an 
individually and culturally constructed form that 
can be used to represent ideas and thus can 
be examined as a source of knowledge.79
cf, see Frayling’s term 
“research for art” p.82 ff. 
Even the preposition is 
not generally agreed 
upon. 
“of” 
art 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s magnum opus Truth and 
Method80devotes significant space to the sensus 
communis, arguing that Kant and the German 
                                            
78 Ibid., p.4 
79 Graham Sullivan, Art Practice as Research Inquiry in The Visual Arts. Thousand Oaks Ca. London, 
New Delhi, Sage publications. 2005  p.80 
80 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. (1960) 2nd revised edition Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald G. Marshall. London, New York. Continuum. 1989. pp. 16 – 27. 
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rationalists, through theorization, degraded it from its 
practical, social dimensions. This aspect would be 
manifested in the well-rounded, cultured, community 
spirited characteristics that the Germans call Bildung. 
This aspect of “common sense” referred to shared 
values for the common good (cf. French “le bon sens”) 
and placed an emphasis on the pursuit of knowledge, 
as Gadamer writes, “This is the art of finding arguments 
and serves to develop the sense of what is convincing, 
which works instinctively and ex tempore, and for that 
very reason cannot be replaced by science.”81
So Gadamer is discounting that 
particular kind of knowledge? 
A good question … 
but isn’t this the 
problem set by 
practice as research 
in its current use 
implying verbally 
articulated 
knowledge? 
Verbally articulated knowledge, of course, need not be 
the goal of cognition. An example might be found where 
cognitive faculties are brought to bear on a drawing in 
terms of say, accuracy to a given intention such as 
visual proportion. However, Steven Scrivener would 
remove the necessity of knowledge altogether, holding 
that the artwork itself conveys its own equivalence in 
what he calls “apprehension” 
How would 
we know 
knowledge 
outside of 
language? 
“Knowledge” relies on 
communication through 
words 
 
 
But isn’t that missing the 
point? — as with art, 
that kind of knowledge 
cannot be communicated 
by the written word.. The 
written word 
communicates knowledge 
by disputation. And 
agreement —what makes 
up a particular definition 
of communication not 
simply a cognitive act 
 
…I start from the position that the proper goal 
of visual arts research is visual art.  … 
Therefore, from my position the most 
interesting proposition to explore is the claim 
that the art object is a form of knowledge 
since it locates the art object as a central and 
fundamental component of the knowledge 
acquisition process. …Nevertheless …I 
argue against this position.82
Riding a bike is a 
form of knowledge that 
does not depend on the 
written word 
 
And 
 
(V)isual arts research can be seen as being 
                                            
81 Ibid.,. p.19 
82 Steven Scrivener, The art object does not embody a form of knowledge. Working Papers in Art and 
Design  volume 2 (2002) 
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol2/scrivenerfull.html  ISSN 1466-49 p.1 
(accessed July 2007) 
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concerned with novel insights through the 
apprehension of and discourse surrounding 
artefacts.83
 
What seems to become problematic is not that practical 
outcomes have cognitive meaning, but what sort of 
meaning is invested and how it is to be extracted. In art 
practice outside of academia the problem need not 
arise and it may even seem preferable for it not to 
arise. Art and research seem to imply incompatibility as 
Picasso implied in reaction to the over-theorization of 
cubism. 84
 
Of course, academic respectability for art in education 
has been achieved in the UK and elsewhere by the 
creation of university degree status culminating in the 
PhD. David Durling has noted that the current debate 
over practice as research has the potential to weaken 
academic integrity through the kind of interpretive forms 
of equivalent value such as “apprehension” substituting 
for hard won knowledge. Scientifically “falsifiable” or 
“hard” knowledge and “probable outcome” based “soft” 
knowledge are both communicable in terms of data or 
by philosophical argument based upon empirical 
evidence. Apprehensions are not knowledge but are 
supposed to infer or confer an equal value. It is the 
conferral of value that makes apprehension a specious 
ideology in its desire to change the parameters of the 
PhD and as such is what so irks Durling. It must be 
added, however, that “hard” scientific enquiry has also 
                                            
83 Steven Scrivener & Peter Chapman: The practical implications of applying a theory of practice 
based research: a case study. (2004) 
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol3ssfull.html  ISSN 1466-4917 p.3 
(accessed July 2007)  
84 “I can hardly understand the importance given to the word research in connection with modern 
painting. In my opinion to search means nothing in painting. To find, is the thing.” Pablo Picasso in 
“Picasso Speaks” part of an interview given with Marius de Zayas in 1923 published The Arts New 
York May 1923pp. 315-26 cited in  Art in Theory 1900-2000 An Anthology of Changing Ideas. 
Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Eds.) Oxford, Blackwell Publishing 2003 p.215 
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been shown to conform to ideological stances, 
particularly in the twentieth century with the Einstein-
Bohr debate which continues to this day to highlight 
belief systems that appear to be the basis of actual 
fact.85In his paper “Reliable knowledge in design”86, 
Durling expresses concern over a number of issues he 
sees as contributing to the erosion of the worth of the 
PhD with particular reference to the practice-based or 
led forms. The issue he wants to elucidate is implicit in 
the title of his paper which is firmly entrenched in 
knowledge as it is traditionally understood. He 
concludes that the artefact has an important role but 
only as an accompanying element to the academic 
content found in the traditional thesis. To this extent it 
might even be superfluous unless it bears relation to a 
new invention.  
The artefact in this instance is 
the object. The reader is… 
… spectator? 
 
It follows that publication by exhibition alone 
would not satisfy these requirements. 
However, if the exhibition were accompanied 
by a substantial catalogue explaining the 
process, it may be argued that there is an 
enduring record that can be published. If the 
catalogue contained all of the elements of a 
PhD thesis and were published and 
accessible, then it would satisfy these points. It 
would then be stand alone with all of the 
process embedded in it, and would be 
indistinguishable (my emphasis) from a 
conventional thesis. The extra burden of 
exhibition would seem unnecessary in these 
circumstances.87
See: the thesis 
                                            
85 See New Scientist vol.195 No.2615 4th August 2007 p.10 debate concerning determinism as 
proposed by the theoretical physicist Gerard ’t Hooft and the theory of effects without causes which is 
hoped to be determined by Anton Suarez at the Center for Quantum Philosophy in Zurich. 
86 David Durling: Reliable knowledge in design. Working Papers in Art and Design 1 
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol1/durling2.html ISSN 1466-4917 (accessed 
September 2007) 
87 Ibid., p.10 
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“These circumstances” being “all circumstances” if  
“exhibition alone” will not do. 
It has been pointed out that Durling is writing specifically 
about design and that art-practice has very noticeable 
differences in the way it is approached and particularly in 
its intentions – and thus its role within society. Design, 
by and large, serves society, and as such fits 
comfortably into the academic community’s ideal of 
innovation that can be useful to future application and 
further research. The same need not necessarily be 
what artists aspire to. It would seem therefore that the 
kind of art that aspires to become academic research 
does so by denying the “art” aspect in order to become a 
strange hybrid form of “design-art” — an art with a 
common sense – a common purpose. 
Can you think of a 
design that was 
intended not to serve a  
social purpose — in 
contrast with an “art” 
that purported to be 
nihilistic? This contrast 
is the one intended. 
(One could suppose 
the computer virus to 
be one such design!) 
Such a view might equally be seen to be ideologically 
predicated by the admission that art does not 
necessarily have to be recalcitrant — though avant-
garde art always had an edge of anti-establishment to 
it. Much art of today now engages with ethical, 
ecological and social issues that give it respectability 
and imply that it has become integrated into society. At 
the beginning of this chapter art practice was assumed 
to be a self-evident enterprise that would lend itself to 
examination as an object of research. This appears to 
be how it has emerged within practice as research, for 
it has become a well-behaved model — diverse 
perhaps in its form, yet homogeneous in exposition. In 
effect, art practice, in the wider context of the world 
outside of academia, has created its own homogeneity 
by abandoning the aesthetic in favour of complex 
agendas. As such, the Kantian model that relies upon 
disinterest no longer holds, and with it the judgement of 
value as understood in the modernist canon. As such, 
i.e. it has a “subject” or a 
“content” – a “message”. 
Are these the aspects 
that are being labelled 
“knowledge”? Does this 
approach get us any 
nearer to the kind of 
knowledge that is 
groundbreaking as 
opposed to being merely 
idiosyncratic – novel 
rather than “new”? 
A subject for art leads 
to the question, “what 
is art of ? What is it 
about? The “aboutness” 
becomes the raison 
d’être of the art and 
art loses its autonomy. 
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this all-embracing quality that characterizes post-
aesthetic art can be seen to be banal, as it relies on 
self-evident explanation — in effect relying on a 
common-sense interpretation of its intensions. In The 
End of Art Donald Kuspit cites Frank Stella’s reaction to 
the MOMA show “Modern starts” (October 2000):  
 
Stella has articulated, with uncanny accuracy 
and discomforting ridicule, the post-aesthetic 
character of art. He implies that it is the end of 
art, which does not mean works of art will not 
be made, but that they will have no important 
human use: they will no longer further personal 
autonomy and critical freedom, strengthening 
the ego against the social superego as well 
as the instincts, both of which stifle indi-
viduality with conformity.88
 
 
Individuality and non-conformity are the hallmarks of 
modernist thinkers and practitioners, and as such 
defy interpretation that aspires to be definitive or even 
in ‘everyday terms. According to Stella and Kuspit, the 
mysterious quality that makes modern art Art becomes 
mystification inculcated by post-modernist galleries, 
and other art institutions.  Stella’s depressing and 
depressed view is shared by Kuspit who deems post-
modernist, post-aesthetic art to be: 
They’re all 
individuals and 
nonconformists?! 
“You are 
individuals” 
“I’m not” 
 
… (A) psychosocial construction defined by its 
institutional identity, entertainment value, and 
commercial panache. No effort will be required 
to understand it, for there will not be much to 
understand, or rather it will be comprehensible 
in everyday terms. The post-aesthetic is not 
simply ironically opposed to the aesthetic or an 
                                            
88 Donald Kuspit, The End of Art. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004 p.14                                                   
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alternative ironical aesthetic, as the anti-
aesthetic has been understood to be, but, to 
use Duchamp's words, wilfully indifferent to the 
aesthetic, which is almost to deny its reality. 
Duchamp clearly wants to deny the finality of 
aesthetic judgment - the kind of aesthetic 
objectivity that Kant spoke of- but in doing so 
he denies that there is any such thing as 
aesthetic experience.89
 
 
 
Fig. 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What Kuspit and Stella react to is the banality of means 
that often conceals complex conceptual ideas. The front 
jacket illustration to his book which is referred to as an 
example of degradation of the aesthetic is Damien 
Hirst’s Home Sweet Home of 1996 consisting of an 
ashtray filled with cigarette stubs (the show which was 
cleared away by a cleaner, unaware of its art status). 
Kuspit objects to the theoretical conceptual justification 
of such work and quotes a passage from Hegel. 
 
Hegel writes: "the interest in art is distinguished 
from the practical interest of desire by the fact 
that it leaves its objects alone in their 
independence, while desire adapts them, or 
even destroys them, for its own purposes. 
                                            
89 Ibid., p.29 
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Conversely, artistic contemplation differs from 
the theoretical contemplation of the scientific 
intelligence in cherishing an interest for the 
objects in their individuality; it does not busy 
itself in reducing them to universal thoughts 
and conceptions."90
 
In the Hirst piece degradation is the theme and the 
means to show it. Whilst it may look as if the 
introduction of the banal is a quality of post-modern 
irony, there are many instances of art practice that 
attempt to address popular issues and concerns 
through discarded debris that are presumably intended 
to be sincere. Here, the means is also meant to convey 
literal content and becomes prime material for research 
practitioners.  
 
Graeme Sullivan’s Art Practice as Research Inquiry in 
The Visual Arts gives a number of illustrated examples 
to his text that purport to “explain” what the artists’ 
intentions were that, at first, give little leeway for 
interpretation. One example of this is Chakaia Booker’s 
(Fig. 27) use of “rubber tires (sic) to give form to social 
commentaries that address issues from black identity to 
urban ecology … Booker however extracts (my 
emphasis) an intense concentration of meanings from 
the tires.”91 Another example is Natalie Jeremijenko’s 
Tree Logic that consists of an outdoor “sculpture-
installation” formed from tree saplings planted in tubs 
suspended upside down from an armature. “Our 
perceptions of trees change when we view them as a 
collection of growth responses rather than immutable 
symbols of the natural world.”92  
James Elkins in Why Are our 
Pictures Puzzles? cites the 
most extraordinary example of 
hermeneutical explanation of a 
number of paintings of the 
Impressionist period by the 
Swedish Art Historian, Birger 
Carlström. Carlström’s thesis is 
that many of the impressionists 
were secretly hiding messages 
protesting against particular 
contemporaneous political 
debacles such as the 
subjugation of Poland by 
Russia or financial scandals 
such as the investments in the 
Panama Canal. Using the 
example of Renoir’s Woman at 
the Piano (1875) Elkins states: 
 
Carlström finds evidence that 
Renoir was angry at Russia 
and Austria for their 
treatment of Poland, and that 
he was upset at France for its 
liberal policy about 
immigration, and that he was 
disappointed in Napoleon III. 
In Woman at the Piano, 
Carlström is drawn a little 
sees the Isthmus of Panama 
in the houseplant at the 
upper left. One twig lies at an 
angle is the “black line where 
the canal is to go,” and he 
reads the letters PAN and 
COL for the cities of Panama 
and Colon at opposite ends 
of the canal. The canal 
inaccurately, Carlström says: 
“ the Isthmus of Panama 
goes a little more west-east, 
than what Renoir has put it 
out here”; but it doesn’t 
matter, because Renoir has 
written the essential 
message across the middle 
of his cryptic map: “TAC = 
BANG”. The entire scandal, 
Carlström says in half-
English, 
 
Were to degager shortly. 
And so they were. From c. 
1884 Renoir has now told 
about this project of 
Panama Canal and he and 
the French people are now 
demanding for an open 
account but in the next 
year1889 so it crashed and 
many people lost their 
savings. TAC = BANG. 
 
                                            
90 Ibid., p.35 
91 Sullivan, 2005 Op. cit p.25 
92 Ibid., p.36 
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    Fig.27                            Fig.28 
 
The same painting also 
depicts Russia’s relations 
with Poland, which 
Carlström calls “the Poland-
Strangling” (p.4) 
 
As unlikely as it would seem 
that Renoir would put any of 
these concerns (had he 
indeed had them) into his 
paintings, Elkins’ point is that 
Carlström’s “findings” have 
come about through a 
hermeneutical process that 
art historians take for 
granted. As he concludes: 
 
My purpose in arguing this 
way is not to persuade 
specialists to take 
Carlström seriously, or to 
add my voice to those who 
advocate invigorating new 
interpretive strategies 
chiefly because they are 
invigorating. (In other 
contexts, I would defend 
both claims.) Carlström 
might well be wrong about 
Renoir’s intentions, but he 
is not “wrong” about art-
history. He is what 
statisticians call an 
“outliner”: a data point far to 
one end of the scale, but 
not off the scale altogether. 
He is less an eccentric, out 
of time and place, than a 
symptom of contemporary 
art history, and his 
extremity can be used to 
point up the shape of the 
discipline as a whole. (p.11) 
 
 
James Elkins, Why are our 
Pictures Puzzles? On the 
Modern Origin of Pictorial 
Complexity, New York and 
London, Routledge, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yet another if less sympathetic interpretation might be that 
the tyres just happened to be around and looked 
“interesting”, or that the inverted trees were actually a kind 
of sublimated form of torture. Whatever the interpretation, 
the practitioners, and Sullivan also, presumably, would 
welcome these as well because of the relativistic stance of 
apprehending the work at a communal level. A common 
consensus prevails over a sense of wonder. The “art” has 
become a secondary discourse — a fiction that justifies 
and initiates discussion.  
These variations on a theme of objet trouvé are in contrast 
to the Hirst ashtray in that they may be seen to stem from 
surrealism’s imbuing of psychical significance as opposed 
to dada’s nihilistic valorization of the commonplace. This 
latter form that began as an attack on bourgeois values 
and institutions has since become the most easy to explain 
and present in museums and art galleries to a public eager 
to learn about “art”. In this context: 
 
Subtleties of connotation disappear into 
blatant denotation, making the subject matter 
seem larger than life and, at the same time, 
instantly comprehensible: what you see is 
what you get, as both Warhol and Frank 
Stella said. Paradoxically, this "enlargement" 
into obviousness - this re-invention of the 
subject matter as an image, more pointedly, 
as a socially representative representation - 
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desensitizes the viewer to it rather than 
intensifies his relationship with it. Unable to 
be taken personally, it becomes simply 
another social product on the market of mass-
reproduced images - images meant for the 
masses not for the individual. Thus, 
mechanical reproduction makes social 
subject matter "comprehensible" to the mass 
mind by turning it into a facile spectacle.93
 
Kuspit attacks the vacuity of the banal that achieves art 
status from a particular ideology and theory. 
 
The artist has become a "positivist," 
"represent[ing] things as they are, or rather 
would be, supposing [he] did not exist." In 
postart this means things are understood 
according to ideology and theory, which 
become glosses on their banality. Ideology 
and theory confirm it: they use real things 
as banal illustrations (thus outsmarting 
them and suggesting that ideology and 
theory are in control of reality).94
Implying “after” aesthetics – 
not just in a temporal sense but 
as a progression … ideologically 
loaded  
 
Ideology and theory are what permeate the explanatory 
labels that are fixed to the wall beside art works in the 
modern museum and art gallery. Ideology and theory are 
what go into a PhD thesis, and in Durling’s terms, taken 
together with Kuspit’s argument, the “art” part has 
become superfluous. 
Surrealism would seem to offer more scope for an 
integrated practice and theory based upon meanings 
that go beyond the facticity of the object. Practices that 
attempt to locate significance that lies “underneath” 
                                            
93 Kuspit, 2004 Op. cit p.92  
94 Ibid., p.97 
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surface appearance are vestiges of modernism’s 
alternative route taken to mean the (re)awakening of the 
“primitive” within.  Infatuated by Freud’s psychoanalytical 
method, the surrealists found an underground 
passageway to liberation through art; an art with 
meaning, but whose meaning was deliberately 
dislocated. Freud was a rationalist, and as such sought 
to explain mental states, and was not impressed by the 
claims that the surrealists made of him as their 
progenitor.  
The art work as a kind of 
narrative that 
nevertheless undermines 
its own authority 
It is surrealism’s heritage that has allowed the found-
object to engender “readings” other than purely 
ontological theorizing. But whereas surrealism, following 
Rimbaud’s admonition to “disorganize all the senses” 
aimed towards the symbolic, art practices such as the 
ones cited in Sullivan’s book are allegorical. Things 
stand for other things. Paul de Man, examining the 
tropes of symbolism and allegory states: 
 
(The) appeal to the infinity of a totality 
constitutes the main attraction of the symbol 
as opposed to allegory, a sign that refers to 
one specific meaning and thus exhausts its 
suggestive potentialities once it has been 
deciphered. “Symbol and allegory” writes 
Gadamer, “are opposed as art is opposed to 
non art, in that the former seems endlessly 
suggestive in the indefiniteness of its meaning, 
whereas the latter, as soon as its meaning is 
reached, has run its full course.” Allegory 
appears as dryly rational and dogmatic in its 
reference to a meaning that it does not itself 
constitute, whereas the symbol is founded on 
an intimate unity between the image that rises  
The power of symbol lies 
precisely in its 
inaccessibility. 
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up before the senses and the supersensory 
totality that the image suggests.95
 
If Gadamer is correct, it adds further substance to the 
argument that art based on the explicatory methods 
associated with allegorical meaning have run their 
course as art, though they could well serve the purposes 
of research. Whereas Kant’s sensus communis was a 
transcendental concept and as such intangible, the 
allegorical artwork is grasped by one and all as if it 
simply made “common sense”.   
One interpretation 
might be that art 
practices have 
become a special 
kind of activity 
specifically limited to 
and aligned with 
academic research 
A critique of the concept of interpretation of artworks can 
be pressed even further, taking ideas from Gadamer’s 
Truth and Method as a starting point. Gadamer is, of 
course, primarily associated with hermeneutics — the 
philosophy of interpretation — an offshoot of 
phenomenology. Gadamer addresses the question, as 
Terry Eagleton puts it: “Is ‘objective’ understanding 
possible, or is all understanding relative to our own 
historical situation?”96 This holds significance for art 
practice as Eagleton goes on to say, “There is … a good 
deal more at stake in these issues than ‘literary 
interpretation’ alone.”97 E. D Hirsch Jr, who, in Validity in 
Interpretation98 claims that despite there being the 
possibility of numerous interpretations of a work there 
exists one original intention. If all possible interpretations 
were completely valid this would lead to the absurd 
consequences of “anything goes”. Works created at a 
time different to our own had very specific intentions due 
to the prevailing conditions. However, both Heidegger 
and Gadamer insist on the ability to engage with the 
historically unfamiliar, for although intentionality may 
— objective — but also 
occupying the same ontological 
territory for all? 
                                            
95 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight. “The Rhetoric of Temporality”. Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press 1983 pp.188-189. The quotation from Gadamer is to be found in Wahrheit und 
Methode (Tübingen: J.C. Mohr, 1960 4th ed., 1975) p.70; trans G.Barden and J. Cumming, Truth and 
Method New York: Seabury Press 1975, p.67. 
96 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory, An Introduction. 2nd Edition. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing 1996. 
p.58 
97 Loc. cit. 
98 E.D Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation New Haven, Conn., 1976 
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differ at different times, there is one unifying aspect 
which prevents our alienation, which is our own culture. 
“Meaning” is that which happens when our own “horizon” 
of interpretation meets the “horizon” from which the work 
is conceived: all belong to the same cultural tradition. 
These issues raised primarily in literary theory are often 
extended into the visual arts — and this would seem 
most apt in art practice that incorporates written 
exegesis. 
We have to go “out” of 
ourselves to meet the 
horizon which is one’s 
understanding that the 
horizon is coming to 
meet us — each 
understanding relies on 
the other. 
 
More on p.80 
What is the nature of this 
“meeting” point? Is it a 
compromise? Is it a “near 
as we can achieve” truth 
to intention? Does it 
disturb us? Do we disturb 
it? Horizons are always 
“beyond”! 
Basing his arguments on Gadamer’s approach, Nicholas 
Davey proposes ways in which the hermeneutical 
understanding of artworks is a form of cognitive 
research. In his essay In between Word and Image: 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, Aesthetics and the 
inescapable Heritage of Kant,99as the title suggests, he 
tries to insert the idea of disinterested method into 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, as when he says, “a 
hermeneutical aesthetics cannot operate without either 
an appeal to disinterestedness or without invoking an 
equivalent of Kant’s “aesthetic idea”100. This, of course 
runs counter to Gadamer’s own position which embeds 
the encounter in such a way that, as Davey concedes,  
“(V)ulnerability to the claims of art depends upon the 
interlocking openness and porous nature of the plurality 
of meanings that constitute the ontological fabric of both 
art work and ourselves.”101 He introduces the idea of 
“method” in order to forestall complacency, that is, to 
cover for the fact that interpretation might in some way 
get stuck through routine approaches to the work. 
(Gadamer’s hermeneuticist, even if he or she has not 
gained many insights is always assumed to be alert, 
always willing to participate — that is to say, creatively 
prejudiced.) The second reason for this “heresy” is to 
                                            
99 Nicholas Davey, In between Word and Image: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Aesthetics and the 
inescapable Heritage of Kant. Ceres, 2007. 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/davey/InBetweenWordImage_Aug07.doc  (accessed 
January 2009) 
100 Ibid., p.4 
101 Ibid., p.12 
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strengthen Gadamer’s approach by stimulating new 
interpretations. 
 
An invocation of method and disinterestedness 
seems very unGadamerian but as we 
approach our conclusion, we shall claim that 
when seen from a wider hermeneutic 
perspective, the invocation is far from 
heretical. Though enabled by deliberate 
methodical intervention, a new alignment of 
meaning will often arise independent of the 
intentions or expectations of the interpreter.102
 
This approach that satisfies both hermeneutical freedom 
and a method for its stimulation is precisely what the 
proponents of practice as a research require. Davey is 
thus making a strong case that satisfies the 
unpredictable nature of “art outcomes” and a means to 
interrogate it rationally. Davey’s account makes 
Gadamer’s methodology “reliable”, that is to say, more 
institutionally palatable. Eagleton, however, condemns 
the entire enterprise as being too cosy. The reliance on 
“tradition” as the “home” where hermeneutics can 
function is challenged when he writes: 
 
 It might be as well to ask Gadamer whose and 
what “tradition” he actually has in mind. For his 
theory holds only on the enormous assumption 
that there is indeed a single “mainstream” 
tradition; that all “valid” works participate in it; 
that history forms an unbroken continuum, free 
of decisive rupture, conflict and contradiction; 
and that the prejudices which “we” (who?) 
have inherited from the tradition are to be 
cherished. It assumes, in other words, that 
                                            
102 Ibid., p.24 
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history is a place where “we” can always and 
everywhere be at home; that the work of the 
past deepen — rather than, say, decimate — 
our present self-understanding; and that the 
alien is always secretly familiar. It is, in short, a 
grossly complacent theory of history, the 
projection on to the world at large of a 
viewpoint for which “art” means chiefly the 
classical monuments of the high German 
tradition.103
 
Wolfgang Iser, following on from Gadamer concentrates 
on contemporary rather than historical interpretation of 
works finding that the hermeneutical approach has value 
in its direct challenge to our assumptions, changing our 
critical awareness. The work of art or literature is 
“transgressive” when its value lies in its ability to shake 
up the complacent reader or spectator, to disturb in 
order to elicit creative understanding: 
 
The work interrogates and transforms the 
implicit beliefs we bring to it, “disconfirms” our 
routine habits of perception and so forces us to 
acknowledge them for the first time for what 
they are. Rather than merely reinforce our 
given perceptions, the valuable work of 
literature violates or transgresses these 
normative ways of seeing and so teaches us 
new codes for understanding.104
Firstly, there has to be a desire to have our 
values transgressed – as if transgression is 
the normative condition 
 
Eagleton’s criticism of Gadamer is equally dismissive of 
Iser’s version of hermeneutics called Reception Theory, 
comparing it to “a club for the like minded.” 
 
                                            
103 Eagleton, op. cit. p.63 
104 Ibid., p.67 
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Behind this case lies the influence of 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, with its trust in that 
enriched self-knowledge which springs from an 
encounter with the unfamiliar. But Iser’s liberal 
humanism, like most such doctrines, is less 
liberal than it looks at first sight. He writes that 
a reader with strong ideological commitments 
is likely to be an inadequate one, since he or 
she is less likely to be open to the 
transformative power of literary works. What 
this implies is that in order to undergo 
transformation at the hands of the text, we 
must only hold our beliefs fairly provisionally in 
the first place. The only good reader would 
already have to be a liberal: the act of reading 
produces a kind of subject which it also 
presupposes.105
 
What can be said for hermeneutics in literary theory can 
also be said for (at least the written aspect of) art 
practice in a research context. The kinds of dialogues 
opened up by artworks and their exegeses, even if they 
are considered of “higher” value, become another kind of 
common sense. They share their commonality within the 
institutional language, the tropes and rhetoric that 
preserve both the observer/critic/assessor and the 
researcher/artist/candidate. This narrative of self-
preservation will be examined in the last chapter and is a 
result of the circular nature of hermeneutics that make 
the part dependent on the whole, which is in turn 
dependent on the part. In the practice by research 
doctorate the integrity of the whole is preserved by a 
grounding of capacities and responses, no matter how 
heterogeneous the effects that are produced; the 
— And, as if this isn’t 
difficult enough in the 
literary field, surely it must 
be compounded in the 
visual field! 
                                            
105 Ibid., p. 69 
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grounding — the “at home” is that cultural tradition. As 
Eagleton concludes: 
 
As with Gadamer, we can foray out into foreign 
territory because we are always secretly at 
home. The kind of reader whom literature is 
going to affect most profoundly is one already 
equipped with the “right” kind of capacities and 
responses, proficient in operating certain 
critical techniques and recognizing certain 
literary conventions; but this is precisely the 
kind of reader who needs to be affected 
least.106
Research as a 
self-perpetuating, 
self-fulfilling 
activity. 
 
The “effects” of the hermeneutical approach, under such 
criticism, only confirm what is already expected of the 
work in question. Interpretation of an art-work, whilst it 
may serve to elicit new responses, does so within the 
narrow confines of closed communities of cultural 
concession. It is this approach that has been invoked in 
the literature of practice-as-research in order to open up 
the debate into the possible “knowledge outcomes” from 
art practice. Interpretation, whilst it offers possible 
outcomes, fails to establish claims that are of the order 
of “knowledge that can be communicated.” 
(Kantian “obligation”) 
…that ought … 
The step from ...to… 
interpretation …to 
knowledge is unable to 
be taken 
  
The Embodiment of Knowledge 
This acknowledgement of the difficulty of embodying 
“knowledge” in an artwork was voiced early on in the 
development of PhDs at the Royal College of Art. In his 
seminal paper “Research in Art and Design”,107 
Christopher Frayling discusses Herbert Read’s three 
categories of art based research. These are: research 
                                            
106 Loc. cit. 
107 Christopher Frayling, “Research in Art and Design”, Royal College of Art Papers Vol1, No 1, 1-5. 
1993  
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into art, research through art, and research for art. An 
example of the first kind would be,  
“Historical Research, Aesthetic or Perceptual Research 
(and) Research into a variety of theoretical perspectives 
on art and design — social, economic, political, ethical, 
cultural, iconographic, technical, material, structural 
….”108 Research through is identified as activities such 
as,  
(M)aterials research — such as the titanium 
sputtering or colorization of metals projects 
(etc.); development work — for example, 
customising a piece of technology to do 
something no one has considered before and 
communicating the results. … (and) action 
research — where a research diary tells, in a 
step by step way, of a practical experiment in 
the studios, and the resulting report aims to 
contextualize it.109    
     
It is the third category of research for art that gives 
Frayling (as well as all who have followed) so much 
trouble. The problem lies in: 
 
Research where the end product is an artefact 
— where the thinking is, so to speak, 
embodied in the artefact, where the goal is not 
primarily communicable knowledge in the 
sense of verbal communication, but in the 
sense of visual or iconic or imagistic 
communication (original emphasis).110
 
The question that always gets repeated in discussions 
about practice as research or, research for art, is the one 
that asks if the artefact in itself can communicate new 
knowledge. Of those who attempt a way forward in 
                                            
108 Ibid., p.5 
109 Loc. cit 
110 Loc. cit 
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consideration of Frayling’s last category of research, two 
academic papers stand out in their different approaches 
to the “for art” category. These are Michael Biggs’s, “the 
Rhetoric of Research”111 and Lucy Lyons’s, “Walls are 
not my friends: issues surrounding the dissemination of 
practice-led research within appropriate and relevant 
contexts.”112
In Biggs’s paper, he “argues that the instrumentality of 
terms such as ‘research’ should be contrasted by 
observations of how the register of artefacts is used in 
the advancement of the field.”113 Here terminology is 
crucial to following Biggs’s thesis as he defines 
meanings of such terms as “criteria” and “symptoms” in 
a Wittgensteinian sense and takes a specifically 
constructivist approach to the subject. He posits words 
as tools to “construe” meaning, as he says, “ex re”, that 
is, from the artefacts rather than as argumentum ex 
verbum that he infers is at the centre of the Arts and 
Humanities Research Board’s definition of research. 
“Criteria” (ex verbum) for research are those normative 
standards that can be shared, and thus become the 
rules that institutions use to assess the value of the 
research in question. “Symptoms” (ex re) are the implicit 
repository of research that the work of art displays. 
Words are used “instrumentally” — i.e. as an instrument, 
a tool — by criteria (the rules and regulations allow or 
prevent by stipulating conditions), but “symptoms” are, 
besides being “indicators that such conditions are being 
met”, do not operate instrumentally. Symptoms of 
artefacts “embody the thinking but fail to make explicit 
their knowledge and understanding.”114 For Biggs, the 
problem of Frayling’s “research-for” is overcome by 
Meaning is made with the 
artwork undoubtedly, but once 
again terminological changes 
contribute as much to 
obscurity as they do to clarity. 
                                            
111  Michael A.R. Biggs, “The Rhetoric of Research” in Durling D. & Shackleton J. (Eds.) Common 
Ground. Proceedings of the Design Research Society International Conference at Brunel University 
111 -118. Stoke –on-Trent, UK: Staffordshire University Press, 2002 (accessed 21/02/09) as URL  
112 Lucy Lyons’s, “Walls are not my friends: issues surrounding the dissemination of practice-led 
research within appropriate and relevant contexts.” Working Papers in Art and Design 4  
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol14llfull.html  (accessed February 2009)  
113 Biggs. Abstract. Op. cit. p.1 
114 Ibid., p.116 in the original 
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construing the artefact as a work of art, and therefore an 
“object of study and cited by researchers.”115 This subtle 
twist of construction appears to give the artefact in part-
practice research a new lease of life as embodiment of 
knowledge, for as Biggs goes on to state, “(A) ‘work of’ 
systematically employs a method that results in a novel 
point-of-view. It deploys it rather than commentating on 
it. Thus it is embodied or deployed in the work rather 
than explicated by it.”116 (my emphasis.)  This reaches 
out to the point where such embodiment of knowledge 
might actually be transferable within the community of 
those who understand and are sympathetic to the 
issues. Biggs, however, concedes that: 
Is this not re-assessing the 
original intention of 
describing an artwork where 
the artwork loses its 
“artness” the more it 
becomes a subject for 
description.  
 
“(t)he legitimacy of claiming embodiment is not 
a claim of intention, but a claim of coherence, 
and whether this point-of-view can legitimately 
or coherently be explicated as being embodied 
or deployed in the “work-of” […]. Such a claim 
needs to be made explicit by “research-into” 
the “work-of”, and may be understood by the 
author of the work.”117(my emphasis.) 
Explicate – elaborate ‐ make plain –
or — 
Flatten. i.e. reduction to flatness 
 
What Biggs has achieved is a restoration of the 
importance of “symptoms” as a means to overcome the 
term “research-for art” that he sees as misleading and 
mismatching AHRC criteria. Even so, the issues of 
intentionality and the transference of knowledge are 
broached with a good deal of circumlocution. As has 
been seen in the last chapter, there are many problems 
that arise from seeking authorial intention, and this 
difficulty can be magnified further by appeals to 
hermeneutics and the common-sensibilities of 
associated communities.  
                                            
115 Loc. cit 
116 Loc. cit 
117 Ibid., p.116 -117 
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In many ways this is more to 
the point … But by 
emphasizing “research” as 
something separate from and 
superior to art practice, the 
very object of research 
becomes use-less 
In contrast, Lyons’s paper approaches Frayling’s 
categories with an added concern for where research 
takes place, reiterating the larger issue of whether to 
assess the artefact as art or as research. The location of 
the artefact is, she argues, especially within an art 
school context, likely to follow conventions of the display 
of art. 
 
I suggest that the presumption that the art 
school is the appropriate context for all forms 
of practice-led research is a problematic 
one.118
 
 This brings with it implicit notions about the quality of 
the artwork which is separate from the usefulness of the 
research. 
 
(The) practice produced itself is not research. 
It is art. It does not contribute to the knowledge 
economy and as such cannot be built upon or 
added to as criteria for doctoral research 
demands.119
 
The standard of art school evaluation is to be found in 
the “crit”, where there are, “four main elements; Identity 
(what is it?), coherence (is the composition successful?), 
effectiveness (do the colours work well together?), and 
purpose (what is the student trying to do?).120 This is the 
model that assesses quality of the artefact through a 
defence of the work within the boundaries of the 
teacher/student relationship, rather than, as she would 
prefer, the researcher/supervisor relationship. Whilst 
Lyons maintains a concession to the practice element, 
Once again, this 
seems to be 
confusion with 
“painting” 
                                            
118 Lyons, Op. cit. p.1 
119 Ibid., p.2 
120 Ibid., p.3. Lyons is here citing Wolff, T.F., and Geahigan G. “Art Criticism and Education 
Disciplines in Art Education: Contexts of Understanding”. Chicago,  University of Illinois Press. 1997. 
p.81. 
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as she continues, her scepticism of the role of art-as-
such becomes more apparent as when, for example, she 
states that, “But in the case of some practice-led 
research, just because it looks like art doesn’t mean it is 
art.” And if this hasn’t entirely diminished art’s 
appropriateness, she goes on to add, “But if it looks like 
art, and then is presented in the same manner as art, 
then one shouldn’t be surprised if it falls into the trap of 
being judged within an art context.”121Art’s insignificance 
is rendered complete as it evanesces into research: 
Thesis “looks like” a 
(stereotypical) thesis. 
What does “looking 
like” mean? 
Question: what is art 
supposed to “look 
like”? Does “looking” 
even count? 
 
If the artefact is a valid part of research and 
communicates new knowledge, it should not 
matter whether it is good or bad in these 
terms. What it does and how effectively it 
communicates information are far more 
important concerns than what it looks like.122
The assumption 
that the PhD 
thesis is a test — 
because it doesn’t 
matter what it 
looks like 
Here the division is 
explicitly stated … word 
over image. 
 
Here is a double bind in that what is being described is 
practice as research and yet the practice as art-practice 
is being subsumed simply as research. It might just as 
easily be a case of disregarding the art based activity 
(which is surely the point of it all) and presenting “pure” 
research. Also, in this model of research, there is no 
practice as such; merely the illustration of (presumably, 
written) ideas. Whilst there is a need to reject the 
extreme implications of these assertions, there is 
agreement with the thesis that the location of the 
research-cum-art is crucial to its being (mis)understood.  
Assuming that one 
knows what “pure” 
research is! 
In order to close this chapter, reference will be made to 
Professor Timothy Emlyn Jones’ paper “The PhD in Art 
and Design” which was given at a symposium entitled, 
“‘Monstrous Thinking: on Practice-Based’ Research”.123 
                                            
121 Ibid., p.6 
122Ibid., p.6 
123 Timothy E. Jones, “‘Monstrous Thinking: on Practice-Based’ Research”. Symposium 6 of the Elia 
Cómhar conference, Dublin October 2002. from URL       
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Jones charts the development of the PhD by practice 
from its earliest inception to the 2000s. He refers to how 
Colin Painter, the former Principal of the Wimbledon 
School of Art won the argument with the Research 
Assessment Exercise over the inclusion of practical 
aspects of Art and Design into the research community. 
He broaches the thorny issue of the embodiment of 
research within the artefact and concludes that, 
“Alternatively, it might be possible to argue that an 
object, particularly in Fine Art does have such an active 
capacity, but such a case has yet to be argued and 
won.”124 Whilst he gives support to the idea that practice 
is a cognitive activity, he nevertheless concedes that 
“knowledge” for the PhD has to be communicated and 
assessed as such. What is “monstrous” in Jones’ 
contention is not that Art and Design is at odds with the 
whole notion of research as is understood by such 
bodies as the RAE, but that the qualification of PhD in 
practice based subjects is distorted if the examination 
process is identical to the ones used for essentially 
theoretical subjects.  
The examination process 
continues on after the viva 
voce in the re-insertion of 
marginal glosses such as 
these. Such “margins” or 
frames behave as 
supplements to the body 
text but by inversion, they 
also marginalize the body 
text. 
 
In my view, it emerges that the PhD in Art and 
Design differs from PhDs in other subjects only 
in terms of the examination regime being 
adjusted for the inclusion of a portfolio. In other 
respects it is the same; a PhD is a PhD.125
 
There is an approach to practice as research that takes 
“practice” as a “subject” for research. “Practice”, could 
be, and I suspect in most cases is a continuation of 
already existing developments that, as Peter Chapman 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.elia-artschools.org/_downloads/publications/EJHAE/Jones.doc  (accessed March 2009). It 
is quite useful to think of practice as research in terms of the “monster” in another sense of the word. 
Etymologically, it has roots in the Latin monstare, from which we obtain demonstrate. The meaning is 
“to show” which connects with deixis and the readymade which has been “pointed to” and “called” a 
work of art. Similarly, the original meaning of “theory” depended on a phenomenon being “shown” for 
speculation.  
124 Ibid., p.4 (download copy) 
125 Ibid.,. p.8 
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says, “(L)eads to a different sort of self-interrogation, 
thus the work, the artefact reflects this.”126 Such an 
approach is contingent upon interpretation of the 
artefact(s) presented and in so doing allegorizes its 
meaning. The “key” must therefore lie in the “theoretical 
exposition” that melds the two aspects into an integrated 
whole. Hermeneutical description has the burden of 
setting the “scene” of such practice — explaining what it 
is, in what context, in relation to past precedents. Of 
course this is true of any attempt to contextualize a work 
intended for submission for assessment.  
Jones regards it as essential that this integration is 
acknowledged when, quoting Andrew Harrison, he adds 
that, “the medium of communication (of knowledge) must 
ultimately be works themselves, not descriptions of them 
or assertions about them.”127
 
Stable Communities and Institutions 
This last section will look at the assumptions that art-
based communities and institutions make in order to 
communicate meaning. It questions the stable ground of 
meaning that is allied to “common sense”, and aims to 
show that art practice and communication of meaning 
are mutually opposed such that there is always an 
undecidable quality that is as enriching as it is 
impossible to pin down. In his book, Why Art Cannot be 
Taught, James Elkins writes: 
 
All criticism — and some would say, all 
discourse, including science — depends on 
“interpretive communities”. A group of people 
who think along the same lines form a “stable 
                                            
126 Steven Scrivener and Peter Chapman (2004), The practical implications of applying a theory of 
practice based research: a case study. Working Papers in Art and Design 3 p.11 
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol3/ssfull.html (accessed October 2008 ) 
127 Jones, op. cit. p. 9 The quotation is from Andrew Harrison. 2002. “Shared Judgements” (in) 
Research into Practice Conference proceedings, University of Hertfordshire on 
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/simsim/rtos/  (accessed September 2009) 
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interpretive community”, meaning they will be 
likely to agree among themselves.128
Ultimately, mutual agreement 
is the limit of hermeneutics as 
much — as we can expect 
from the hermeneutic project!  
Indeed, a “collectivist” reading of Wittgenstein would 
claim that meaning itself is generated through 
communities and it is this congruence that is called an 
institution. Wittgenstein’s famous “language games” are 
how meanings become proliferated by communities that 
“play” within the “rules”. The rules themselves (within a 
collectivist reading) are generated agreements as to 
what is acceptable and what is not possible to say and 
mean. Jonathan Culler takes this idea to task from a 
deconstructive point of view when he is reminded of 
Wittgenstein’s assertion, “one cannot say ‘bububu’ and 
mean ‘if it does not rain I shall go out for a walk.’”129 By 
asserting a limit of what is not possible, there opens up, 
by its very mention, that possibility, as Culler says, “(It) 
has, paradoxically, made it possible to do just that. Its 
denial establishes a connection that can be exploited.”130 
Of course, it could be argued that this is just a switch of 
language games in that these are merely additional 
rules, but as Culler later points out, “Those who cite 
Wittgenstein are inclined to adduce the language game 
and its rules as a simple given. ‘But — it is just a fact,’ 
Wittgenstein is reported as saying, ‘that people have laid 
down such and such rules.’131Culler is making the 
deconstructive case for the impossibility of the 
logocentric “origin”, the “grounding” of meaning and the 
“presentness” of any statement to its intention. This is 
not in order to nihilistically abort the whole project of the 
philosophy of meaning (as this in itself would constitute 
such a “ground”), but is a recognition that at the very 
point of enunciation there is division; what Derrida 
Any institution is the 
sum of rules agreed by 
those participants who 
belong to the institution 
Therefore, the institution’s 
rules are based on sincere use 
of language. When that 
language becomes opaque, 
by say, fictionalizing the 
sender the institution loses 
purchase on the meanings 
offered up to it. However … 
the representative of the 
institution may already have 
anticipated this, giving rise 
to a meta-communication. 
A double 
difficulty. Without 
meaning: without 
sender; without 
addressee. 
                                            
128 James Elkins, Why Art Cannot be Taught: a Handbook for Art Students. Chicago, University of 
Illinois 2001 p.128 
129 Culler, op. cit p.124 
130 Loc. cit. 
131 Ibid., p.131. The quotation is from Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, 
Psychology and Religious Belief. Oxford Blackwell,1966. p.6n 
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describes variously as Différance/Différence an 
untranslatable homophone that can only be 
differentiated in the written form as “difference” and 
“deferral” and where its spoken sound carries the 
ambiguity.132This division is what is enriching in its 
potential to “disseminate”.   
If one is to envisage the institution as a stable 
community wherein what is being communicated is 
understood by all participants, there has to be a surplus 
of that which has to be consigned to the margins. That is 
to say, there is always an element of a stable structure 
that is capable of proving the exception and as such, the 
possibility of its destabilization. One such example in the 
artworld’s self-description might be the introduction of 
the readymade, whose ready-madeness is 
simultaneously within and without the realms of 
aesthetics. Concerning the debates prompted by 
academic papers mentioned in this chapter there are 
palpable moves to reorientate academic understanding 
of research in art practice. All the arguments seek 
presentness to intention and as such are caught up in a 
game of reshuffling terminologies that seek to define for 
the sake of “common ground”. James Elkins devotes 
chapter five in Why Art Cannot be Taught to “critiques”, 
which could be seen as micro versions of the idea of 
communicating intentionality through artworks. In his 
summing up he describes “crits” as, “(U)nbelievably 
difficult to understand and rich with possibilities. All kinds 
of meanings, all forms of understandings, can be at 
issue.” He concludes with the admission that, “They just 
barely make sense — they are nearly totally 
irrational.”133  
                                            
132 The choice of homophone is an interesting one as it demonstrates  the idea it is attempting to 
explain; which is that the precedence of “speech” over “writing” (i.e. “presentness” to immediate 
thought and therefore intention) can be hierarchically inverted by the very medium itself : e.g. 
homophones, puns, etc. which Derrida deliberately brings into force.) 
133 Elkins, op. cit p.166 
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This chapter has tried to highlight attempts, both past 
and present, to make a case for art as: an extension of 
reason (Kant), communicable (Gadamer, et al.) and 
bearer of knowledge (current debates over practice as 
research). Each approach has been taken within the 
humanistic tradition where language and intention are 
seen to correspond. However, metaphors and other 
tropes pierce the writings that purport to envelope their 
ideas, threatening rupture. One of the uncanniest of 
these metaphors is the term “embodiment” that is used 
to show how knowledge somehow comes together in a 
work of art, somewhat like a golem or a Frankenstein 
monster. If one were to extend this idea, it might imply 
that “knowledge” is the soul or life force, and the art, the 
unruly part, is the body. It would follow, then, to express 
this Cartesian duality in hierarchical terms where 
soul/immortal/knowledge is superior to 
body/contingent/sensation. Such a description 
immediately invites an inversion where dependence is 
reversed. Apprehension takes over from comprehension, 
and though it agrees in the sense of, “to be conscious of 
by the senses: (and) to lay hold of by the intellect: to 
catch the meaning of: to understand; to recognize etc.,” 
it is appended by, “to look forward to, esp. with 
fear”.134Such a rhapsodic creature as the work-of-art-
embodiment-of-knowledge is the monster created from a 
particular patchwork dream of reason. …And yet this is 
precisely what this chapter aims to become by 
explaining the conditions that make it an embodiment of 
knowledge as a work of art.  
Subject / frame 
The inclusion of “art practice as research” into the 
realms of the RAE is now no longer in question. 
Professor Jones is right in his assertion that, “Only once 
the doctorate is commonplace and doctors abundant in 
UK Art and Design schools will the development of 
                                            
134 Chambers 20th Century Dictionary 
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higher education research culture within Art and Design 
education become mature.”135 His opinion that it is within 
the ways that the institution of higher education deals 
with the assessment of submissions is also likely to be 
heeded, as an article in a recent issue of Times Higher 
Education seems to support.136 There is a peculiar kind 
of irony in the idea that as the world of “art at large” 
moves towards the spectacular, the commercial 
success, the cult of celebrity and chic; the “artworld” that 
Danto (et al.) valorised seems to have found sanctuary 
within the walls of academia.  The move, in British art 
education, from the vocational arts and crafts to the 
academic university degree seems to have set the seal 
on such a project. Perhaps the implication is that “art as 
such” is in its rightful place here. The institution that 
fosters common sensibilities has become a teratological 
place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
135 Jones, op. cit. p.4 
136 Robin Hambleton, “Scholarship is multi-faceted, but the RAE is blind to its richness. Robin 
Hambleton argues that we need a new vision of academia to replace the myopia of the research 
assessment exercise.” THE.19/03/2009. 
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Illustrations 
Fig.26 Damien Hirst, Home Sweet Home 
 
Fig.27 Annotated page 36 from Graeme Sullivan’s book Art 
Practice as Research showing Natalie Jeremijenko’s Tree Logic of 
1999. Six live trees, metal armature, stainless steel planters, and 
telephone poles. Photograph Douglas Barlow. Reproduced 
courtesy of MASS MoCA 
 
Fig.28 Annotated page 25 from Graeme Sullivan’s book Art 
Practice as Research showing Chakaia Booker’s It’s So Hard to 
Be Green 2000. 381 x 640 x 732cm. Rubber tyres and wood. 
Reproduced courtesy of the artist and Marlborough Gallery. 
Photograph by Nelson Tejada 
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Art as Autopoietic Research (Uncanny Methodologies) 
 
The term “autopoiesis” was originally coined by 
Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
J. Varela to describe biological systems such as the 
cell that contain the means of their own creation.  
They are characterized as closed systems. There is a 
compelling congruence between the self-rendering 
properties of such a system and the self-defining roles 
of social systems of which the institution of art is an 
example.  This analogy is taken up by the social 
systems theorist Niklas Luhmann.   
 
… that all subsystems employ the operational 
mode of the system as a whole, in this case 
communication, and that they are capable of 
fulfilling the conditions of system formation — 
namely, autopoiesis and operative closure — 
no matter how complex the emerging 
structures turn out to be.137
 
Within the autopoietic system of institutions that make 
and define art Luhmann distinguishes between 
perception and communication, where the former is to 
do with inner sensation and the latter shared expression.  
Crudely put, these are seen as mutually exclusive.  
Communication is always a case of failure to realize 
perception.   
What interests us here is merely that they help 
clarify how art functions as communication. 
 
communication through art is not 
concerned with automating understanding.  
Rather it is inherently ambiguous 
                                            
137 Niklas Luhmann: Art as a Social System Ch 1Perception and Communication: The Reproduction 
of Forms. Stanford, California. Stanford University Press 2000 p.2 
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(semiologists speak of polysémie) 
independently of whether or not the diver-
gence of observational possibilities was 
planned in the sense of an "open work." The 
fact that observers cannot agree on a single 
interpretation of a given artwork may even 
count as evidence of its artistic quality. This 
is an inevitable and often deliberately 
cultivated aspect of "differentiation."138
Luhmann (Ibid.,  p. 39 -40)  
 
In order to succeed as an 
understanding of communication, 
that is, in terms of understanding 
the difference between information 
and utterance perception requires the 
perception of perception. 
Psychologically, this means that the 
normal externalization of con-
sciousness takes place. Rather than 
being suspended, it is modified by 
the questions "What do I see? Am I 
seeing correctly what I see?  This 
means 
that social communication is 
dealing with a self-generated 
difficulty of understanding to 
which open expectations concerning 
its meaning can attach themselves: 
"The ... life of a poem is the way 
it performs itself through the 
difficulties it imposes upon 
itself" The artist must therefore 
observe his emerging work in 
anticipation of its observation by 
others. ; There is no way of 
knowing how others (which 
others?) will receive the work 
through their consciousness. But 
he will incorporate into the work 
ways of directing the expectations 
of others, and he will make an 
effort to surprise them. This is how, 
to borrow a phrase from antiquity; 
the work of art is created for the sake 
of astonishment. This is how it 
surprises with information about 
itself. This is how it unfolds the 
self-generated paradox of 
creating and disrupting illusion. 
And this is how it incorporates 
the blind spot  — its  own uni ty 
as  unfolded paradox-that 
renders  the work 
incomprehensible to whoever 
focuses on this spot.  
The artist might go astray in the 
process, projecting more into 
his work-or less-than others might 
be getting out of it. This is not the 
point, since it holds for every 
communication. Nor are we 
dealing with a teleological process 
that strives toward consensus or 
adequate understanding. This 
goal, too, may or may not be 
reached in any communication. 
What matters instead is the 
autopoietic organization of an 
activity that processes distinctions 
within the frame of self-generated 
uncertainties, independently of the 
desires, impressions, and feelings 
of those who participate in it. In 
other words, for communication 
to come about, it is irrelevant 
whether or not systems of 
consciousness are capable of 
figuring each other out. 
Here then, lies the heart of the problem of art practice 
as research.  The kind of communication associated 
with art is information about itself, and that 
information is communicated ambiguously is 
moreover a sign of its success.   
While still working from within the 
framework established by the principle of 
imitation, early modern art moves away 
from merely copying what might as well be 
just perceived and toward imitating 
foundational (Platonic) ideas. Art renders 
accessible what is invisible without it. In 
the wake of this transformation, the 
social relationship between the artist and 
his audience becomes more problematic, 
provoking debates on the social status of 
an expert culture of connoisseurs and art 
critics in the eighteenth century and 
eventually leading not only to the 
realization that conversing about art is 
different from conversing about other 
objects, but also to the possibility of 
communicating through art." Is it 
conceivable that art, as a kind of 
"writing," builds a bridge between 
                                            
138 Ibid., pp. 39 – 40 
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perception and communication, that it 
compensates for the communication 
system's inability to perceive? Or could it 
be that art discovers in this very lack a yet 
unoccupied field of possibilities in which it 
can unfold?139
 
Research that is also art practice is therefore not of the 
kind that seeks “external concordance”, but one that is 
itself a manifestation of autopoiesis, satisfying its own 
demands.  This places a burden of justification upon the 
researcher and representatives of the providing 
institution in a way that goes against the grain of what 
has been said.  For the end product of academic 
research is unlikely to succeed if it is ambiguous — 
unless, of course, that ambiguity is found to be a 
necessary outcome of rigorous testing of a hypothesis. 
Under the circumstances of practice-based research the 
testing would require methodological approaches that 
would seem strangely out of place in the scientific sense.  
Indeed, the very term “methodology” seems to fade in 
and out of focus, momentarily graspable in itself but 
chimerical when seen in an art context. One could ask: 
what would a work of art look like if it really were 
research — and what would a piece of research “read” 
like if it really were an art work?  
And indeed, the 
traditional academic 
sense 
Of course art can 
be research. E.g. .a 
sketchbook can be 
research for a more 
resolved piece of 
work. However, art 
and research are 
used here in 
opposition 
“looks like” — does 
appearance take 
precedence? 
 
“Read like”, does 
literal understanding 
take place? 
Then, what is it about the art of today that makes it 
especially amenable to research?  The author believes 
that this situation that has arisen within the academic 
community could only have been possible with the 
appearance of the readymade. It is with an ironical 
gesture that the readymade, as an object outside of art, 
has caused art to become “about itself”, that is to say, a 
closed system.  Whilst art prior to the emergence of the 
readymade was (discounting overtly social or political 
Whilst there are a number of  
“new” forms of the PhD by 
practice that make such 
statements seem almost 
passé, there may be a danger 
of missing the point that is the 
emphasis of text and image as 
mutually exclusive. 
See Foucault, This is not a Pipe 
                                            
139 Ibid., pp.17 - 18 
 98
Rob Ward: The Hunting of the Duckrabbit: In Pursuit of an Aesthetics of Knowledge. 
  
intentions) also self-referential, it was the readymade’s 
capacity to question the ontological status of art that 
gave it a novel if threatening role.  Joseph Kosuth 
(Fig.29) expands the Duchampian paradigm: 
 
And there is certainly an 'art condition' to art 
preceding Duchamp, but its other functions or 
reasons-to-be are so pronounced that its ability 
to function clearly as art limits its art condition 
so drastically that it's only minimally art. In 
no mechanistic sense is there a connection 
between philosophy's 'ending' and art's 
'beginning', but I don't find this occurrence 
entirely coincidental. Though the same reasons 
may be responsible for both occurrences, the 
connection is made by me. I bring this all up to 
analyze art's function and subsequently its 
viability. And I do so to enable others to 
understand the reasoning of my art and, by 
extension, other artists', as well as to provide a 
clearer understanding of the term 'Conceptual 
art'140
Though an “art 
condition” might have 
“existed “in some 
sense, it was assumed  
— and furthermore, 
assumed under a 
different name 
What Kind of Nonsense Is This? 
Richard J. Sclafani The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
Vol. 33, No. 4 (Summer, 1975), pp. 
455-458  
 
 This placed a nominal art in thrall to a theoretical 
exposition.  Without the readymade aesthetics would 
have dominated discourse.  As it stands the 
readymade’s capacity to blur the distinction between 
reality and fiction has insinuated itself into thinking about 
art such that art itself requires self-definition.  Luhmann 
states: “(W)orks of art must be distinguishable as such.  
Otherwise they are perceived as objects of utility or, 
more recently, as trash — or they are mistaken for 
sacred objects, instructional texts, and so on.”141 He 
adds, “Observations of art occur only in the autopoietic 
Cf. a post-modern 
form of pseudo-
aesthetics now 
happens to arise out 
of attempts to 
promote artists from 
gallery “stables”. 
See p.33 ff. 
Institutional theory. For a 
critique of this see 
R.Wolheim. Painting as an 
Art, London, Thames and 
Hudson, 1987  
                                            
140 Joseph Kosuth: Art After Philosophy in Art After Philosophy and After – Collected Writings, 1966 -
1990.  Massachusetts and London, The MIT Press Cambridge. 1991.  p.15 
141 Luhmann: Op. cit. Ch 7 Self Description p.245 
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network of the art system.”   This however can become 
the basis of a duality that is problematical when art is 
treated to the same requirements for academic 
standards of research.   
 
 
 
Fig.29 
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The question arises: To what extent is the practice of art 
equivalent to the acquisition and dissemination of 
knowledge? To sum up the problem:  If art within its 
system of self-definition is autopoietic — that is, it 
constantly re-creates itself — It insinuates an approach 
to methodology that is always on the move.  
Methodological procedures that are meant to stabilize 
approaches by consistent reference to formulations are, 
in the case of art practice, irresoluble.  There will always 
be a “gap” between two types of cognition that entail 
ideation and manifestation that makes certain 
methodologies relevant in a provisional (deferred) sense 
— that is to say, they may be treated either separately, 
or fictionally.  To strive for an all-encompassing 
methodology is like trying to stabilize the duck-rabbit 
riddle into one of its constituent parts.  For the purposes 
of the research, the author will attempt inroads into this 
riddle with the help of examples that whilst they may be 
regarded as works of art are also projects for the sake of 
.. and the tone  of 
the writing … 
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opening up discourse. Conventional methodologies will 
be brought into being only as if they are being used in 
that particular context: that is, I take the fictional option.  
However, one should be aware that they are being used 
comparatively, in that, as fictions, they serve to draw out 
relationships of ideas.  The projects themselves may be 
thought of as meta-projects in that they are subsumed 
under the Project called, In Pursuit of an Aesthetics of 
Knowledge. The Methodology (capital M) of the Project 
(capital P) is to take a philosophical stance from 
deconstruction, institutional theory, the later work of 
Wittgenstein; and the self-reflexive productions of 
Duchamp and Marcel Broodthaers.  The institution 
requires the positioning of a Project and a Methodology 
(as opposed to meta-projects and meta-methodologies) 
but in doing so must acknowledge that Project and 
Methodology are both easily capable of slippage into 
their “meta” counterparts; something that the 
representatives of the University would claim has to be 
resisted so that sense may prevail. It is this “closure” that 
poses the greatest problem to the success of the PhD in 
that the autopoietic system to which the artefact belongs 
is immured from the autopoietic system of the academic 
institution142. For the project to be recognized it will be 
crucial that there is a distinguishable form of reception, 
that is able to mark time, and, as in the case of “normal” 
academic research it will be clear as to what is being 
researched and what the theoretical underpinning is.  It 
is the author’s intention to test the limits of this distinction 
by locating practice at the liminal conjunction of art and 
institution — a place that is fraught with bogies and the 
bogus!  That there is a risk of incomprehensibility is 
acknowledged, but it is a risk analogical with autopoiesis 
itself, i.e., the act of creation. 
Ghostly 
examples … 
What 
examples? 
Where is the 
substance? Not even secure 
projects – meta-
projects 
… and self description 
“A” university: “This” 
university. The range of 
forms of the PhD 
permitted by universities 
has widened 
considerably. The 
conventional form of an 
artwork supported by a 
written text stands for that 
stereotypical submission 
in that it enters the system 
without controversy only 
to open up debates about 
the aporias associated 
with such a system. 
See LUSAD regulations 
for practice based 
research. This is precisely 
the “target” that such a 
stereotype is based upon 
 
                                            
142 This also calls into question why art institutions need to consider themselves as “academic”.  If 
funding were not available, would there be a case for a different kind of art practice (by which I mean 
student practice)? 
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The Uncanny 
In his 1919 essay “The Uncanny”, Freud takes great 
pains to define the term in an exhaustive way taking up 
most of the first part with dictionary definitions and 
literary quotations in order to get a sense of the 
innumerable nuances offered.  Ostensibly, it is in order 
to surpass an earlier essay by Ernst Jentsch (On the 
Psychology of the Uncanny 1906) that Freud goes to so 
much trouble.  However, the essay itself gets caught up 
in its own uncanniness in that it sets out to be a 
disengaged scientific enquiry that leads the author into 
contradiction and a compulsion to represent his 
innermost thoughts.  Just as there appears to be some 
sort of closure on the subject, yet another instance 
seems to spring to mind, as he “finally” concedes: 
 
On the whole, however, this illustrates the 
thesis that we have just advanced — that 
fiction affords possibilities for a sense of the 
uncanny that would not be available in real life. 
Where “networks” of fiction and 
reality cross over through the 
tropes offered by the language 
used in each. 
The foregoing remarks clearly do not exhaust 
the possibilities of authorial licence and the 
privileges that fiction enjoys in arousing and 
inhibiting a sense of the uncanny.143
 
Nicholas Royle, in his uncannily titled double-take study 
The Uncanny,144 says that, 
 
(t)he uncanny is never simply a question of 
statement, description or definition, but always 
engages a performative dimension, a 
maddening supplement, something  
                                            
143 Sigmund Freud The Uncanny (1919) republished as one of five essays in The Uncanny (Trans. 
David McLintock) Penguin Books 2003 p.157 
144 Nicholas Royle: The Uncanny ch.1 “Literature, teaching, psychoanalysis”. Manchester and New 
York, 2003, Manchester University Press. p.16 
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unpredictable and additionally strange 
happening in and to what is being stated, 
described or defined.  To quote Freud in 
another context: “an author’s words are 
deeds”.  They are deeds, we might say, 
precisely to the extent that they can produce 
unpredictable and strange effects. 
In the context of this thesis, 
glosses and footnotes that 
are offshoots of the main 
“body” of the text. See 
chapter 4 “Thesis”  
 
The uncanny, then, is not only subject but also the way 
that the subject is transmitted.  Its transmission is 
effected by the modes of engagement, so that the 
usual source of transmission — for example, an author 
or maker — is not in control of the transmitted subject, 
but only of its transmission.  Royle again states: 
The supplement 
that is … 
 
Freud is storytelling in ways that make his 
essay irreducibly literary, touched and 
energized by the fictional. Towards the end 
he declares: `The uncanny as it is depicted 
in literature, in stories and imaginative 
productions, merits in truth a separate 
discussion' (U, p. 372). Again, it becomes 
difficult to know how (seriously) to take him. 
Yes, he is right: in which case, why has he 
spent so much of his text focusing on 
literature? No, he is wrong: he has 
demonstrated very well that the question of 
literature, fictionality and `imaginative 
productions' cannot be dissociated from any 
attempt (including his own) to elaborate a 
theory or critical account of the uncanny145. 
 
Read: “Thesis” Royle goes on to describe how Freud’s essay loses its 
grip on its subject as uncanny “voices” interrupt and 
comment on his attempt to produce a straightforward 
                                            
145 Ibid., p.18 
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thesis: 
 
Working through digressions, fictional 
insertions, autobiothanatoheterographical 
supplements and the subterranean 
passageways of so-called footnotes, we must 
try to reckon with the ways in which a text 
does not belong. There are mixings, 
deformations and transformations of genre. 
What is the uncanny? Does it belong to 
philosophy or literature or psychoanalysis? If it 
belongs, it is no longer a question of the 
uncanny. Rather, the uncanny calls for a 
different thinking of genre and text, and of the 
distinctions between the literary and non-
literary, academic and nonacademic 
writing146
In discussing Freud we 
are led into discussion of 
how this inflects the text 
in the margins or, how 
one is the supplement of 
the other. 
Such writing falls into 
the margins – is 
marginalized because it 
deflects – it reiterates 
and it “returns” and 
repeats the main body 
of the text. 
 
The uncanny (Das Unheimliche) has entered into 
research by the admission of art practice as its 
performative aspect.  It is not the intention (by the 
author, nor one assumes, by the receiving institution) to 
settle the score by attempting to control this 
uncanniness, as Derrida says about his own writing: 
 
It is less a question of … trying to master the 
Unheimliche or the uncanny so that it becomes 
simply the familiar, than it is of the opposite 
movement. But this is not to say that one has 
to turn oneself over, bound hand and foot, to 
the Unheimliche, because I don’t believe in 
that.  In other words, I don’t believe in seeking 
out absolute risk, absolute nonreappropriation, 
alienation and madness for their own sake, 
and besides, I don’t want to have anything to 
When language of the text 
tries to understand its every 
connotation as it continues 
along the line of the 
sentence. 
                                            
146 Loc. cit. 
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do with that.  I’m too afraid of it.  [What I have 
been] trying to do [is] work out a kind of 
economy with the means at hand, an economy 
that would not be one of a maniacal and self-
centred autotranslation … [I have been trying 
to work with texts as] things that don’t come 
down to me or come back to me.  A text, I 
believe, does not come back … One regulates 
an economy with one’s texts, with other 
subjects, with one’s family, children, desire.147
So, not a(n) 
(auto)biographical text 
but a “being” between 
the two texts that abrade 
each other – their 
resistance to each other 
forms the economy of 
the text.  
The thesis as a 
text that returns to 
its author but 
without a claim 
..even so there is 
much at stake. 
 
“Economy” is here used in its etymological sense of 
“law” (nomos) of the “house” (oikos) and as a counter-
balance to the Unheimliche (un-homely).  It would 
appear that this “domestic science’s” methodologies are 
to be “cooked to order”.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Menu 1 
 
Book of Projects 
Meta-project “Studio” 
Meta-project “Autofiction” 
Meta-project “Monsters” 
Double-bind 
Menu 2 
 
Preface and Introduction 
Studio 
Art as Common Sense (Canny 
Ideologies) 
Art as Autopoietic Research 
(Uncanny Methodologies) 
Thesis 
 
As an attempt to answer their earlier question, “How can 
we carry out rigorous and respectable inquiry using 
methodologies and methods appropriate to practice – 
                                            
147 Jacques Derrida: The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation, trans. Peggy 
Kamuf, ed. Christie V. McDonald  New York, Shocken Books, 1985 pp 156-7 
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research without wearing a lab coat and safety 
goggles?”148, Gray and Malins state: 
  
From an analysis of previous and ongoing 
research degrees in Art and Design a series of 
characteristics emerge which help to define 
research, in terms of ontology, epistemology 
and methodology. 
 With regard to the “knowable”, the kinds 
of projects that have been tackled seem to 
embrace both positivist and constructivist 
research ontologies.  Exploring “what’s out 
there” in an externalist “realist” sense – 
especially in relation to technological issues.149
  
They then go on to cite an example of PhD research 
concerned with the development of kinetic sculpture 
using solar power.  This, merely judging by the title of 
the thesis, seems to avoid the issue of “practice as 
research” as it separates out into two distinct activities.  
Firstly it is concerned with “technology” (and an aspect 
which has surely been well documented), and secondly, 
it treats something called “kinetic sculpture” as if it were 
a commodity requiring upgrading.  Practice, one would 
assume, being “kinetic sculpture” and research, “solar 
power technology”.  This should properly be called 
“research-becoming-practice” as it would appear that 
once the technicalities have been solved there would 
then be scope for further developments in some form of 
kinetic sculpture.  What the research does not address 
(again, I have only the title to go on so it will serve as an 
example) is whether “kinetic sculpture” is itself viable 
practice given its not altogether comfortable nexus in 
the1960s multiplicity of artistic genres.  Kosuth was 
This has similarities with the 
issue broached by Lucy Lyons 
on p. 87 where even an 
“outmoded” form might merit 
serious research. This might 
extend in extremis such that, “it 
doesn’t really matter what is 
researched so long as the 
research is ‘good’”. See also 
B.Readings on the empty 
category of “Excellence” 
                                            
148 Carol Gray and Julian Malins: Visualizing Research: A Guide to the Research Process in Art and 
Design Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004 p18 
149 Ibid., p.20 
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adamant that the “art condition” does not “reside” in 
particular morphologies, but rather in process: 
 
One begins to realize that art's 'art condition' 
is a conceptual state. That the language 
forms which the artist frames his 
propositions in are often `private' codes or 
languages is an inevitable outcome of art's 
freedom from morphological constrictions; and 
it follows from this that one has to be familiar 
with contemporary art to appreciate it and 
understand it. Likewise one understands 
why the 'man on the street' is intolerant to 
artistic art and always demands art in a 
traditional 'language'. (And one understands 
why formalist art 'sells like hot cakes'.) Only 
in painting and sculpture did the artists all 
speak the same language. What is called 
`Novelty Art' by the formalists is often the 
attempt to find new languages, although a 
new language doesn't necessarily mean the 
framing of new propositions: e.g. most kinetic 
and electronic art.150
 
Here, at least, there should be clarity about what is 
meant by practice as research, and it is not surprising 
that there should be so much discussion around its 
possibility within already existing frameworks.  It is not 
the author’s intention to make any such separation; 
however, what will be required by the institution will be 
some form of justifiable clarity that may be regarded as 
methodologically transparent.  It is to this challenge that 
the whole research project is aimed i.e. to show through 
methodologies that pertain to practice as research.     
“New Art” does not 
imply new technology 
nor vice versa. An 
“impressionist-style” 
painting sent to the 
Moon is still an 
impressionist-style 
painting — although 
the “placing” of an art 
work might be. But in 
this case the 
technology becomes 
the “art”. 
 
By what Kosuth terms 
“the framing of new 
propositions” 
One such recent 
“novelty” was when 
one of Hirst’s “Spot 
Paintings” was 
launched on the 
Beagle 2 mission to 
Mars (2002) – 
ostensibly to be used 
for colour calibration. 
The methodologies 
used are reiterated 
throughout the text 
                                            
150 Joseph Kosuth: Art After Philosophy in Art After Philosophy and After – Collected Writings, 1966 -
1990.  Cambridge Massachusetts and London, The MIT Press. 1991 p.20 First published in Studio 
International [London] 178 ( no. 915, 916 and 917 in 1969) 
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At the outset of this chapter I suggested that it was the 
arrival on the art scene of the readymade that made the 
idea of “research” into art practice possible.  The 
readymade, like the atomic bomb, cannot be un-
invented.  We are stuck with it and its consequences.  It 
does not negate other practices in art and design, even 
conventional ones151, but it does alter the paradigm of 
reception.  What is uncanny about the readymade is its 
dubious provenance.  It is both art and non-art and it 
allows for the intrusion of other hitherto undesirable 
(from a medium-specific point of view) aspects such as 
written text — calling for extra-aesthetic 
considerations152.  The autopoietic recusance of the 
readymade can infiltrate like a virus; it can admit any 
thing, any situation, and any consequence to “be” a work 
of art. More insidiously, perhaps, is the converse: that all 
morphologies have now to be regarded in the light of the 
readymade.  What I mean by this is that since the grand 
narrative of modernism has run its course, there can be 
no simple “return” to painting, drawing or sculpture, as 
authentically these were predicated on past historical 
conditions.  To attempt to retrieve or revive these 
conditions would be like the Victorian infatuation with 
mediaeval chivalry and associated Gothic 
phantasmagoria. If one is not to fall victim to 
overweening sentimentality one has to accept this state 
The readymade 
gave the artist 
freedom to apply 
all forms, including 
non-material forms 
to produce “work” 
that delivers 
“cultural capital” 
such that cultural 
capital has become 
the driving force 
that makes it hard 
to distinguish the 
force from the 
product. cf,. the 
empty set called 
“excellence”. 
Concur with Beuys  
That … 
the readymade gave 
the artist the freedom 
to apply all forms 
including non-material 
forms to produce 
“work”. Dissatisfaction 
with neo-aesthetics of 
the cultural capitalists 
has led to an 
adjustment of the art 
work’s purpose to 
foster those areas of 
human interaction that 
had hitherto been 
repressed by the 
hegemony of the 
western aesthetic 
canon. The forms now 
applied have more 
subtlety than the 
“pure” readymade of 
Duchamp and the 
obviousness associated 
with 1930s social 
realism. The potential 
for this hybridization 
of the two forms to side 
step capitalist 
appropriation could 
perhaps be sought 
within the strategies of 
teaching as the work. 
                                            
151 I diverge from Kosuth in that I suspect he lays his argument(s) open to the criticism that they rely 
on conventional (i.e. conventionally “modernist”) notions of an entity called “art condition” as if this 
preceded and exceeded morphology.  My own view is that there can be any kind of morphology, and 
that it is the reception (where receiver includes the maker) that creates a “condition” that can be 
called art. 
152 See, for instance, how pre-modernist “genres” gave way to painting “as such”, and post 
readymade painting became “objects as such”.  Even painting that tries to “return” to some kind of 
content or formal concern can only do so in a bracketed way, i.e., institutionally regarded in a 
bracketed way.  In his paper “Critical objects: the practice of research through making” in Working 
Papers in Art and Design 3  Chris Smith (2004) states:  “There may of course be a problem in the 
universalised Duchampian object in so far as it makes a claim that only operates through 
metaphorical space and context.  There is also a problem in so far as it has come to stand for a 
range of contemporary practices.  Whatever, the Duchampian paradigm has created a space where 
context becomes everything, whether this is the gallery or the textual placing.  It has taken from its 
work the inner complexity of the work.  The work stands merely for the other.”  
 (http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol3/csfull.html) (accessed December 2006) 
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of play.  After the convergence of minimalist modernism 
with Duchampian Objecthood (say, with the instance of 
Judd’s work [Fig.30]) in the 60s, Morphological forms of 
art were set to become representations of their former 
selves and have since become closely related to the 
readymade in that they map onto themselves their 
ostensible identities.   
When I paint a 
“landscape” … 
Landscapes are 
landscapes of 
landscapes –not of 
“land”. The term 
“landscape” is already 
written over – already a 
palimpsest.  
 
 Judd’s work as a termination 
of painting rather than an 
extension of sculpture: i.e. the 
three-dimensional Specific 
Object as a reductive form 
beyond the flat optical space 
of the traditional canvas 
surface into the physical 
space occupied by its 
present-ness.  
 
See M. Fried’s essay Art and 
Objecthood A t Forum June 
1967  and reprinted in 
Minimal Art-A Critical 
Anthology). Studio Vista Ltd, 
1969. 
r
 
 
Fig.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Arthur Danto’s chapter on “Representational Properties 
and Mind / Body Identity” in The Body / Body Problem 
cites examples of paintings that map “reality” onto 
themselves such as Jasper Johns’ Targets, Flags and 
Maps — they are both painterly representations and the 
actual forms of the things represented.  Even a painting 
of a painting whose edges are congruent with each other 
form two co-incidental works:  
The Uncanny double 
versions in the same body 
 
…Even when the coincidence has been 
achieved, so that the vehicle of representation 
indeed has the properties of the thing 
represented, the former is of the latter and the 
distinction would remain, granting that it would 
now be easy to confuse and difficult to 
recognize the differences between (say) a 
 109
Rob Ward: The Hunting of the Duckrabbit: In Pursuit of an Aesthetics of Knowledge. 
  
square of painted white canvas and a square 
white painting of a square.153
 
When Picasso collaged newspaper into an image 
representing a café table with a newspaper on it the 
newspaper occupied this strange ambiguous condition of 
being actual newspaper and representational of itself as 
newspaper (Fig.31).  
 
 
 
Fig.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The readymade is the special case in which the artwork 
is coincidental with itself — that is to say; there is no 
morphological trace of a medium as it is mediated only 
by the art context.  It could be said that the readymade 
and subsequent art morphologies become meta-forms 
for the reason that they are fictions in a location already 
occupied — the readymade in space, and the painting or 
sculpture in history. 
Two spaces 
simultaneously 
“alive” and 
“dead”  
Schrödinger’s 
cat syndrome 
Try looking at 
artworks in a 
gallery in this way 
 
Accepting that art practice can disseminate 
polymorphous representations (and the latter half of the 
twentieth century gives plenty of corroboration for this), it 
places a great burden upon hermeneutical exposition.  
Whilst the rest of the humanities may retain a vestige of 
tradition that is assessable, despite modernist 
tendencies to such reductive forms as aleatoric 
Art becomes harder to 
understand because 
for art to progress it 
has to become harder 
to understand. 
                                            
153 Arthur C Danto The Body / Body Problem – Selected Essays “Representational Properties and 
Mind / Body Identity” University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles 1999 p.26 
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performance, they have not suffered the fate that the 
readymade has brought to art practice.  The areas of 
literature and music have associated disciplines, 
whereas art has even lost, despite attempts to resurrect, 
its morphological exegeses in painting or sculpture.  
What is residual is that which ontologically opens itself 
up to interrogation and interpretation.   It is this emphasis 
on hermeneutics that I maintain makes it especially 
conducive to research.  It is the fact that the 
hermeneutical processes that run parallel with praxis can 
themselves be called practice that intrigues me to the 
extent that I sense it is the core of the difficulty 
associated with trying to impose inappropriate 
methodologies on a morphological amoeba.  If 
“interpretation” is itself in question, then it becomes clear 
that any sense of “using” a methodology as if it were a 
specialized “tool” would suggest expediency through 
amnesia, forgetting for convenience’s sake, the caveat 
and presumptuously proceeding as if history had stood 
still.  I believe that the problem of appropriate 
methodology stems from the confusion of usage.  
Wittgenstein’s assertion that meaning is socially defined 
and that usage is its appropriate condition, works very 
well for social interactions that have a longstanding or 
traditional (or cultural) milieu such as an aesthetic 
approach to works of art.  The conditions that obtain 
post-readymade have severed this milieu where, “what 
is art?” replaces “what is art about?”  It is the lack of 
recognition of this severance that has led to the 
confused use of terminology of pre-readymade (i.e. 
Kantian) aesthetics to (Duchampian) deixic 
pronouncements (i.e. that this thing pointed at, declared, 
is a work of art!).  To talk or write about anything as if it 
were a work of art now seems possible to the extent that 
the writing and talking have become autopoietic 
conditions within the work of art being expounded: in 
A case may be made for a 
practice that attunes itself 
to research by means 
other than the 
conventional separation of 
text and artefact. One is, 
however sceptical if one 
considers “text” as any 
form of subsumed 
communication of 
intention. Speech, etc. as 
writing. Cf. Derrida. 
In an ironic sense, 
already covered — 
where quality of 
research depends upon 
the ingenuity of the 
research question and 
the methodology more 
than the object of 
research. In this case, 
the success or quality 
of the “art”! 
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Derridian terms, they frame the conditions and are 
themselves framed. 
 
What happens when one entitles a "work of 
art"? What is the topos of the title? Does it 
take place (and where?) in relation to the 
work? On the edge? Over the edge? On the 
internal border? In an overboard that is re-
marked and reapplied, by invagination, within, 
between the presumed center and the 
circumference? Or between that which is 
framed and that which is framing in the 
frame? Does the topos of the title, like that 
of a cartouche, command the "work" from 
the discursive and juridical instance of an 
hors d'oeuvre, a place outside the work, 
from the exergue of a more or less directly 
definitional statement, and even if the 
definition operates in the manner of a 
performative? Or else does the title play 
inside the space of the "work," inscribing the 
legend, with its definitional pretension, in an 
ensemble that it no longer commands and 
which constitutes it-the title-as a localized 
effect?154
 
 The object and its associated discourse are also a kind 
of test — a tried and tested test, but also one that may 
still be applied with re-invented vigour, testing both the 
validity of the proposed work and the parameters of the 
institution to which it is addressed.  As Thierry de Duve 
says of the implications of Duchamp’s proto-
readymade, Fountain: 
  
Was Duchamp's urinal a joke or a test? Or 
was it both? Jokes and tests certainly 
                                            
154 Jacques Derrida (Trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod) The Truth in Painting  Chicago and 
London, The University of Chicago Press 1987 p.24 
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abound in the history of modern art, and 
they're usually the two sides of one and the 
same coin. Every futurist prank, dadaist hoax, 
expressionist farce, or surrealist pun that 
history has recorded was a way of scoffing at 
some authority whose liberalism, open-
mindedness or resistance to ridicule it put to 
a test.155
Duchamp's urinal is no exception. 
But here the joke was a test in more 
than one sense, for the testing device 
was obviously designed to be itself 
submitted to a test: if the hanging 
committee of the show at the 
Grand Central Palace consented to 
exhibit the gleaming object poking 
fun at them, they would have to call 
it art. If they were to pass the test, 
so would it. They didn't, as we shall 
see. But it did, and that's the irony 
of the joke. Who would dare deny, 
today, that Duchamp's urinal is art? 
Such is its status in any case or it 
wouldn't be on the record. What is 
also on the record is that cohorts of 
artists registered that Duchamp's 
joke had passed the test and then went 
on to play variations on it, pushing 
the limits of art further and further, 
probing its boundaries, some jok-
ingly, some in dead seriousness. From 
surrealism to conceptual art, half of the 
avant-garde played a game on the 
definition of art in general. (The 
other half, which is often called 
modernism, apparently played a 
different game, confining itself 
within the specific boundaries of 
painting or sculpture.') While Meret 
Oppenheim cloaked a cup and its 
saucer in fur and Magritte put a 
painting representing a piece of Brie 
under a cheese-cover, the surrealists as 
a group put up a show where myriads 
of "objets sauvages," redubbed "objets 
surrealistes," claimed their newly 
conquered art-status. Later, Yves 
Klein exhibited the Void and Arman 
the Full, while Manzoni sold cans of 
Artist's Shit and balloons of Artist's 
Breath. Warhol produced fake Brillo 
Boxes while Judd and Morris pro-
duced boxes. Rauschenberg sent his 
gallerist, Iris Clert, a telegram stating 
"This is a portrait of Iris Clert if I 
say so," and a few years later On 
Kawara sent his gallerist, Yvon 
Lambert, a telegram stating "I am 
still alive." And by the time lan 
Wilson could carry on conversations 
about art and call them art, Robert 
Barry was able to invite his audience 
to an (imaginary) round-the-world 
hopping from one gallery to the next, 
only to discover that the promised 
show was to be held the next month 
in the next gallery. In each of these 
pieces, subtle humor and deliberate 
provocation mingled to raise the 
question of the conditions under 
which any given thing could be 
called art 
 
De Duve Ibid., pp.91-92 
 
Commentators desperate to uphold art practice to the 
test of academia agonize over the problem of whether 
practical methodological approaches to knowledge are 
sustainable.  Stephen Scrivener’s attempts to bypass 
such hard-line definitions of “knowledge” (a litmus test 
some would say) when applied to art practice seem to 
get caught up in arguments about justifying what artists 
do as an alternative (what he describes as 
“apprehensions”).  It is my contention that the “art” he 
describes is of the pre-readymade, (pre)modernist 
ethos of being concerned with, “deep insights into 
emotion, human nature and relationships, and our 
place in the World, etc”156.  However, almost in passing, 
and as a defensive rearguard response, he admits to 
the possibility that, “If someone set their mind to it, I’d 
guess that they could communicate knowledge 
together with justification pictorially (my italics) (it is 
another matter whether it would be regarded as art)”157.  
It is the assumed “pictorialness” that betrays the 
concern to uphold (at least) modernist values, and in 
the last parentheses, doubt over this phenomenon’s 
inclusion into the art world is a phrase reminiscent of 
early twentieth century bourgeois outrage against the 
                                            
155 Thierry de Duve Kant After Duchamp Ch.2 “Given the Richard Mutt Case”  October Books, 
Cambridge Mass. and London, The MIT Press 1996 pp. 91-92 
156 Stephen Scrivener “The art object does not embody a form of knowledge” in Working Papers in 
Art and Design 2002  (http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol2/scrivenerfull.html
(accessed December 2006) p. 1 
157 Ibid., pp. 9-10 
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avant-garde.  My point being this:  perhaps there is a 
kind of art that does directly address knowledge; 
perhaps this is the only kind of art that can do so, but 
can only do so by metamorphosing into an 
interventionist, site specific form of parasitism — or 
rather, “negotiated symbiosis”, where “art”, “practice”, 
“institution” and “knowledge” are all part of a discourse 
on knowledge, institutions, practice and art. 
 
Interview (Mumbo and Jumbo) 
I suspect it is apposite to try to place some of these 
ideas into perspective taking, for example, one of the 
projects undertaken so far, eliciting methodologies both 
within and without the framework of its making.  Let us 
consider the project called Interview – Mumbo and 
Jumbo (August 2006, [Fig.32]).  This consisted of 
setting up two portfolios on a table, each containing ten 
sheets of hand made paper.  In one of the portfolios the 
paper had screen printed text of questions and in the 
other were appropriate answers to those questions.  
The project took the form of the artist and an 
“interviewer” taking it in turns to speak the words from 
each portfolio.  The project was described beforehand 
with the “intention” of the project explained, citing the 
content of the question and answer sheets.  The 
“event” was photographed in black and white and 
submitted as part of the end of year research report to 
LUSAD.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Fig.32 
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Now, all of this seems pretty straightforward until one 
begins to question what exactly was taking place. 
There may be a reaction based on suspicion (the 
“Emperor’s New Clothes reaction).  For instance, one is 
right to suspect certain “red herrings” here: for 
example, how do we know that the “interview” actually 
took place?  Or, is there something suspicious about 
why “still” photography was used to record the process 
of an interview — and why black and white?  Did the 
“event” qua event take place at all?  These reactions 
are fairly common kinds of response to “obscure work”.  
The accompanying text “explaining” the “intentions” of 
the event follow the usual track of “clarifying” what has 
come to be one of the many intractable examples of 
(post) modern art.  Are these helpful in any way?  Or, 
are we now used to the idea that certain artists subvert 
the whole encounter where the frame of the art space 
violates gallery space, and systems of information are 
parodied. Is Interview a hoax or a demonstration of its 
own redundancy as the recording of an artwork — a 
joke, or a test? Interview could be explained as an 
interview, or as an artifice mimicking the process by 
which artists (and particularly student candidates) “pass 
the test” of inclusion. Interview could stand for 
something else — a metaphor, for example, for 
dialogue between two people that is prescribed 
implying latency of options.  Even if all of these 
suspicions and interpretations were true, what would be 
the response, given that meaning would be modified; 
given that this new layer of explanation that we are now 
working through is taking place?  Does it matter if the 
event Interview did not take place at all? Because, 
within the context of methodological approaches, it is 
serving exactly the purpose that other works of art-
practice can be found to be doing: that is, being the 
subject of analysis and discourse.  It serves the 
purpose of inclusion herein — this particular piece of 
Once the shaggy-dog 
story is mentioned, there 
arises a suspicion about 
everything presented as 
sincere!  
The canard! 
The canard/lapin! 
 
See also a similar corrosive 
effect of the cryptomorph in 
J.Elkins, Why Are Our 
Pictures Puzzles? On the 
Modern Origins of Pictorial 
Complexity. New York and 
London, Routledge, 1999. 
At what point do we 
get “purchase” on 
authenticity – if at all? 
But there must be 
a point, or our 
interest would 
dwindle. Perhaps it 
is the point at 
which we change 
tack with regard to 
how we approach. 
Where “getting the 
joke” opens up an 
initiation! 
Or, is awareness of 
the blague an 
initiation and 
another kind of 
methodological 
enquiry 
Interpreting the locus of 
interpretation 
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text describing, implying (or fictionalizing) an event. 
However, unlike other practices offered for the purpose 
of research, Interview opens up the process of 
interpretation; a process that examines not only the 
intentional veracity of the “work”, but also assumptions 
and guiding language of this work that is about the 
work.  What may have been seen to encompass an 
external event has embedded itself in this text such that 
the page with its lure of an image and quasi-
speculation about its content show an approach to 
(re)new methodological approaches that seem to fall 
between representations.  It may be thought that the 
approaches I am taking are both critical and relative, 
relating to constructivist theory as expounded by 
Glasersfeld.  In Guba’s Paradigms of enquiry this 
implies that Methodology (capital M) will take the form 
of Dialogic and Transformative (critique of 
[mis]appropriation and altering approaches to how 
practical work can be regarded as research), and 
Hermeneutic (possibilities for interpreting meaning) and 
Dialectic (discourse that generates credible constructs). 
This terminology will suffice as a separator of 
processes generating more complex interactions, for 
instance “dialectic” implies thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis, a philosophical procedure that, whilst 
satisfying the logic of educational objectives, ought to 
acquiesce to what Deleuze and Guattari158 would 
characterize as the analogy of the rhizome (i.e. 
undifferentiated, unhierarchical) 
The process — the 
methodology, again and 
again repeats and bifurcates 
ad infinitum — eternally 
evasive — uncannily 
irretrievable … 
Ultimately this thesis is a 
reduction ad absurdum — 
and as such is its own 
progenitor — autopoietic 
variations on theme. 
And parody of the academic 
papers that cite … 
 
The author —authority as a 
fictional self.  
The “I” – authentic 
The “we” 
The economy of the home, the 
clan, the tribe, the family— 
The “FAMILIAR” 
Uncanny Return of the Work – (Re)Beginnings 
These last paragraphs have changed tone.  From the 
voice of “the author” of the first paragraph, there is now 
an “I”, an authorial first person.  In much art historical 
                                            
158 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans. Brian Massumi): A Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Ch.1 Rhizome. Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press. 1987 pp.3 – 25 
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and theoretical discourse the voice is one of “we”: we 
are travelling together down this unknown dusty road 
and “one” of us knows where (s)he is going.    
A proposal has been made that offers up the readymade 
as the quintessence of a paradigm shift in the form of a 
short essay with illustrations.  The essay might read 
quite reasonably as an argument for the inclusion of any 
object or circumstance as a work of art — something 
corroborated in the twentieth century — which threatens 
value and meaning unless disciplined by context.  The 
rules of the institution become that context, and in the 
case of research by part practice it is the University and 
the funding body that decides what the rules consist of 
and how they are to be implemented.  Yet if the “real” 
situation of twentieth century and early twenty-first 
century art practice is acknowledged, it should be made 
clear that the practice of “naming” is legitimate which will 
eventually find itself voiced in the question: “Under what 
conditions is the work called a work of art and under 
what conditions is it called research?”  An answer may 
require a reciprocal antonomasia. The context is made 
by the art that is made by the context.  The short essay 
is itself a work defining context within context.  Although 
it is composed of words with some illustrations, it need 
not be regarded as literary.  It may be thought of as a 
fragment of a catalogue of the work of so and so.  If 
worked up into something more “glossy” it may stand 
alone as an example of art practice.  Context (“thought 
of as a fragment”, “glossy”) changes apprehension. 
Nicholas Royle’s Book, The Uncanny unearths the 
spectrality of Freud’s 1919 essay of the same title (Das 
Unheimliche) in which he finds a pervasive influence 
disturbing the familiarity of apprehension into apparition.  
Institution as the 
economy of the 
home 
— a fictional world where 
what is in this (real) world 
becomes significant in the 
fictional world 
Getting “lost” as in 
vertiginous fictional 
spaces. 
The “double” (Doppelganger), the “return” and repetition, 
the change and interchange of “names” are fearfully 
characteristic of the uncanny.  They disturb by their 
irresolvable ambiguity; alive and dead at the same time 
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(Fig.33).  “There is also a kind of dismemberment in 
operation …” says Royle: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Jeremy Bentham, 
Utilitarian 
philosopher and 
author of “the 
greatest happiness 
principle”. His head 
and skeleton, after 
dissection, were 
acquired in 1850 by 
the University 
College. The 
skeleton was 
stuffed with hay, 
dressed in his 
clothes and put on 
show as an Auto-
Icon.  
 
See also Marcel 
Broodthaers: Interview 
with Jeremy Benthamin 
in his film, Figures of 
Wax 1974 
 
 
Fig.33 
The uncanny figure of Jeremy 
Bentham on display at University 
College  London 
 
 “that recalls Freud’s remark about 
‘[d]ismembered limbs, a severed, head, a hand 
cut off at the wrist [and] feet which dance by 
themselves’: all these have something 
uncanny about them’. If the University is a 
body, it is strangely headless, estranged and 
disconnected from itself.  Directives come from 
the phantom of ‘the centre’ – and here we 
might recall Derrida’s provoking contention 
that the centre, as ‘the absence of play and 
difference’, is ‘another name for death’159
 
To return to the living, to use Derrida’s analogy would be 
to “play” – to de-centre, to live on the “edge”, but also, to 
“limit” oneself.  The automaton’s methodologies are to 
be mirrored in order to displace them.  
As a mirror 
vanquishes the 
vampire so parody 
vanquishes regulations Such approaches may be thought of in methodological 
terms as “testing” the limits of the frame.  Work that has 
so far been produced has exposed one common 
strategy: intangibility.  Here there is a connection with 
                                            
159 Nicholas Royle: The Uncanny ch.1 “Literature, teaching, psychoanalysis”. Manchester and New 
York, 2003 Manchester University Press. p.54 
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Broodthaers in that visibility holds in abeyance text, 
texture, touch and tangibility.  In one sense it is ironically 
analogous to all institutionalized exhibition where 
artworks are present and distant due to protocols of 
spectatorship and the fragile (and expensive) nature of 
the objects displayed.  The “frame” as such is literally the 
gilded frame (or absence) around the painting, its form, 
its shape that addresses by connotation and denotation, 
the plinth (or absence) upon which the sculpture is 
situated; it is the gallery’s ambience; it is the title (even 
untitled) and the “interpretation” often located on a 
plaque alongside the work. Also, it is “what the spectator 
brings to the work”.  Even accepting these 
contingencies, the “work” that is framed allows the 
spectator to engage.  Work that debars the spectator by 
yet another frame – be it literally a barrier, or a 
contradictory mode of reception, an encasement or a 
non sequitur of a route map is a different matter.  Its 
refractoriness leads to a kind of “no space” where 
spectator “grasps” through seeing work-and-frame.  His 
or her embodiment is irresolutely situated simultaneously  
Through art books 
and journals, culture 
programmes on radio 
or TV. 
inside and outside of this monstrous hybrid.   
This chapter may be regarded as one such hybrid 
where the lure to its encounter is via reading.  Its 
self-reflexive, self-referential strategy is to split into 
two, where “reading” and “looking” are its modes of 
counterchange.  As lure it is “bait”, etymologically, 
derived from “an invitation” (even here there is an 
implicit ambiguity in its sinister and homely 
etymological nuances!)  It is the lemma, the point of 
entry, the “given”:  
The hybrid that 
is /that slips 
between ergon 
/parergon 
“bait” = Unheimlich 
“invitation” = Heimlich 
 
But since it is necessary, in fact, to begin 
"lemmatically, so to speak" (sozusagen 
lemmatisch) by anticipation or precipitation 
of the circlet, Hegel recognizes that his 
point of departure is vulgar, and its 
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philosophical justification insufficient. He 
will have begun by the "representation" 
(Vorstellung) of art and of the beautiful for 
the "common consciousness" 
(imgewohnlichen Bewusstsein). The price 
to be paid may seem very heavy: it will be 
said for example that the whole aesthetics 
develops, explicates, and lays out the 
representations of naive 
consciousness.160
i.e. a fictionalized “naïve 
consciousness” which has to be  
and yet  isn’t naïve  
 
We are dealing with the blind spot where writing “about” 
loses its subject and becomes writing “for”— a 
performative function.  The thing “becoming-what-it-is” 
has two beginnings that overlap, that map each onto the 
other.  Then the question might be asked:  
 
But how to begin without having begun, since 
one needs a distinction in order to begin?" 
And must not the distinction itself be 
distinguished from its indication so that the first 
distinction reenters itself. In the older literature, 
this problem was treated in quasi-objectivist 
terms: by appealing to divine inspiration, to the 
inscrutability of sudden insights, or to the for-
tune of chance" — all of which obscured the 
issue. … 
A
s if the preface w
ere dictated 
before the w
ork w
as w
ritten 
Se
e 
pr
ef
ac
e 
to
 th
es
is
 
… Only an observer can run into paradox and 
be forced to admit that paradox is always 
presupposed — in mathematical and even 
more so in logical operations — as the blind 
spot that makes distinction, and thus 
observation, possible in the first place."161
 
                                            
160Jacques Derrida, (Trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod) The Truth in Painting  Chicago and 
London, The University of Chicago Press 1987 pp.28 – 29. 
161 Luhmann, Op. cit.. pp. 31 – 32 
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It is nevertheless a knowledge of “figure and ground” 
that allows the distinction between “a square of painted 
white canvas and a square white painting of a square” — 
even if that ground cannot be seen.  The knowledge of 
its possibility supposes the awareness of its existence.  
What seems an odd proposition is that the observer, 
(observing/assessing institutional representitive) has to 
create a fiction which is cover for that blind spot in order 
to find a grounding where two identities coincide?  This 
is anticipated by the maker.  That there are such 
things as beginnings is difficult to apprehend.  
Heidegger writes about being thrown into the world, 
and before (spatially in front of) a paradox there is 
only a sense of “before” (temporally never after, that 
is, never resolved).  What then can be asked of 
research that distinguishes it from art practice? Is this 
not the reverse of the burning question that tries to 
connect the two?  Imagine a doctoral thesis (as 
research) and another thesis (as art practice) — one 
may be called the anti-thesis of the other.  In what way 
will they differ?  Would it be content or form that would 
disturb the ground, exposing the tectonic plates of 
either intention, or, could the deferral of that 
pronouncement be continued indefinitely?  Here is 
tricky terrain that the maker has inadvertently 
wandered into because if he succeeds in the latter he 
will quite reasonably fail the requirements of the 
institution, and if he rescinds the deferral he has failed 
on his own terms.  The maker has become enmeshed 
in his own paradox!   
At this point the thesis 
has become the 
economy. It is the 
reconciled abode where 
the prodigality of the 
art system finds 
resolution within the 
institution 
 
Should they differ? 
However, institutional  
definition makes the 
difference. 
 
 
 
 
Does this, then, not reflect on the institutional values (of something that is 
chimerical)? 
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(Re)openings and Disinterment  
 
In his chapter “Conceptual Art and the Suppression 
of the Beholder”162, Charles Harrison makes out a 
case for Art & Language that is different from the 
conceptual art surrounding it in the late 60s and early 
70s.  Conceptual art, he has it, was yet another 
Modernist twist in the tale of Minimalism that was 
itself (although in self-denial) a twisted form of 
reductive Abstraction.  That twisted form of Literalism 
dubbed “Objecthood” was different from Abstract 
painting in that it was not addressed to the spectator 
as an optical experience — that is, it was not to be 
beheld.   
Seeing 
As a complex activity — not 
necessarily “looking at”. 
 
Consider “saccades” and 
other involuntary 
movements of the eye as well 
as the physiological 
relationship between the eye 
and brain. 
 
A(n) …assumption was that works of art are 
things made primarily to be looked at — or 
‘beheld’, to use a term given special 
currency by Michael Fried.  If that seems a 
truism, we should note that not all possibly 
canonical works of modern art are 
necessarily seen as fulfilling the description.  
The ready-mades of Marcel Duchamp, for 
instance, were used in the later 1960s and 
have been used since as examples of a form 
of art which — whatever its merits or 
inadequacies — was not addressed to the 
beholder.163
? 
 
Harrison goes on to suggest that the form of modernist 
critique — its compelling if specious American form 
elicited by Greenberg and Fried — “was such as to 
contain the reader within the terms of its argument.  You 
either attended to the optical qualities and the syntax of 
                                            
162 Charles Harrison: Essays on Art & Language. Cambridge Mass and London, The MIT Press. 
2001pp. 29 – 62  
163 Ibid., p.33 
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the works at issue, or you were disqualified from 
discussing them.”164 Minimalist work at that time was 
often on the cusp of being regarded as either an 
extension of the modernist aesthetic of criticizing its own 
discipline (“not to subvert it “ but “to entrench it more 
firmly in its area of competence”165) or, as an example of 
“theatricality” — disqualified because of its Literalism.  
For instance, when it came to decisions about  
Modernism 
was elitist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
Fig.34                Fig35 
 
 
which camp Frank Stella’s paintings (Fig.34) fell into 
Fried and Carl Andre were “fighting for his soul” such 
was the importance given to the high ground of avant-
gardism — that is to say, a continuation of Modernism.166
That is to say, a 
hierarchical, 
hegemonic status. 
 When Harrison later introduces the forms of conceptual 
art that have derived from “a cluster of ‘post-Minimal’ 
forms”, he cites Sol Le Wit’s (Fig.35) declaration in 
“Sentences on Conceptual Art”. 
 
Ideas alone can be works of art; they are in a 
chain of development that may eventually find 
some form. All ideas need not be made 
physical. 
 
                                            
164 Ibid., p.35 
165 Clement Greenberg ‘Modernist Painting’ First Published in Forum Lectures (Voice of America), 
Washington DC, 1960.  Reprinted in Art and Literature, Lugano, No 4 Spring 1965.  Quoted here 
from Harrison and Wood Art in Theory 1900-2000. Oxford and Malden Mass. Blackwell Publishing 
1992 p.774 
166 Charles Harrison, Op. cit.. p.44 
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And 
 
Since no form is intrinsically superior to 
another, the artist may use any form, from an 
expression of words (written or spoken) to 
physical reality, equally.167
 
It was these forms, seen in the light of reductive 
Modernism, that confined them to what Dan Flavin said 
of art, “(S)hedding its vaunted mystery for a common 
sense of keenly realized decoration … (we are) 
pressing downward towards no art — a mutual sense 
of psychologically indifferent decoration — a neutral 
pleasure of seeing known to everyone”168  It is at this 
point in the essay that Harrison makes his case for the 
different approach taken up by Art & Language 
(Fig.36).   
No art — a patronizing view 
— as once applied to child 
art, “primitive “art etc. 
 
 
Fig.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He sees the critique of modern art — entrenched rather 
in a cultural hegemony that has found great advantage 
in continuing a debate in which the beholder is 
marginalized into what Richard Wollheim calls “the 
                                            
167 Ibid., p.47 originally in Art-Language, vol.1, no.1 (May 1969),pp.11 - 12  
168 Ibid., p.49 with endnote Quoted by Lucy Lippard in her introduction to Minimal Art (catalogue of an 
exhibition at the Geemeentemuseum, The Hague, 23 March – 26th May 1968, p29  
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adequately sensitive, adequately informed, 
spectator”169.  
  
 …for the discourse of the beholder is a 
literary discourse.  It constructs retrospective 
historical accounts, forms of interpretation and 
systems of evaluation, and it constructs them 
as kinds of allegories which develop in a time 
and a space adjacent to practice but separated 
from it.  The mechanisms which animate these 
allegories, and which give them their 
systematicness and their autonomy, are those 
forms of power and interest which define and 
sustain the beholder’s non-aesthetic existence.  
The forms of reference to the aesthetic which 
are the apparent functions of the allegories 
serve and express these powers and interests 
even as they mask and misrepresent them.  
The ‘adequately sensitive, adequately 
informed, spectator’ historicizes, interprets and 
judges in the aesthetic realm, and does so 
securely so long as he is allowed to be 
disinterested; that is to say, as the material 
(and other) grounds of that adequacy are not 
laid open to inquiry.170
Literary 
 
What Harrison is proposing here, which is relevant to 
this chapter and to the Project as a whole, is that the 
American interpretation of post-Minimal conceptualism 
was further evidence of a kind of professionalism vis-à-
vis the gallery institution and those forms of 
commercialized myth-making, whereas (and if the 
legacy of Modernism in some sense emancipating) 
Through art books 
and journals, culture 
programmes on radio 
or TV. 
                                             
169 Ibid., p.50 quoted from Richard Wollheim Painting as an Art.Thames and Hudson London 1987 
p.22 
 
170 Ibid., p.55 
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there are grounds for an art practice that disturbs its 
own foundations as it builds upon them.  Whilst this is 
hardly a reassuring allegory from an architectural 
standpoint, it emphasises the kind of nomadic un-
homing that finds its rationale through didactic 
strategies.   
Bill Readings describes the ideals of the Humboldtian 
University (that has been the model for our modern 
“cultural” university) as having “communicative 
transparency” (his italics): 
The uncanny aspect 
of language that 
urges on the 
meanings that we are 
made of 
 
For the German Idealists, this transparency 
allows the fusion of ethnic community and 
absolute idea.  The fusion takes place at 
multiple levels.  Pedagogically, Fichte refers to 
teaching as the self-unveiling of the students 
to the professors and of the professors to the 
students.  Self-unveiling has nothing to do with 
classroom nudity but with a dialogue that is 
supposed to fuse the teachers and the 
students into a single corporate body with “a 
common spiritual existence … in which they 
have learned early on to know each other in 
depth and to respect each other, where all 
their reflections take off from a base which is 
identically known by all and which provides no 
matter for dispute among them.”  This is the 
community of the University, the endless 
dialogue of which Humboldt and 
Schleiermacher speak.  It is a community 
whose dialogue is about nothing, in the sense 
that no issues for dispute are engaged.  There 
are no differends, no radical and 
incommensurable differences, only arguments 
See chapter four 
“Thesis” for an 
exposition in the 
modern university 
Dialogue for the pleasure 
of speaking and listening 
Analogy with 
Eagleton’s criticism of 
Gadameran 
hermeneutics 
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as to the exact nature of what it is that we 
agree on.171
 
I feel that we are now in a position to pull some of these 
ideas together in order to foreground the main purpose.  
It seems to me that there is much in common between 
the dialogues between the artist and Harrison’s (and 
indeed Wollheim’s) “adequately sensitive, adequately 
informed, spectator”, and the “dialogues about nothing” 
between the professors and their students in the 
University of Culture described by Readings.  Both 
participate in “already givens”; the cultural respect that 
marks the boundary of hegemonic tolerance.  Whilst the 
term “respect” can have negative connotations of 
reserve, of leaving well alone, it can also fall back on its 
etymological meaning of “regarding”, of “looking back”, 
and therefore “re-viewing”.  The kind of reviewing I am 
suggesting is not dependent on “sensitivity to” or 
“knowledge of” the autopoietic system that is art theory 
and practice, but rather it is a speculation about the 
conditions that operate ontologically when an 
educational Institution admits a form of critique that is 
outside of its anticipated curriculum morphology.  This is 
not to naively assume that the Institution will accept 
defeat – it will, of course, make its own mind up about 
“quality” and accept the work submitted either for a pass 
or a fail.  However, I might suggest that by doing so, it 
will be acting in a way very similar to the commercial 
appropriation of avant-garde stances.  Not only will there 
be no shock value, but that very intended shock value is 
already anticipated as commercial (or educational) 
surplus value.   
So, for instance, when 
a student plays a role 
as opposed to offering 
an authentic account, 
such things arise most 
predominantly in an 
art educational setting 
where the work 
submitted for 
assessment derives 
ultimately from a 
fictionally projected 
persona. 
And the development 
of the practice-based 
PhD 
                                            
171 Bill Readings The University in Ruins. Cambridge Mass. and London, Harvard University Press. 
1996. pp. 122 - 123.  The inserted quotation is from Johann Gottlieb Fichte, “Deductive Plan for an 
Institution of Higher Learning to be Founded in Berlin,” in Philosophies de l’Université, pp.180 – 181 
trans. Readings 
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It is Readings’s intention to show how the idea of a 
University of Culture that once preserved the identity of 
ethnicity and nationhood has developed in a high 
capitalist, globalized era into a University of Excellence.  
The consequences of this are that as there is no longer 
any belief in a myth of grounded culture, all 
manifestations of cultural activity are provisional and 
valueless per se and are given token accountability in 
the term “Excellence”.  Excellence, then, is a 
bureaucratized form of intention.  It has no immanent 
subject or purpose besides promoting itself.  In this 
model of the institution, there is neither purpose in 
“unveiling”, nor in dialogue extirpating the roots of 
intention.  If the rules set down by the Institution are 
obeyed – or rather accounted for — then work submitted 
may qualify for the approbation that goes under the 
name of Excellence.   
Cf. Lucy Lyons p.106 
Idea is of a “research 
excellence” where practice 
only occupies a token 
position in order to 
instigate research. 
A flourish as an empty sign 
At this point it would be useful to return to the problem of 
the practice that set out to test the rules of this institution 
and to embed the test within the practice itself.  The 
problem for the practitioner as candidate was that any 
unresolved confusion of the theory and practice would 
be deemed unacceptable by the institution, and that 
resolved presentation would fail the test of its own 
parameters which are necessarily ambiguous.  The 
Institution as authority can, of course, make decisions 
without compunction.  After all, it has its objectives and 
outcomes clearly stated.  Yet, if the University is 
modelled either on culture or on Excellence — that is, 
either concerned with dialogue or with accountancy — it 
ought to engage in the process of engagement, even if 
that engagement confounds the process.  In so doing it 
would find itself caught up in a similar conundrum to that 
which faces the practitioner.  Legitimately, it needs to fail 
the candidate, and yet the conditions for successful 
so, ironically 
enough, the 
Wittgensteinian 
stuff about 
meaning being use 
supports the 
passing of this 
thesis because it 
demonstrates that 
it can use the 
theoretical 
words/concepts/syn
-taxes and 
arguments of the 
postmodern academy 
in an appropriate 
and satisfactory 
fashion… 
 
Tolerance extended 
through rational 
argument. Artwork 
accepted through 
declaration.  
Cf. theory ⇒ theoria 
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completion are all present and correct.172 The question 
that the representative of the institution might wish to ask 
is: “is the practice to be beheld, or does it mean to ‘take 
hold of’?  Does it contain value, or does it evaluate?”  
What I am imagining is new kind of engagement here 
that consists of practitioner and institution in creating 
conditions within the scope of each one’s “failure” to 
resolve their roles — to dig out a place of habitation from 
the ruins as Bill Readings suggests: 
Does it describe 
or does it 
perform? 
 
 
 
 
 
Practice on a 
fictional stage 
— see p. 136 
 
(T)he present model is in its twilight, and I do 
not think we can continue to make 
redemptive claims for the role of the Uni-
versity of Culture, be that culture humanistic, 
scientific, or sociological. Rather than offering 
new pious dreams of salvation, a new unifying 
idea, or a new meaning for the University, I will 
call for an institutional pragmatism. This 
pragmatism recognizes that thought begins 
where we are and does away with alibis. By 
thinking without alibis, I mean ceasing to justify 
our practices in the name of an idea from 
"elsewhere," an idea that would release us  
Like the atomic bomb 
and the readymade, 
we cannot uninvent —
cannot restore a ruin. 
from responsibility for our immediate ac-
tions173. 
 
In this chapter I have tried to prepare the ground for a 
legitimate practice that is ostensibly an extension of 
Modernist art practice but extends interpretations 
towards a particularly interventionist set of acts.  These 
practices come from the acknowledgement of the 
readymade as a protean form whose only measure is 
that it exists within the autopoietic self-definition of art.  
                                            
172 Of course there may be other reasons for ‘failure’ besides the conditions given here.  The 
hypothetical situation given is to show possible consequences if these were the only conditions. 
 
173 Ibid., p.129 
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Examples of practice that derived from the readymade 
reappeared in the late 1950s and 1960s as a response 
to reductive tendencies of the American exegesis of 
Modernism.  However, much of what was considered as 
a break with norms of authorization and spectatorship 
could be seen as yet more reductionism through 
Minimalism to the “specific object” and then the 
“concept”.  What this led to was a form of 
connoisseurship where work was positioned, often 
ambivalently within or against the gallery.  However, the 
form of conceptual art expounded by Harrison and Art & 
Language was such that its “form” was critique itself and 
was thus more conducive to actions and teaching in that 
it opened up to critique the assumptions that 
characterized the beholder as part of the aggrandizing 
narrative of art.   The practice that I am expounding is 
therefore along these lines where “beholder” takes the 
form of representative of the Institution, or, a personified 
Institution.  The work to be entered is therefore 
positioned according to assumptions made about 
practice as discreet from research in such a way that 
those assumptions are themselves called into question.  
Whilst there has to be a discreet “originator” and 
“participant”, it will not be clear which aspect of the 
practice belongs to which — a situation that can not be 
resolved by either party.  This is the point.  It has to 
become negotiated critique where initiating practice is 
itself deferred for the sake of a mobile set of conditions. 
Greenbergian “flatness” — 
abstraction reduced to (non-
Greenbergian) Objecthood of the 
physical form. Nevertheless, part 
of that same logic is that 
extended into the non-material 
Of tolerance —— 
What are the parameters 
within particular 
institutions? 
Perhaps this is the 
implication intended 
here. 
 Cf. Terry Atkinson, Ken 
Hay and Leeds University 
students (Leeds 13) concept 
piece billed in the press as: 
“Con Artists’ Spanish Rip 
Off” (May 1998). This 
consisted of students 
acquiring funds for an 
exhibition in Spain which 
was then reported to have 
been spent on a holiday on 
the Costa del Sol with an 
empty exhibition space as a 
result. The students had in 
fact faked the Spanish 
holiday and had stayed on 
the east coast of Yorkshire. This institution that offers 
the PhD as a personified 
stereotypical institution. 
Are we not also 
privileging 
“speech” over 
“writing” say, in the 
viva voce? 
 
 The viva voce that elicits these 
comments after - words  
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  Thesis 
This is a work of Art 
Antithesis 
This is not a work of Art  
 
A phrase, even the most ordinary one, is 
constituted according to a set of rules (its 
regimen). There are a number of phrase 
regimens: reasoning, knowing, describing, 
recounting, questioning, showing, ordering, etc. 
Phrases from heterogeneous regimes cannot be 
translated from one into the other. They can be 
linked one onto the other in accordance with an 
end fixed by a genre of discourse. For example, 
dialogue links an ostentation (showing) or a 
definition (describing) onto a question; at stake in 
it is the two parties coming to an agreement 
about the sense of a referent. Genres of 
discourse supply rules for linking together 
heterogeneous phrases, rules that are proper for 
attaining certain goals: to know, to teach, to be 
just, to seduce, to justify, to evaluate, to rouse 
emotion, to oversee. . . . There is no “language” 
in general, except as the object of an Idea.174
 
The Language of the Institution of the University 
In chapters two and three references were made to Bill 
Readings’ book: The University in Ruins.175 Readings’ 
thesis is that the raison d’être of the modern University 
has radically shifted from its inception as a cultural 
inculcator to a self-referential role, having no appreciable 
requirement other than to deliver ‘excellence’. The 
University of Culture in the Humboldtian sense referred to 
                                            
174 Jean François Lyotard, (trans. Van Den Abbeele, Georges)  The Differend. Phrases in Dispute 
Minneapolis. The University of Minnesota Press (originally published as Le Différend [1983] Les 
Éditions de Minuit.)  1988.  p. xii 
175 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins Cambridge Mass. and London. Harvard University Press. 
(1996) 
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the values of the state and to the culture of a people. It 
was designed to effect Bildung — the forming of a wholly 
rounded character who would be able to participate in the 
continuation of those cultural values. Circumstances that 
led to the disaffection and disillusionment with such 
values culminated in the widespread protests within 
universities during 1968. Globalization, as opposed to the 
interests of particular cultural and social hegemonies, has 
meant that the language of institutions has had to reform 
in the interests of plurality and relativity. The Institution of 
the University is a case in point where the grounding of its 
ethos lies within its own authoritative capacity. The 
University may thus be seen as a self-referential 
institution and ‘excellence’ is its substitute for grounding 
in authenticity. This is made particularly manifest in the 
teaching and studying of art.  
Not only the artist but the 
institution is unable to 
establish authenticity 
 
The demise of avant-garde narratives has left the 
teaching studio in a state of relativism where the 
language of teaching art has become less specific to art 
as such but rather an extension of the language of the 
institution. In his paper entitled Fictions of the Studio176, 
Mike Belshaw explains the parallel conditions of vacuity 
of both “excellence” and the indexical nature of (post-
readymade) art. He draws upon Howard Singerman’s Art 
Subjects: Making Artists in the American University177 
which in turn derives its notion of indexicality from 
Rosalind Krauss (Notes on the Index)178. It is argued that 
the indexical sign is ‘empty’ in that it constantly requires 
assertions of its identity as art179. Whilst this may 
specifically refer to the readymade, I maintain that in the 
post-historical narratives of studio pedagogy and 
                                            
176 Mike Belshaw, Fictions of the Studio. Paper given at The Association of Art Historians’ 
Conference. 2008 (Unpublished) 
177 Howard Singerman, , Art Subjects, Making Artists in the American University, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles and London. University of California Press, 1999. 
178 Rosalind Krauss, “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America”. October  vol 3 (1977) 
179 Consider the mandatory labels beside artworks.  
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corresponding sites of display, indexicality is 
appropriately applied to art practice. The language that 
attempts to fill these empty spaces has necessarily 
become fictional, allegorizing dialogues between the 
author(ity) of the institution and the candidate for 
inclusion. The reference to authorship is one that 
Belshaw uses in relation to literary studies where there is 
a notion of ‘implied’ author. This is distinct from (and 
confused with) the identity of the one who has written the 
text. Under circumstances of fictional authorship there is 
no question of authenticity, sincerity or seriousness in the 
author according to the literary theorist Wayne Booth. 
The consequences for a dialogue of this nature within the 
context of the institution of art education are profound and 
initially pessimistic, as Belshaw states: 
As … the author has 
disappeared … 
 
…(T)he university, in order to function, must take 
the student’s account of his or her own work as 
candid, authentic and transparent — and we can 
recall here Booth’s doubts about the “sincere” and 
“serious” author. Some assumptions must 
underwrite the teacher’s record of a student’s 
progress. To put the same point in reverse, if the 
student is thought to be acting a role and treating 
the crit as the work itself, then the teacher has no 
credible institutional purchase on it. The language 
becomes opaque.180
As with all education – this 
is assumed – as is the role 
of the teacher!
 
However, it is only by understanding this lack of purchase 
that a self-conscious awareness of the dialogue with its 
tropes of declaration is revealed, as he goes on to say: 
 
What the fiction of the teaching studio can reveal 
is the nature of the narrative sketched out above. 
That is to say, when obscured, the procedures of 
                                            
180 Ibid., p.3 
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teaching are assumed to be natural, given as the 
inevitable order of things. But bringing them to 
light does not necessarily institute a different kind 
of pedagogy; rather it shows a given reality to be 
staged in a certain way. This would amount to a 
kind of institutional critique — a mode of 
intervention that has in the past almost 
exclusively belonged to the museum.181
 
Here there is a sense of unveiling; but what is unveiled is 
not the Fichtean “dialogue that is supposed to fuse the 
teachers and the students into a single corporate body”182 
but a fictional stage upon which ‘characters’ present 
allegories of roles satisfying the rules and conventions of 
the Institution. Readings describes how a dialogue of 
dissensus can continue within the emptiness of the ruin 
that was once grounded in authenticity and autonomy. 
Taking his cue from Lyotard’s The Differend he states: 
 
… What prevents a fusion between teachers and 
students and makes teaching interminable 
(structurally incomplete) is that the network of 
obligation extends to all four poles of the 
pragmatic, linguistic situation: the sender, the 
addressee, the referent and the signification. The 
referent of teaching, that to which it points, is the 
name of Thought. Let me stress that this is not a 
quasi-religious dedication. I say “name” and I 
capitalize “Thought” not in order to indicate a 
mystical transcendence but in order to avoid the 
confusion of the referent with any one 
signification. The name of Thought precisely is a 
name in that it has no intrinsic meaning. In this 
sense, it is like excellence.183 … 
                                            
181 Ibid., p. 4 
182 Readings (1996), op. cit. p.122 
183 Ibid., p.159 
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Although the above concerns appear to affect mainly 
undergraduate or possibly post-graduate levels in that 
terminology such as “teaching” seems appropriate, it 
should be recognized that this could be thought of as 
marginal in the case of art and design education. As 
Elkins would corroborate184:  
 
Of course the institution 
consists of persons who, 
whilst they occupy 
positions of authority also 
understand the problems 
associated with their 
institutional roles. 
 
First, we don’t know how we teach art, and so we 
cannot claim to teach it or to know what teaching 
might be like. This may sound odd …— … but it’s 
my experience that studio instruction teachers 
and students accept some informal version of it. 
 
The assertion is made to distance “teaching” from a 
traditionally held idea of the autonomy of the magister, as 
Readings describes it, and replace it with the dialogics of 
the rhetor. This relationship is more in keeping with the 
roles of supervisor and examiner, ostensibly occupying 
roles of “colleague”. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon 
them to address the candidate in the language of the 
institution. Whilst the persons who occupy these roles are 
possibly practitioners of fictional diegetics and are 
sympathetic to the value of these particular language 
games, they nevertheless, at some point have to assume 
that the candidate’s authenticity is inevitably a 
requirement. However, a mode of communication may 
arise that acknowledges the fiction in order to preserve 
the antagonist’s integrity. Lyotard cites Wittgenstein’s 
language games to emphasize the agonistic nature of 
communication: 
A conventional 
appearance 
The institution recognizes 
and assesses the 
unconventional 
submission
 
(E)very utterance should be thought of as a 
‘move’ in the game. 
                                            
184 James Elkins (2001), Why Art Cannot be Taught. A Handbook for Art Students. Urbana and 
Chicago. University of Illinois Press. p. 91  
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This last observation brings us to the first principle 
underlying our method as a whole: to speak is to 
fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall 
within the domain of general agonistics. This does 
not necessarily mean that one plays in order to 
win. A move can be made for sheer pleasure of its 
invention: what else is involved in the labour of 
language harassment undertaken by popular 
speech and by literature? Great joy is had in the 
endless invention of turns of phrase, of words and 
meanings, the process behind the evolution of 
language on the level of parole.185
See p. 112 
—the agonistics of the 
candidate and the institution 
 
I have argued in previous chapters that the significance of 
the enunciative paradigm in relation to declaring art to be 
art was the point of no return which superficially may lead 
to eschatological speculations as to art’s end. I have also 
argued for this position to become one that is most likely 
to succeed within parasitic (or, more acceptably 
symbiotic) situations that are site-specifically 
interrogatory. Thus the indexicality of such practice, 
which, like the ‘name of Thought’, has no intrinsic 
meaning other than to keep open the terms of its 
engagement. This is the Thesis that is herein described, 
and this is the thesis that describes what lies herein.  
 
Consensus and Dissensus: Assessing art practice as 
research within the post-historical university. 
 
It is sometimes mistakenly presumed that one may 
autonomously make judgements from a modernist (or 
pre-modernist) standpoint of work that engages with post-
modern situations such as those intimated at above (one 
could think of the inauthentic student’s response to a “crit” 
as the work). Whilst the term post-modern is here 
So, does this still assume the 
tutor/supervisor /examiner 
may also offer inauthentic 
responses or, is (s)he forced 
into such a role? 
                                            
185Jean François Lyotard (Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi), The Postmodern Condition: 
A Report on Knowledge.( History and Theory of Literature, Vol. 10. 1984 ) Manchester. Manchester 
University Press p.10 (originally published as La Condition Postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir [1979] 
by Les Éditions de Minuit.) 
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intended to imply a scission, such interventionist practice 
may be still interpreted as a continuation of avant-gardist 
narratives of dissent — be they formalist or pragmatic. 
Leaving the formalist argument to one side, it is more 
relevant to discuss pragmatic narratives that impinge both 
on art practice and its situation within education, 
particularly at the level of “academic research”. It is at this 
point that the aporia of consideration of each one’s claim 
to precedence becomes manifest. What is placed at the 
disposal of the University is subject to its regulations and 
would normally consist of a thesis and a product of 
practice; these representing the theory that underpins a 
manifestation that cannot “explain” itself. What may elicit 
alarm might not so much be that the practical 
manifestation cannot speak for itself but that the thesis, 
whilst conforming to the requirements for a successful 
PhD. also determines its own indeterminateness. This 
indeterminateness is like the Name of Thought in that it 
represents a horizon of possibility and is central to the 
idea of a dialogical justification of (doing justice to) its 
value. Readings’ proposition of the dialogue between 
institutional representative and student/candidate can be 
seen to substantiate the same implications. 
Pragmatics of making 
art… 
Pragmatics of education 
that makes some “thing” 
happen.
This University 
i.e. a stereotypical thesis
 
(W)hat is drawn out is the aporetic nature of this 
differend as to what the name of Thought might 
mean: the necessity and impossibility that it 
should be discussed, despite the absence of a 
univocal or common language in which that 
discussion could occur. Thought is, in this sense, 
an empty transcendence, not one that can be 
worshipped and believed in, but one that throws 
those who participate in pedagogy back into a 
reflection upon the ungroundedness of their 
situation: …186
Pragmatics of dialogue
… 
                                            
186 Readings (1996), op. cit. p.161 
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By drawing attention to the thesis as possible art work the 
thesis as theoretical grounding is “ungrounded”. As a 
comprehensive argument for its status with academic 
respectability, the thesis qua thesis relinquishes its “art” 
condition except insofar as it is in “Name”. 
It may be relevant at this point to examine what might be 
the nature of the content of a thesis declared as a work of 
art. In structural terms it becomes meta-content; and as 
such constructs an internal dynamic that in turn 
reciprocates the forces at work in the rhetoric of the 
academic thesis. In its simplest terms, it has to keep up 
with what is being said; it has to search again in order to 
connect with its alter-ego. The onus thus falls on the 
candidate to make the work look like a thesis and be a 
work of art; or conversely, look like a work of art and be a 
thesis. This latter denotation is most likely to satisfy 
academic requirements, yet it poses a strange condition of 
“looking like” something that relies on revelation as its 
modus operandi. There is perhaps, a suspicion of 
something disingenuous in the sleight of hand that would 
have been recognized by Plato in his objections to 
simulacra. How would one recognize something that “looks 
like” what it is? What is the “what it is” in these 
circumstances? In the case of the work of art looking like a 
thesis, surely this is a requirement for competence. In 
other words: can the candidate display his philosophical 
competence as an artist? 
What does a 
“Thesis” look like 
– considering 
the now 
acceptable 
variety of forms? 
∗look like a 
stereotypical thesis. 
Re‐cognized as a thesis 
–as a thesis “looks 
like” – that sets the 
visual against the 
verbal – a veritable 
straw man who 
nevertheless serves the 
purpose for this 
opposition 
Competence – i.e. 
a spin off – a 
supplement to the 
frame/re-frame of 
oscillating self-
description 
This issue is elaborated upon by Fiona Candlin when she 
writes: See Jacques Rancière: 
The Philosopher and His 
Poor (Trans. Andrea 
Parker) Durham, N.C. 
Duke University Press 
2004 for fuller discussion 
on competence and the 
right to engage across 
“disciplines”. 
 
Precisely because the demarcation between 
specialist areas is so closely tied to judgements 
of competence and the attribution of authority, it 
is unsurprising that people feel anxious when 
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Boundaries may move – 
forms of something 
other than the 
conventional thesis. But 
novel forms do not 
necessarily engage with 
the aporia of the two 
modes of seeing and 
reading.  
projects like practice-based PhDs cross 
boundaries. 187
But this stereotypical 
thesis displays the 
ambiguity – the 
irretrievable nature of 
two modes of 
reception –that 
bedevils reconciliation 
 
She goes on to add that, “Significantly, the practice based 
PhD has involved a shift in the institutional arbitration of 
competence”, and that it is, “a shift in the way that the art 
object is legitimated as such.”188 Legitimation in this 
sense is to do with the identification of the network 
through which practice operates, as she continues: 
 
It is not, therefore, the subjects or material that 
the practice-based PhD works with that 
potentially make it awkward, because art can 
unproblematically incorporate academic material 
(emphasis added), rather, the difficulty arises 
from the change in networks through which the 
artwork is recognised189. 
 
Candlin’s assertion is crucial to the methodology adopted 
by this thesis which is to declare hermeneutical 
description redundant — a point that has been missed in 
much practice-as-research literature190. However, in this 
particular instance, the network changes in which the 
artwork operates are the work’s ontological condition and 
as such are produced in order to present difficulty within 
the networks of the institution. Candlin’s illustration 
highlights this aporia: 
Isn’t all artwork 
subject to 
interpretation? 
i.e. the artist makes 
something in order to 
interpret its meaning as 
the theoretical basis. In 
this instance the two 
aspects are one, but, 
without a ground for 
distinction. 
 
If authority is linked to specifically located and 
defined areas then it is clear that someone who 
is differently situated, who employs different 
processes, norms and frames of judgement, will 
                                            
187 Fiona Candlin (2000), “A Proper Anxiety? Practice-based PhDs and academic unease” Working 
papers in art and design 1. http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol1candlin2html  
(accessed May 2008) p.2 
188 Ibid., p.3 
189Ibid., p.3 
190 I refer to commentators (Sullivan, Scrivener et al.) who regard the “practice” element as 
unproblematic ontologically and thus “see through” its apparent transparency towards subject matter, 
material and meaning — “what it is about”.   
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not have the same claim to authority (emphasis 
added). For example, I may know as much about 
law as a Queen’s Council but without institutional 
recognition will not be able to practice as such. 
An artist could potentially make the same 
statement as an academic, but like the legal 
statements uttered by a layman, without the 
recognised position of an academic, it would lack 
value and status as an academically legitimate 
pronouncement. This is not to say that the 
declarations artists make do not have any status, 
but that they are constituted differently and have 
force in different areas.191
 
Under the “baptismal” conditions of a work of art that is 
under discussion, it could be concluded that the “right” to 
call something a work of art strictly depends on the calling 
of an artist “an artist”, that is to say that (s)he has passed 
the test of the institution of art (anyone simply calling a 
chair a work of art lacks any wider significance and 
purchase). Here, then, is a two way test of competence: 
one which asks whether a non-professional’s judgement 
is appropriately applied; and another which questions the 
meaningfulness of judgement per se. Each competence 
question only stands in chance resolution within the 
institution that it is situated. Lyotard, writes in the 
“Preface: Reading Dossier” to The Differend:  
The thesis as a work of art 
The artist as 
an artist 
What does the 
institution require? 
How can one fulfil 
the requirements 
whilst evading the 
resolution? 
 
As distinguished from a litigation, a differend 
[differend] would be a case of conflict, between 
(at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably 
resolved for lack of a rule of judgement 
applicable to both arguments. One side’s 
legitimacy does not imply the other’s lack of 
legitimacy. However, applying a single rule of 
                                            
191 Ibid., p.3 
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judgement to both in order to settle their 
differend as though it were merely litigation 
would wrong (at least) one of them (and both of 
them if neither side admits this rule).192  … 
 
This is not a Thesis 
In his lengthy essay This is not a Pipe, Michel Foucault 
attempts several ways that the Magritte painting can be 
interpreted. In chapter two he describes the work as “The 
Unraveled (sic) Calligram”. Whilst the painting is 
ostensibly “an image” it is nevertheless “writing”, not 
merely containing writing. The demonstrative pronoun 
“This” constructs multi-layered edifices of senses such 
that:  
 
‘this’(the drawing, whose form you doubtless 
recognize …) ‘is not’ (is not substantially bound 
to. . ., is not constituted by. . . .does not cover the 
same material as. . . .) ‘a pipe’ (that is, this word 
from your language, made up of pronounceable 
sounds that translate the letters you are 
reading).193
 
 
 
 
 
But “This” can also be read as: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
192 Lyotard (1988), op. cit . p.xi 
193 Michel Foucault Trans. and Ed. J. Harkness, This is Not a Pipe. Berkeley and Los Angeles 
California. University of California Press. 1983  p.26 the illustrations are from the same pp. 26 - 28 
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‘This’ (the statement arranging itself beneath 
your eyes in a line of discontinuous elements, of 
which this is both the signifier and the first word) 
‘is not’ (could neither equal nor substitute for. . . , 
could not adequately represent . . .   ) ‘a pipe’ 
(one of the objects whose possible renderings 
can be seen above the text — interchangeable, 
anonymous, inaccessible to any name).194
 
 
 
 
 
 
The “calligraphic play” that is “hovering over the 
ensemble’s background” renders it as: 
 
‘This’ (this ensemble constituted by a written pipe 
and a drawn text) ‘is not’ (is incompatible with) ‘a 
pipe’ (this mixed element springing at once from 
discourse and the image, whose ambiguous 
being the verbal and visual play of the calligram 
wants to evoke).195 (Fig.38) 
 
The calligram’s shock effect is not so much to do with it 
being a “word-picture” but that the version “bursts apart” 
when one converts from seeing to reading and vice versa.  
Foucault eloquently describes the profundity of the effect 
when he concludes that the calligram, “aspires playfully to 
efface the oldest oppositions of our alphabetical 
civilization: to show and to name; to shape and to say; to 
reproduce and to articulate; to imitate and to signify; to 
 
                                            
194 Ibid., p.27 
195 Ibid., p.27 
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Fig.38  
 
Look and to read.”196 Later on in chapter three (Klee, 
Kandinsky, Magritte), Foucault reiterates the opposition 
when he says, “What is essential is that verbal signs and 
visual representations are never given at once. An order 
always hierarchizes them, running from figure to discourse 
or from discourse to the figure.”197 This appears to create a 
disturbance similar to that of the duck/rabbit in that the 
latter is a switch between imagery, whereas the calligram 
is a switch between hierarchies of representation. This 
thesis that is congruent with itself as artwork has become 
such a calligram. 
The visual and 
the verbal 
 
The thesis begins to 
describe itself in an uncanny 
series of analogies 
The thesis begins to 
describe itself in an 
uncanny series of 
The thesis begins to 
describe it el  in an 
uncanny series of 
analogies 
 
Monsters 
In chapter two (Art as Common Sense), Professor 
Timothy Emlyn Jones referred to the PhD as “monstrous”, 
and it is germane to consider this term in relation to the 
idea of work that de-monstrates (i.e. shows) and explains 
itself. Duchamp’s deixical gesture pointing at and 
declaring an object to be “art” is monstrous in this 
                                            
196 Ibid., p.21 
197 Ibid., p.33 
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  BODY TEXT 
etymological sense. The notion of the “embodiment” of 
knowledge in the practical outcome has more than a hint 
of Freud’s uncanny “living” cadavers. This thesis is 
equally entitled to be considered as a monster for each of 
these reasons, but also in another sense of its 
typographic form.  
 
It is not merely coincidental that the structure of a book 
makes reference to the human body. There is, of course, 
the “spine” of the book, but also descriptions of page 
layout and typographic text refer to what Ellen Lupton and 
J. Abbot Miller refer to as the “Body of the Book”.198Citing 
Derrida’s consideration of material speech, they state, 
“But what if one were to see writing as an extension of 
the body, no different in essence from an artificial limb or 
a contact lens?” They go on to add: 
G
LO
S
S
E
S
 G
LO
S
S
E
S
 
There is another way in which writing extends 
the body: it is a physical by-product, a material 
trace of human activity. Unlike speech, writing 
leaves behind a physical mark. As the end-
product of the so-called “thought process”, 
writing thus resembles excrement. It is also akin 
to hair, finger nails, and the surface of skin — 
each is a part of the body that is continually 
regenerated yet biologically dead, detachable, 
disposable. Writing is like blood, sweat, semen, 
saliva, and other substances that the body 
periodically produces and eliminates.199
 
They then proceed to define terms common to 
typographical and physiological usage that constitutes a 
“body”. First, there is the “head” defined as: 
 
FOOTER 
                                            
198 Ellen Lupton and J. Abbot Miller, Design Writing Research – Writing on Graphic Design New York. 
Kiosk, Princeton Architectural Press. 1996. p.50. 
199 Loc. cit. 
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1, The upper division of the body that contains the 
brain, mouth, and chief sense organs. 
2, A word or series of words, often distinguished 
typographically, placed at the beginning of a 
passage or at the top of a page in order to 
introduce or categorize. 
 
Then the “body” is included as: 
 
1, The organized physical substance of an 
animal or plant, whether living or dead. 
2, The dead organism: CORPSE. 
3, The trunk of a person or a tree, as distinct 
from its head, limbs, branches, or roots. 
4, The main part of a literary work: TEXT.200
 
They go on to describe how, figuratively speaking, the 
two aspects of the visceral and the textual relate: 
 
In the language of typography, we refer to the 
body of a work as its “main part”, its central, 
substantial core. When we refer to the “body” of a 
person, we invoke a division between inside and 
outside: body and soul, body and mind. Similarly, 
the typographic term “body” suggests division 
between inside and outside, between that which 
properly belongs to a text and the secondary 
limbs attached to it: glosses, footnotes, heads and 
subheads, figures and appendices. 
 
These last described accessories are parerga, that is, 
they are “around” rather than “contained” within the 
“work” (frames, being a prime example of this). But, as 
Derrida explains, “A parergon comes against, beside, and 
in addition to the ergon, the work done [fait], the fact [le 
                                            
200 Ibid., p.51. 
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fait], the work, but it does not fall to one side, it touches 
and cooperates within the operation, from a certain 
outside. Neither simply outside nor simply inside.”201
Lupton and Abbot Miller continue: 
 
One of the Graphic designer’s tasks is to 
articulate visually the differences between these 
secondary elements and the “body” of the text. 
But do such limbs remain safely “outside” the 
text? Instead we could see these seemingly 
detachable, external parts as internal organs, 
life-support systems fundamental to the shape of 
meaning. As an extension of the text, an element 
such as a gloss, footnote, figure, or appendix is 
an integral part of the body, opening up the skin 
of the text, turning it inside out. 
V
o
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Glosses are particularly important to this thesis in that 
they incorporate many voices other than those of the 
author, and may, by definition, contain “a false and often 
wilfully misleading interpretation”. They include the 
author’s own commentary as well as notes taken during 
discussion with supervisors and at yearly reviews 
showing a consistency in the project that is the PhD by 
practice. All of these voices, and more, are “embodied” in 
the text. Lupton and Abbot Miller sum this up when they 
add: 
 
Whereas the “body” of a text is typically assigned 
to a single author, notes, glosses, figures, and 
appendices are organs for importing material 
from the outside, for exchanging discourse with 
other documents. Such organs nourish, 
impregnate, and sometimes deface, infect, the 
internal body.  
                                            
201 Jacques Derrida (trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod), The Truth in Painting. London, 
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 1987. p.54.  
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The rhetoric of typography ensures a double encounter 
with the physical page with its thread of linear sense and 
counterpoint of voice made noticeable by the use of fonts 
and spacing. A parallel motion of forward movement in 
the body text with that of interruption or expansion 
enables and at the same time frustrates a single cohesive 
formula. The language of the institution and the language 
of the artwork that seeks to parasitize institutional 
language run side by side. The work is at once authentic 
and ironic, dealing with a fiction and its theoretical 
underpinning. It tells the truth, and fictionalizes it! 
However, no amount of self-confession is going to make 
Epimenides of Knossos a trustworthy companion— even 
when he is being sincere202. The thesis as antithesis has 
entrapped itself so that it is unable to extricate itself from 
its own paradox. 
 
 
  
 ? 
 
 
 
 ?
 
And self-description Structure of The Book 
Double-bind 
The thesis is constructed symmetrically such that the 
introduction mirrors the conclusion, chapter one (Studio) 
mirrors chapter four (Thesis) as both manifestations of a 
studio and a thesis are in keeping with the duality 
described in each form. The inner chapters (two: Art as 
Common Sense: Canny Ideologies, and three: Art as 
Autopoietic Research: Canny Methodologies) engage 
with the philosophical underpinning of this particular 
approach and examine a substantial amount of current 
literature on the subject of the doctorate in fine art 
practice. The narrative that carries the argument runs 
linearly through the centre of each page where 
occasional significant illustrations are sometimes placed. 
The left and right-hand columns are spaces for marginal 
questions and critique and are often synonymous with the 
“voice” of the institution, sometimes transcribed from 
                                            
202 This refers to the “liar” paradox. If the Cretan Epimenides says all Cretans are liars, he is both 
telling the truth and lying at the same time. 
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actual discussion and written criticism of the thesis as it 
has progressed and been tested by supervisors and 
others. Sometimes a column holds yet another voice 
“external” to the main thesis that adds commentary and 
responds to the voice(s) in the opposite column. Thus, 
there is a hierarchical structure imposed that 
typographically prejudices certain aspects of the text. 
However, there is scope to read across the page and 
down-up where footnotes are brought into the text. Here, 
then, is the Thesis as thesis speaking of itself and 
including elements of its own making (becoming what it 
is). This is a continuing process that potentially has no 
ultimate resolution — except for the one negotiated 
between the institution and myself.  Lastly, there is the 
“look” of the text/image/page/book as a whole (Fig 39).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
          Fig 39 
Interment of the body of the text  
When Marcel Broodthaers signalled the moment that he 
was to become a “visual” artist, he did so by encasing the 
remaindered copies of his literary oeuvre in plaster of 
Paris, adding a rubber ball and entitling the result as 
Pense-Bête (Fig.40) — idiomatically translatable as “a 
 150
Rob Ward: The Hunting of the Duckrabbit: In Pursuit of an Aesthetics of Knowledge. 
  
reminder” the verbal equivalent of a knot in a 
handkerchief.203
 
 
 
 
Fig.40 
 
 “Stupid, like a painter” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By trapping the books of poems in this way, he 
transformed literary texts into three-dimensional 
“sculpture. Embedding one kind of communication in 
another that cancels out the original was a strategy often 
used by Broodthaers, as in his overworking of Mallarmé’s 
Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hasard –POÈME. (In 
Broodthaers’ version the title changes to Un coup de dés 
jamais n’abolira le hasard –IMAGE.) (Fig.41) 
                            
          
 
 
Fig.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
203 In her doctoral thesis Marcel Broodthaers: Strategy and Dialogue, (PhD Thesis, Trinity College, 
University of Oxford 1998) Deborah Schultz says, “In 1963 Broodthaers published his second volume 
of bestiaries which he titled Pense-Bête. Once again there is more than one meaning to this phrase. 
Pense-Bête is used to mean a ‘memory aide’, like tying a knot in a handkerchief or a string around a 
finger. However, it translates literally as ‘Think Beast’ or ‘Think Stupid’. Considering the nature of the 
contents of the book, Broodthaers seems to have intended that the literal meaning should apply.” (pp. 
22-23) 
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This strategy of concealment is a leitmotif that may be found throughout this PhD practice including, Exhibition, 
Artist’s Studio, No Entry, Malevich Archive, Mumbo and 
Jumbo, and the Thesis itself — hidden under the cover of 
a thesis. Although the regulations pertaining to a 
successful submission of a PhD dictate that the work 
must be examined internally and externally and that 
copies are to be deposited for future reference, there is 
an inevitability — symbolically at least — that the body of 
the work should be impossible to extricate, to be literally a 
“double-bind”. 
 
The “Double” 
The coffined work necessarily has a “double” — in fact 
three identical siblings (three exam copies to be 
submitted according to university regulations.) However, 
the term “identical” should be received with caution. The 
whole concept of identity (identicalness) is fraught with 
difficulty. One could speak of the different substances 
used to make up the material consistency of paper, ink, 
board etc. of each printed thesis, but this would be 
description merely on the level of identical substantive 
physical properties and would reveal an obvious lack of 
identicalness. What is less clear and more difficult to 
distinguish is: if all the words, all the syntax, all the 
grammatical constructions, all the punctuation and all the 
illustrations and typographical arrangements were the 
same in each “copy”, would they be identical? After all, 
this is exactly the requirement of “copies to be submitted”. 
How is the identity of a “thing” to be assigned? Saul 
Kripke has this to say about objects:204
? 
 
What I do deny is that a particular is nothing but a 
“bundle of qualities”, whatever that may mean. If a 
quality is an abstract object, a bundle of qualities 
                                            
204 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Malden (USA), Blackwell Publishing 1981. p.52 
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is an object of an even higher degree of 
abstraction, not a particular. Philosophers have 
come to the opposite view through a false 
dilemma: they have asked, are these objects 
behind the bundle of qualities, or is the object 
nothing but the bundle? Neither is the case; this 
table is wooden, brown, in the room, etc. It has all 
these properties and is not a thing without 
properties, behind them; but it should not 
therefore be identified with the set, or “bundle”, of 
its properties, nor with the subset of its essential 
properties. 
 
Identity in this sense, as a form of modal logic, is 
concerned with “all possible worlds” scenarios such that if 
something exists in our “world”, what conditions would 
make it “the same thing” under different world scenarios? 
Kripke adds: 
 
Some properties of an object may be essential to it, in 
that it could not have failed to have them. But these 
properties are not used to identify the object in another 
possible world, for such an identification is not needed. 
Nor need the essential properties of an object be the 
properties used to identify it in the actual world, if 
indeed it is identified in the actual world by means of 
properties.205
 
Of course the “copies” are in the same world as each 
other and “stand for” an “original” which, however, copies 
itself every time the word processor “saves” the 
document. The implication of Kripke’s argument that is 
counter intuitive is that description is not how we can be 
assured that we identify things. Contra Kripke, this way of 
thinking might argue that two things are identical if they 
The uncanny “double” 
                                            
205 Ibid., p.53 
 153
Rob Ward: The Hunting of the Duckrabbit: In Pursuit of an Aesthetics of Knowledge. 
  
are each described in the same way. “In the same way” 
would then have to mean using exactly the same words, 
in the same order. But even this wouldn’t solve the 
problem of two extremely similar, but “not quite the same” 
objects as there would be a slippage in the meaning of 
the words used to describe one or the other object. The 
question that is pertinent to the assessment of this thesis 
is, “Are the ‘copies’ of the thesis submitted for the 
attainment of the PhD identical — and therefore, truly 
copies?” 
 
In 1973 Marcel Broodthaers published a book version of 
A Voyage on the North Sea.206 The format of the work 
was odd in many ways. The content consisted of images 
— mostly in colour, some in black and white — of a 
nineteenth century amateur painting of a sailing fishing 
boat photographed in various degrees of close-up. These 
were interspersed with black and white photographs of a 
modern day sailing boat. The second oddity is that the 
pages of the book are joined in pairs which Deborah 
Schultz highlights as a probable reference to Mallarmé: 
 
In this text Broodthaers was evidently making 
reference to Mallarmé’s “Le Livre, instrument 
spiritual” (The Book: A Spiritual Instrument 
[1885]), in which Mallarmé wrote about the then 
common practice of publishing a book with the 
pages uncut. For Mallarmé this implied “an 
almost religious significance” — the folded 
pages, pure and uncut, containing the “mystery” 
of the book.207
 
                                            
206 Marcel Broodthaers, A Voyage on the North Sea London, Petersburg Press, 1973. Also published 
in France and Germany. There was also a film and a diapositive slide “version” of the same name 
that used the same material as found in the book.  
207 Deborah Schultz, op. cit. p.191. The quotations in Schultz’s thesis are from Stéphane Mallarmé, 
“Le Livre, instrument spiritual” in Quant au Livre (As for the Book), (1895) trans. Caws (ed), Stéphane 
Mallarmé Selected Poetry and Prose, pp. 81-82: “un indice quasi religieux.” 
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The third puzzle concerning this book is to do with the 
only written content (see below). Inside the front cover is 
a written warning not to cut the pages. Inside the back 
cover is an almost identical, almost symmetrical version 
of the front cover. The text in the back end-paper varies 
from the front version in its admonition to: 
 
…fling away that weapon, that dagger, which, 
swift as a miracle, might turn into a piece of 
office equipment.208   
The uncanny similarity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig 42 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.43 
 
 
 
 
                                            
208 Broodthaers, Op. cit. 
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Given Broodthaers’ fascination with children’s books 
(instructional books, ABCs etc.), it is reasonable to 
suggest that these end-papers were in some way 
influenced by picture books that have similar 
beginnings and ends — where  the same picture is 
repeated, or, where it is a puzzle of the “spot the 
difference” kind. Hector Obalk, writing about 
Duchamp’s obsession with the transformation of an 
object’s ontological status when it becomes a 
readymade writes: 
The structure 
of the Book 
The thesis as 
readymade 
 
And it is true that the very, very old philosophical 
questions about identity versus similarity, or about 
the existence of concepts versus the true 
singularity of individuals, must have been 
completely removed by the Industrial Age. 
Examples are very important in philosophy and 
the examples that the greatest philosophers — 
Duns Scotus, Plato, Occam, Hobbes, whoever — 
had in mind to discuss these matters could be 
faces, tables, pebbles or flowers. But all these 
objects, so similar, so similar could they be, 
remain very different to the naked eye.209  
 
The Thesis, then, will be submitted in the required 
number of copies. But, in order for this thesis to 
retain its adversarial stance vis-à-vis the institution 
one could imagine that a game, a puzzle, might 
similarly be inserted into it, that only by careful 
scrutiny of all “copies” could it be discovered. The 
mere suggestion of such a strategy might well be 
enough to cause suspicion — of the thesis as an 
artwork. 
                                            
209Hector Obalk, “The Unfindable Readymade” part of a lecture given at the Conference of the 
College Art Association Boston Mass. February 21-24 1996 in Tout-Fait The Marcel Duchamp 
Studies Online Journal vol.1 issue 2 May 2000. p.9 
http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_2/Artiles/obalk.html (accessed August 2009) 
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Fig.44 
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Illustrations 
 
Fig.37 Rob Ward, Charcoal drawing on canvas from installation: Exhibition, Artist’s 
Studio, No Entry.102 x 81.5cm. LUSAD 2005 
 
Fig.38 Plate 7 from Foucault’s book This is not a Pipe showing 
Apollinaire’s calligramatic poem, Fumées 
 
Fig.39 Rob Ward, Blocked out text with footnotes. Word 
processed sheets A4. 
 
Fig.40 Marcel Broodthaers, Le Pense-Bête. Books, plaster and rubber ball 98 x 84 
x 43cm,. Collection Anne-Marie and Stéphane Rena 
 
Fig.41 Marcel Broodthaers, Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hazard. IMAGE 
MOMA 12 13/16 x 9 
 
Fig.42 Marcel Broodthaers, A Voyage on the North Sea 1973, 
Petersburg Press. Inside of front cover. 
 
Fig.43 Inside of back cover 
 
Fig.44 Rob Ward, Calligram of “Entire” Thesis. 
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Minus one   Conclusions 
 
Duchamp’s Legacy 
The well-known photograph taken by Alfred Stieglitz 
of Duchamp’s Fountain (Fig.45) that was published in 
volume 2 of The Blind Man (1917) shows the 
notorious urinal on top of a plinth against a 
background of vaguely patterned shapes that may be 
a curtain, or as we now know, a painting entitled The 
Warriors (1913) by Marsden Hartley. Tied 
unceremoniously to the left attachment lug (the urinal 
is turned on its back) of the porcelain object is the 
entry ticket to the Independents’ exhibition from which 
it was refused.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
Fig. 45        Fig 46 
 
In chapter one, Studio, the actual studio represented a 
“thought experiment” offering up a repertoire of 
possible consequences. It would be interesting to 
conclude with a similar interrogation of the Duchamp 
through the Stieglitz photograph in order to 
demonstrate the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the 
language associated with the “frame”; with the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the language of the 
“readymade”. 
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As mentioned before, Fountain is regarded as a 
readymade — that is, it is an artwork legitimated by 
the fact that it is in an “art” context. If so, then the 
plinth (as metonymic form of the gallery/art institution) 
represents such a context. However, the “plinth” as 
object could equally be seen to be readymade, 
bearing in mind that it is an object used for the 
purpose of presenting artworks. Therefore, Fountain 
and Plinth become a readymade (not readymades). If 
Bicycle Wheel of 1913 (Fig.46) is seen to consist of 
two parts — bicycle part and stool part — is there a 
possibility for Duchamp to declare one of those parts 
“art” and one “not art”? In this context, can there even 
be a discussion of “parts”? Is there such a thing as a 
semi-readymade?210 Duchamp regards such an entity 
as being so liminal as in the instance of With Hidden 
Noise (Fig.47):  
 
 
Fig.47
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Make a readymade with a box containing 
something unrecognizable by its sound and 
solder the box already done in the semi 
readymade of copper plates and ball of 
twine.211
 
                                            
210 Of course such constructions are termed assisted readymades in that they have required some 
form of construction — however, the whole is to be regarded as an art object. The same applies to 
the inverse-readymade, for example using an “authentic” artwork (e.g. a Rembrandt) outside of an 
“art” context (e.g. as an ironing board).  
211Hector Obalk, “The Unfindable Readymade” part of a lecture given at the Conference of the 
College Art Association Boston Mass. February 21-24 1996 in Tout-Fait The Marcel Duchamp 
Studies Online Journal vol.1 issue 2 May 2000. p.6 
http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_2/Artiles/obalk.html (accessed August 2009) 
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The semi-readymade is the actual object and the 
“other half-readymade” is the statement of its coming 
into being, as Hector Obalk says: 
  
You will notice that he calls a readymade the 
object which wouldn’t be recognizable by its 
sound. But he calls semi readymade the real 
object which could give a body to such a 
project. In other words: when you make known 
that you make a readymade, you make a 
semi-readymade — there is no other way. In 
both projects, the work is not a readymade, it 
is a handwritten note here, it is a “not 
readymade” sculpture there.212
 
All of these declarations of legitimacy depend upon 
the framework imposed, and the framework as such 
depends on the legitimacy of the work as artwork. 
Take for instance, the entry ticket attached to the 
urinal. Could this also be included as readymade? If  
any of the many “replica” Fountains in art galleries 
had replica entry tickets attached, would this imply 
ready-madeness, or, would such an item merely 
consign the object to the status of a “document of its 
time” befitting a museum rather than a place of artistic 
exhibition? If the logic of the readymade means that 
the plinth and the ticket are also included as 
readymade, they can also be seen as supporting 
material, outside of but integral to Fountain. They are 
its “frames”, but a reversal of the situation would be 
caused by seeing the “artwork” called Fountain 
framing the readymade objects called “plinth” and 
“entry ticket”. Also, in the Stieglitz photograph, the 
background pattern gives location, however vague — 
it is in a place and a time. Here is another parergon! 
— or, the photograph itself can be such a frame, as 
                                            
212 Loc. cit 
 162
Rob Ward: The Hunting of the Duckrabbit: In Pursuit of an Aesthetics of Knowledge. 
can the image in the issue of The Blind Man, or 
indeed, in the computer printout from an internet 
source that has found its way into this thesis. The 
more the proliferation of images of Fountain, the more 
it seems to become the frame for all that proceeds 
from it. 
 
This thesis that is offered as the practice element of 
the PhD by part practice shows and makes a case for 
a readymade that is framed by the institutional context 
of the PhD and frames the “content” which is the 
framing of the object “Thesis” as readymade. As 
recognizable theoretical argument it makes its case 
for legitimacy. It alleges certain conditions that apply 
to itself and awaits legislation on its viability213. 
However, given the consequences of the Duchampian 
thought experiment (which is ultimately what 
Duchamp is about) it is not a simple case of an 
“original” frame. In one sense there is no “opening”, 
only a tacit agreement on a point of entry. This is 
highlighted in the Preface to this thesis, and similarly, 
the implication is that there is no conclusion as 
conclusion. The conclusion that is reiterated can only 
be re-reiterated as the context falls into place offering 
novel perspectives on what is ostensibly the same 
issue.   
 
The chapter entitled Studio proposed a situation that 
was irresolvable in terms of how it should be “seen” — 
as a “real, working, artist’s studio”, or, as an art work 
called Studio. Of course, the “artist” himself could be 
no nearer to deciding the correct solution to the issue 
as he was both actor acting the part of an artist and 
being an artist making the installation in the form of a 
studio. The installation “framed” the idea of a studio, 
                                            
213 The etymology of the word “Legal” has derivatives “allege”, “alloy”, “colleague”, “college”, “legacy”, 
“legislator”, and “legitimate” as well as “relegate” — literally to consign to exile! (Walter Skeat, The 
Concise Dictionary of English Etymology. Wordsworth Editions, War, Herts. 1993. 
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which in turn “framed” an installation based on an 
artist’s studio. Reliant to a great extent upon visual 
codes, there appeared to be close affinities with the 
bistable figures in optical illusions such as the 
duckrabbit.  
 
In Chapter Two, references were made to art 
practices that appeared to be relevant to research. 
The problem that arose from any of the wide ranging 
approaches was the one concerning the embodiment 
of knowledge. Two approaches seemed to offer 
possibilities. These were where the art practice 
“explained” itself — or, came close to doing so. The 
banality of the outcomes would in these instances 
eclipse the art object completely, making it virtually 
irrelevant to the written aspect. The second approach 
would valorise the art object, whose “outcome” would 
in some way become analogous with a scientific 
experiment — that is, it would be the demonstration or 
“proof” of a hypothesis. Again, the problem that 
returns is the one which attempts to extricate words 
from things, if words are to be the necessary medium 
of the kind of knowledge acceptable to the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council or the Research 
Assessment Exercise. In order to circumvent the 
problem, supporters of this approach resort to 
redefinition of knowledge using alternative terms for 
what is supposed to stand in its place, of which 
“apprehension” is the most apposite. Chapter two 
explains how both of these approaches, that start from 
a rational basis are doomed by either the 
“disappearance” of the subject (i.e. the art-work), or 
the merging of knowledge with “apprehension”. What 
had been ostensibly a rational way forward  argued 
itself into the uncanny realms of tropes whose 
figurative language was in this sense most apt.  
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In chapter three the idea of an uncanny approach is 
explored through the notion of autopoiesis — the self-
defining, self-reflexive quality of the closed system of 
the “institution of art” in all of its forms but especially 
art education in the university. This particular choice 
was made for the obvious reason that this thesis is 
itself subject to the pedagogical and bureaucratic 
logistics of the system as it is manifested in the UK. 
Within this chapter the tropes encountered in the 
previous one are exposed and given serious 
consideration as a way forward in the case for 
embodying knowledge within art practice. These two 
chapters frame each other in that each necessarily 
has to refer to the other if a (deferred) resolution is to 
be extracted for the purposes of justifying the thesis 
being submitted.  
 
Chapter four is titled “Thesis” in order to demonstrate 
the work as a whole as a self-reflexive enterprise. 
Taking Lyotard’s Differend as a starting point, it 
begins with a discussion of how language is used 
through two opposing networks. This can be 
summarized by thinking of the thesis as research, or, 
as an art-work. As research, the language has to 
focus on authenticity to intention; it has to be seen to 
be logical, rational and ingenuous. As artwork, these 
qualities need not be the same, so that taking an 
extreme case, the language adopted can become 
ironic, playful and even disingenuous. However, as 
before, figures of speech, tropes such as metaphor 
invade even the most austere sentences making the 
“thread of logic” more vulnerable to charges of 
misunderstanding. Similarly, “irony” needs a sense of 
the authentic in order to gain purchase. In these 
circumstances knowledge becomes playful and art 
has an urgency to follow up intentions. Language 
used within and for the PhD must necessarily be used 
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legitimately so that legitimacy itself is the main issue 
when the two modes of representation become mixed. 
The effect is of a fictional scenario where each 
representative is acting his or her part. The “law” (the 
university’s; the AHRC’s; the institution’s regulations) 
that makes the judgement on the work is itself a self-
contained, self-regulating autopoietic system whose 
basis is equally a fictional space self-defined by 
consensus. By revealing its own mechanisms, this 
chapter exposes its paradoxical nature and makes a 
connection with the first chapter, but in this instance 
the ambiguity is less reliant on seeing things in two 
opposing ways, but in encountering an art object as 
seeing and as reading.  It is calligrammatic.  
 
The chapter ends with an explanation of how the 
visual layout of the text is important both in terms of 
supplemental marginal glosses that haunt the text with 
voices other than the author’s, and the allusion to 
terms previously encountered such as “embodiment”. 
The structure of the thesis is thus laid open at the end, 
inviting it to be read (differently) for a second time.  
 
Identity and similarity are germane issues, and it is no 
coincidence that the readymade is invoked as the 
initiator of this project, a point that Duchamp makes in 
the following note: 
 
Sameness 
Similarity 
The same (mass prod.) 
practical approximation of 
similarity 
—— 
In time the same object is not 
the same after a 1 second  
interval — 
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What Relations with the identity 
principle?214  
 
“The” thesis has a single identity if the knowledge, 
understanding and semantics of the arguments are 
taken as fixed in spite of making “copies”: as a thesis, 
copies are still a thesis. The thesis as a “work of art in 
the age of mechanical reproduction” is subject more to 
a metaphysical interrogation.  
 
Two Paths 
As the PhD by part practice proliferates in academia, 
the arguments about how art practice can be 
equivalent to “knowledge” in the traditional academic 
sense will continue. There are likely to be two main 
approaches to the question. Firstly, there will continue 
to be those who are ostensibly “artists” of a 
particularly academic bent, who regard their work as 
having something more, or other than retinal 
significance. They will continue to produce “artwork” 
but consider the challenge of a PhD as a necessary 
adjunct to an already theoretical practice. Secondly, 
there will be thinkers who use a form of art practice as 
a way of expanding ideas. Duchamp, Magritte and 
Broodthaers are the examples that necessarily spring 
to mind as precedents for this approach. This thesis is 
intended to show how such an approach can be 
achieved on the back of a PhD. It is unlike other 
practice based doctorates in that it does not assume 
practice to already exist so that it can be theorized, 
but invents it as it explains itself. By doing so, it opens 
up a myriad of possibilities for extension by those who 
would wish to follow such a path in the future.  
Does this really affect the 
situations that have been 
described? 
Whilst innovative formats of 
“research” and “practice” 
obtain and are constantly 
developing in institutions, are 
not the problems set out by 
this thesis continued under a 
different guise? 
Whether the format for the 
research is verbal, visual, 
electronically processed, 
hypertext or non-material, 
there are the opportunities to 
promote a “practice” or to 
deconstruct practice as such. 
The latter would constitute a 
Reductio ad absurdum. 
The variable models of 
'art practice-based' PhD 
research that exist, even 
within the UK system are 
not always adequately 
taken into account, and 
the “two paths” for artists 
pursuing PhDs identified 
in the conclusion (p.167) 
are inadequate as a 
summary of either the 
currently available 
approaches or the 
motivations of PhD-
seeking practitioners. In 
this context the project 
may not be “unorthodox” 
and “paradoxical” to the 
extent that the thesis 
wants to claim. 
 
 (From Notes for Final Joint 
Report on Thesis and Oral 
Examination 2nd September 
2010) 
 
Blanked out text that could have 
been a conclusive flourish — a 
serpentine, undulating underline 
However, in reality, such things 
do not exist. 
 
 
 
                                            
214 Note 7 from Paul Matisse, Marcel Duchamp: Notes, 1980 in Hector Obalk, “The Unfindable 
Readymade”, tout-fait, The Marcel Duchamp Studies Online Journal. vol 1 issue 2 May 2000.  
http://www.toutfait.com.issues/issue_2/Articles/obalk.html  (accessed September 2009) 
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I don’t believe in film, nor do I believe in any 
other art. I don’t believe in the unique artist or 
in the unique work of art. I believe in 
phenomena, and in men who put ideas together. 
215
 
Illustrations 
 
Fig.45 Marcel Duchamp, Fountain Published in Blind Man, no. 2 (May 1917) 
Gelatin silver print; 11 x 17.9 cm © 1998 Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York; 
ADAGP, Paris; Estate of Marcel Duchamp 
 
Fig. 46 Marcel Duchamp, Bicycle Wheel. New York 1951 (third version, after lost 
original of 1913). Metal wheel mounted on painted wood stool,129.5 x 63.5 x 41.9 
cm). The Sidney and Harriet Janis Collection. 
 
Fig.47 Marcel Duchamp, With Hidden Noise. 1916. Readymade: Ball of string 
between two brass plates held together by four screws. 12.9 x 13 x 11.4 cm. The 
Philadelphia Museum of Art, Philadelphi
 
215 Interview de Marcel Broodthaers (Jan. 30 1968) reprinted in Benjamin H.D. Buchloh (ed.) October 
No 42. Cambridge, MIT Press 1987 p. 38 
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